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Abstract 
As social media has become ubiquitous, power over news media agenda setting, traditionally 
reserved by elites, has become less secure. Current research shows how elite actors enact 
strategies of message control in an attempt to retain this power. This thesis examines the impact 
of online media on the news media agenda-setting process during the 2015 United Kingdom 
general election. The original contribution to knowledge offered by my research is the 
conceptualisation of authenticity of communication on social media within this process and how 
this relates to role of commodification of citizen-users’ content in the process of setting the news 
media agenda.  
I argue that this process elite actors to harness the network power that exists in online 
social networks. I find that successfully using network power, in conjunction with established 
inter-elite power relationships, leads to greater success in news media agenda setting process. In 
order to become part of networked relationships, the actor must appear authentic to other users 
by meeting required communication standards. I further find that being perceived as inauthentic 
on social media makes explicit the commodification of citizens’ content and actions. This results 
in the subversion or challenging of elite agendas on social media.  
I analyse two case studies of cross-media content production and dissemination; (1) the 
first leaders’ debate of the campaign on 2 April 2015; and (2) the report of a leaked memo on 3 
April 2015. I also evaluate power relationships between political and media elites, and their 
perception of audiences online, using two case studies; (3) BBC Radio 4’s Today programme; 
and (4) ITV News’ Election 2015 results programme. The news media agenda setting process in 
2015 was marked by a continuation in traditional power structures between elites, but the most 
successful actors were also able to use network power and to avoid commodification through 
authentically-perceived actions. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Agenda-setting is the way in which actors are able to place items on the media agenda in order to 
influence the public agenda. It is a well-explored area of political communication (McCombs and 
Shaw, 1972; McCombs, 1997, 2004; Lee, Lancendorfer & Lee, 2005, Tran, 2014). However, the 
established process, and power relationships within it, face challenges from the affordances of 
new information communication technologies (ICTs). This is concerning for those political and 
media actors who have traditionally controlled the agenda. Many empirical studies have focused 
on the impact of the internet on agenda setting, arguing either that it strengthens (Lee, 2007; 
Russell, Hendricks, Choi & Stephens, 2015) or weakens the agenda-setting process (Schoenbach, 
de Waal, and Lauf, 2005). I argue that the pre-existing news media agenda-setting process has 
changed so that it is more difficult for elites to control1. This is not a normatively ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
thing, but requires further examination to understand how the process of setting the news media 
agenda now functions, what constitutes the roles of politicians and journalists, and how power 
relationships operate between them. 
A recent advancement in agenda-setting research has been the development of a third-level 
of agenda setting, or network-agenda setting (NAS). McCombs (2014: 17-18) writes that: 
 
With the vast expansion of communication channels in recent decades, particularly the 
continuing proliferation of internet sites and personalized social media, we have entered 
a new era of agenda-setting research that is seeking answers to three key research 
questions.  
 
These research questions are: (1) Do internet channels of communication have agenda-setting 
effects among the public?; (2) Has this proliferation of new channels diminished the agenda-
setting impact of the legacy media?; and (3) To what extent are there specific channel effects vs. 
the collective impact of a communication gestalt? The research agenda of this area of enquiry is 
                                                          
1 “Control” refers to the ability of politicians or journalists to set the news media agenda by directing 
messages on news media platforms, and achieved partly through harnessing network power or directing 
citizen-users’ content or action on social networking sites. 
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therefore progressing from theorising the first-level of agenda-setting, focussing on hierarchical 
object salience2, and the second-level which analyses hierarchical attribute salience3. The third-
level of agenda-setting allows us to understand how a network of objects and attributes transfer 
from the media agenda to the public agenda. Figure 1.1 shows the first- and second- levels of 
agenda-setting. Figure 1.2 shows the third-level of agenda-setting. This is an important 
development, but it does not look at the starting point of this process – what actions are taken to 
try to set the news media agenda, and by whom?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: McCombs (2014: 41) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Guo (2016, 6) 
Around half of agenda-setting studies, including the seminal Chapel Hill study 
(McCombs and Shaw, 1972), focus on election campaigns (Tran, 2014). The impacts of ICTs are 
                                                          
2 By object salience I refer to the importance of topics and issues as they are ranked on the media agenda 
or public agenda. 
3 By attribute salience I refer to the importance of characteristics or traits pertaining to objects as they are 
ranked on the media or public agenda. 
MEDIA AGENDA PUBLIC AGENDA 
Transfer of salience 
Objects Salience of objects 
First-level effects: Traditional agenda-setting 
Attributes Salience of attributes 
Second-level effects: Attribute agenda-setting 
Figure 1.1. The first- and second-levels of agenda-setting 
MEDIA AGENDA PUBLIC AGENDA 
Object a 
Attribute a1 
Attribute a2 
Object b 
Attribute b1 
Object a 
Attribute a1 
Attribute a2 
Object b 
Attribute b1 
Figure 1.2. The third-level of agenda-setting, the Network Agenda-Setting Model 
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particularly evident during an election campaign, when the competition to lead the day’s news 
stories enters an intense, rapid cycle in which many more actors become involved. Some of the 
uncertainties for political and media elites seeking to promote their agendas in an election 
campaign period include: how to reach fragmented audiences; how to use newer media tools to 
achieve traditional campaigning goals such as fundraising; how to control the dissemination of a 
message; and, pertinently, how to ensure that a certain message or narrative sets the day’s 
campaign agenda.  
This dissertation takes a different standpoint from studies which focus only on the impact 
of one medium or a comparison of two media platforms or organisations. Such an approach 
creates dichotomies between media platforms which are, in actuality, interdependent. This 
dissertation uses original empirical evidence to understand the process of contemporary news 
media agenda-setting by studying political communications across media platforms during an 
election campaign. The investigation triangulates content and discourse analysis of media texts 
and citizen-users’4 content with a behavioural understanding gleaned from semi-structured 
interviews with, and observations of, political and journalistic elites.   
This is a study of the process of setting the news media agenda during the 2015 United 
Kingdom general election campaign. I present an evaluation of how political and media elite 
actors have responded to the impact of new technologies in order to promote and control their 
messages in a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013). Significantly, it re-conceptualises 
relationship structures between political elites, media producers, and citizens as a combination of 
network and hierarchy.  I posit that the way in which power is exercised through these structures 
can take the form of commodification of citizen-users’ content and action. I use these findings to 
describe in detail how political and media elites are able to set the news media agenda.   
 
                                                          
4 Citizen-users are defined as citizens on social and online media who are not elite actors. The term is used 
where I am specifically discussing the content produced, or actions taken, by citizens on a social media 
website. 
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1.1 Case selection: Agenda-setting in the 2015 UK general election 
 
Research has shown that during an election campaign citizens get their political news 
from a wide range of sources. Furthermore, established media organisations and political parties 
and candidates increasingly have an active online and social media presence that offers new ways 
to engage with voters. These facts are indicative of the mix of media consumed and produced 
during election campaigns, as well as during business-as-usual. The British Election Study 2015 
found that of 20,043 respondents, 58.2% confirmed that they had read news or information on 
Facebook from candidates, parties, commentators, journalists, or activists (British Election 
Studies, 2015). Table 1.1 gives the responses of those questioned in full. The rise of alternative 
sources of information threatens the established news media agenda setting process. This is 
because it becomes more difficult for elites to maintain control over information flows as new 
actors enter the information environment. This results in changing power dynamics between the 
politicians, journalists, and citizens that the elite actor groups seek to manage.  
 
Table 1.1. In the last 4 weeks, have you read news or found information about the upcoming 
general election or politics more generally that was posted on Facebook by any of the following 
people or organisations? 
 Frequency % (n=30027) 
Valid No 11671 38.9 
Yes 8092 26.9 
Don’t Know 280 .9 
Total 20043 66.7 
Missing 9984 33.3 
Source: Fieldhouse et al. (2015). 
 
Agenda-setting is the subject of study in this thesis due to its innate primacy over priming 
and framing. Without the creation of a media or public agenda, and the decisive inclusion and 
exclusion of certain issues and policies, there would be no need for strategic framing or priming 
to take place. This thesis uses the definition of agenda-setting developed by McCombs and Shaw 
(1972), as a function of the mass media. In a study which recognised the role the news media 
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were playing as intermediaries between electors and political elites, the authors assessed “the 
agenda-setting capacity of the mass media in the 1968 presidential campaign” in the Chapel Hill 
district by attempting “to match what Chapel Hill voters said were key issues of the campaign 
with the actual content of the mass media used by them during the campaign” (McCombs and 
Shaw, 1972: 177). Their key hypothesis – tested through the use of content analysis – was that 
“the mass media set the agenda for each political campaign, influencing the salience of attitudes 
toward the political issues” (ibid.). Later studies have also found support for this hypothesis, 
emphasising its relevance in the mass media system. However, it is important to note that 
McCombs and Shaw’s claim that “The information in mass media becomes the only contact many 
have with politics” (ibid.: 176) does not remain true in the contemporary media system in which 
the internet and hybrid media logics (Chadwick, 2013) used by traditional media afford voters 
more direct and varied contact with politics.  
Nevertheless, as McCombs (2004: 98) has highlighted, “As more and more evidence 
accumulated about the agenda-setting influence of the mass media on the public, scholars in the 
early 1980s began to ask, ‘Who sets the media’s agenda?’” Therefore, in a media system 
characterised by meshing and interdependence of multiple platforms, production and 
consumption, two key research questions are raised. Firstly, in such a media system, where many 
more media platforms and actors can come into play, who sets the news media agenda? Secondly, 
how does the agenda-setting process function across the contemporary media system? This 
dissertation seeks to contribute to the body of work which addresses these question, with a unique 
focus on the power relationships involved in setting the news media agenda. 
The choice of case study, the 2015 United Kingdom general election, was made in part 
as a continuation of existing investigations into agenda-setting. According to McCombs (2004, 
111), “Elections offer a particularly intensive setting for examining both the influence of news 
sources on the media and, in turn, the influence of the media on the public.” As noted above, Tran 
(2014: 206) identifies that around half of agenda-setting studies take place in the context of 
elections. Therefore this dissertation sits within a strong body of literature, suggesting that the 
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analysis of an election campaign is the ideal case study with which to examine news media agenda 
setting.  
 This predominance may be explained by the fact that general elections do continue to be 
broadly understood as the ultimate exercise of democracy in the United Kingdom5, despite 
arguments for a broadening of effective participation methods online (Dennis, 2016). The 
development of information communication technologies and corresponding changes to the UK’s 
media system has altered general election campaigns extensively in the contemporary era. The 
more chaotic media environment therefore necessitates changing campaign strategies as elites 
struggle to retain control over their traditionally reserved domains of power such as agenda-
setting. The role of the relationships and networks that exist within the news media agenda-setting 
process in the contemporary media system is yet to be fully explored; this dissertation will make 
a contribution to this body of knowledge through its holistic approach to media platforms and use 
of a mix of qualitative methods.  
The 2015 United Kingdom general election has been selected for analysis as it provides 
a timely opportunity for this research to analyse the relationships and methods which exist in the 
agenda-setting process during a high profile election campaign. The analysis takes place at both 
the macro- and micro-levels, looking at organizations and the ways in which they structure their 
approach to media and news-making and incorporating individual-level observation to establish 
the underlying thinking and behaviours of key actors. This methodological approach will enable 
a deep analysis and thick description of the relationships which exist between political elites, the 
established media, and citizens within the news media agenda-setting process.  
I recognize that problems of generalization and representation arise in selecting just one 
case for analysis; it is not possible to make inferences about the nature of “politics-as-usual” from 
the case of one election. However, due to the important and recurring nature of general elections, 
this case reveals significant findings regarding the nature of interactions during UK election 
                                                          
5 The latest report from the British Social Attitudes Survey shows that less than half of respondents took 
part in a political action that was not voting or signing a petition. (National Centre for Social Research, 
2014). 
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campaigns. I have been able to make observations about power relations between the key actors 
on a wider scale.  
Before the contemporary news media agenda-setting process can be delineated, I will 
provide some context to the development of agenda-setting over recent decades. This will also 
make clear the impetus for undertaking a study of this nature; with the constant development and 
adoption of “new” media, the rules governing the process of setting the news media agenda 
change. The following section provides a brief contextual overview of technology used in 
campaigning and foregrounds the theme of continuation in hierarchical power structures.  
 
1.2 Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose: The historical context of agenda-
setting during election campaigns 
 
There have always been patterns of change and continuity in UK general elections. As the media 
and communication technologies have evolved, actors have adapted the available tools and media 
platforms to use them to their advantage. By briefly evaluating UK elections since 1945 I outline 
how campaigns have always taken advantage of communication innovations in order to reach the 
electorate and promote their messages. That is to say that whilst contemporary media and 
technology would be barely recognisable to the voters of 1945, the ends of a campaign – gaining 
a majority of seats in the House of Commons – remain the same. There may be more similarities 
between election campaigning in 1945 and 2015 than we might think. Parties still want their 
agenda to be the most salient and impactful, and news producers still want to break stories and 
attract the largest audience or readership.  
 For example, in the 1945 general election the populace was subjected to a new form of 
technology: 
 
This peripatetic form of propaganda is particularly valuable because enormous numbers of 
people can be reached by it, and because of its uses. It may be used to chant slogans; this is 
unlikely to convert electors but it arouses them to the fact of the contest. It is useful for 
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collecting audiences for meetings, and saves much expense in printing advertisements. 
(McCallum and Readman, 1947: 133-134) 
 
The authors are describing a loudspeaker van used by constituency campaigners to promote their 
parties, candidates, meetings, and policies (see Figure 1.3). If taken out of context the description 
given above, and the understanding of this particular strategy’s purposes, could apply to social 
media websites today. Whilst contemporary political parties and news media producers promise 
interaction with citizens via newer forms of media, they largely retain their hegemony over media 
production - their message can “penetrate into house and home however unwilling the electors in 
them may be to hear” (Ibid., 89). Although citizens may shout back, for example via Twitter or 
email, for many MPs and journalists social networking sites remain a one-way, push, form of 
communication. Demos found that during the period of 28 January 2015 to 4 March 2015 MPs 
sent 60,000 tweets, of which 23% were @ replies (Judah, 2015). Although nearly one-quarter of 
interactions were responses to other Twitter users, more than three-quarters constituted other 
types of interactions. This reveals a preference for broadcasting their own information, or selected 
other information through retweets, over discussion. Therefore – despite the intention of the 
design of online tools or their principal method of use by citizen-users – the action of a voter 
contacting an MP directly via social media could become the equivalent of running down the road 
shouting back at the loudspeaker van.  
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Evidence for politicians’ preference of using social media as push media comes from the 
Hansard Society. A study conducted in 2009 showed that “MPs’ focus remains largely on 
promoting themselves through reportage of their efforts in the House or constituency and by 
linking to ideologically similar commentators or websites” (Williamson, 2009: 3). Recently, 
Lilleker and Jackson (2014: 6) undertook a review that found that “the evidence, thus far, is that 
MPs have largely relied on Web 1.0 applications, such as websites as a one-way, top-down 
monologue in the form of an electronic brochure to enable them to promote their views”. There 
appears to be a consistent preference by political elites to be the active communicators, 
broadcasting through digital and social media. Nevertheless, this role becomes challenged when 
media platforms built for both one-to-many and many-to-many communications, which allow 
citizens to communicate within the public sphere as easily as elites may, become prominent in the 
dissemination and reception of campaign messages and agendas.  
Figure 1.3. The Labour Party's loudspeaker van in the 1945 UK general election 
 Source: The Daily Herald Archive at the National Media Museum, Bradford 
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McCombs (2004: 104) highlights the continuity/evolution paradox of election campaigns 
in relation to investigations into the agenda-setting process: “Although the ultimate goal of any 
political campaign is to win on Election Day, campaigns increasingly see their immediate purpose 
as capturing the media agenda.” As the mass media have developed and evolved into the 
information age, information flows have become faster and open to greater challenges. Capturing 
the media agenda has become simultaneously increasingly central to a campaign and increasingly 
difficult. Newer communication platforms are often endowed with greater influence than they 
may actually have – for example, being bestowed with the monikers of “the television election” 
(Harrison, 1964), “the internet election” (Worth, 2010), or “the social media election” (Channel 
4 News, 2015c). Despite these titles often overstating the role played by the medium in the 
outcome of the election, it is true that newer communication tools increasingly become central to 
campaigns and reporting over time. This is evidenced by campaigners and news producers who 
assemble teams to design strategies based on the new tools afforded to them. It is for this reason 
that I assume that the structures of power relationships between the three actor groups – political 
elites, news producers, and citizens – will be different in 2015 to those exercised during preceding 
elections. The desire to understand how they differ, and what the impact is for the operation of 
the news media agenda-setting process, is the motivation for this research. 
 
1.3. Actors, relationship models, and associated agenda-setting processes 
 
1.3.1 Categorising actor groups 
 
This thesis specifically addresses the agenda-setting process in a general election campaign by 
looking at interactions between different actor groups, referred to as political elites or political 
parties, media or news producers, and citizens. As Stanyer (2007: 2) states, “the ‘ideal type’ 
political communication system consists of three sets of actors: political and media institutions, 
and citizen audiences embedded in a national socio-political environment”. This thesis uses 
McNair’s (2007: 4) outline of the “three elements [political organizations, media, and citizens] in 
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the process by which political action is conceived and realised” to provide the scope for the actors 
on which this study focuses. Whilst McNair does include multiple sub-groups within the 
overarching category of ‘Political Organizations’, this thesis will focus only upon the ‘Parties’ 
subgroup. I acknowledge that many other organisations play a role in agenda-setting, however, 
accounting for this is beyond the scope of this research as a result of time and resource constraints. 
Political parties, as the central political organisation in an election campaign, will be the only 
political organisation analysed.  
The category of “political elites” includes organisations and individuals who have access 
to, or have the potential to gain access to, political power through a role in a UK political party, 
whether as a politician, candidate, or member of staff. “Media or news producers” includes 
organisations and individuals who create mainstream news media for dissemination on a public 
platform – whether under the umbrella of ‘old’ or ‘new’ media - and includes journalists, editors, 
and high-profile national bloggers. Finally, the category of “citizens” encompasses all those who 
do not fall in to other categories but who were eligible to vote in the election. I will refer to citizen-
users where I am specifically discussing the content produced, or actions taken, by citizens on a 
social media website. See Table 1.2 for an outline of these categorisations. 
 
Table 1.2. Categorisation of actors included in the study 
Political elites Media elites Non-elites 
Political parties, MPs 
and candidates, 
political party staff 
Mainstream print, 
broadcast, & online 
news organizations. 
Influential blogs with 
a national remit 
Citizens who are 
not included in 
another category 
 
 
1.3.2 Relationship structures encompassing relevant actor groups 
 
One way in which this dissertation will describe the process of news media agenda-setting during 
the election campaign is by applying an understanding of the exercise of power and 
conceptualising the relationship structures through which this takes place. It is important to 
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establish the ways in which relationships between the different actor groups have developed, and 
outline the existing relationship structures that influence agenda-setting in 2015. As discussed 
briefly in section 1.2, power relations from 1945 until recently were predominantly hierarchical, 
and items for the mass media news agenda were set by the campaign teams as primary news 
sources and by print and broadcast news editors as gatekeepers (Bruns, 2005). However, from the 
growth of mass media through to the emergence of the information society there has been a shift 
from top-down power relationships to more horizontal flows of power through networked 
relationships (Skelcher, 2000) This is characterised by the interdependence of different media 
platforms and the potential for citizens to engage directly with elites online. Furthermore, 
evidence has been found of a citizens’ rejecting or reversing attempts to set the news media agenda 
or dominant news narratives (Chadwick, 2011a).  
A hierarchical power relationship sees political and media elites at the top of a pyramid 
of actors, able to dictate messages and actions from the top-down (see Figure 1.4). Examples of 
this are found in McCombs and Shaw’s 1972 study, where they noted that the mass media had 
the power to determine the issues that readers learnt about. This structure may also feature 
different stratifications of influencers or actors who amplify the message, as conceptualised by. 
Katz and Lazarfelds’ (1955) “two-step flow” model of communication. In the two-step flow 
process, the news agenda is propagated by elites, received by citizens through the mass media, 
and then reinforced through influential citizens amplifying the message in their personal social 
networks. This model exists today, with social media and online social networks playing an 
important role in the amplification and embedding of certain messages, and hence playing a role 
in the news media agenda setting process. Many of the elite actors interviewed for this research - 
a sample consisting of journalists, bloggers, politicians, and party staffers - described Twitter as 
an “echo chamber” in which particular news stories and narratives are amplified by influential 
users to their followers, reinforcing specific agenda items. 
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Recent research has suggested that the development of ICTs has enabled the growth of 
networked relationships, constituted by a ‘flatter’ arrangement of nodes and links between groups 
of people (Benkler, 2006). In such a configuration, it can be argued that information flows are 
more equitable, enabling those previously bereft of influence to potentially weigh in on the media 
agenda, and perhaps cause a shift in news narratives and discourse. McNair (2006) describes the 
impact of networked digital relationships: 
 
The speed of news flows has increased ... this acceleration is a function of the combined 
technologies of cable, computer and satellite, and of the highly networked nature of the 
global media environment, in which online journalists and bloggers who post an article 
or item in one part of the world immediately become part of a globally accessible system, 
their postings indexed, linked, signposted for others, rapidly becoming part of the 
common conversation of millions. (McNair, 2006: 2) 
 
This argument is often made for the democratisation of political communication through 
the use of online tools. Yet crucially in such a structure I expect that agenda-setting becomes more 
problematic for elite actors. Competing agendas proliferate from an increasing number of sources; 
it might be the case that it is more difficult for traditional actors to set and control the news media 
agenda. This is an area which this study explores. However, evidence shows that the public still 
Elites 
(Political/Media)
Influencers/mediators
Non-influential citizens
Agenda-Setting Process 
Issue/Policy placed on media 
agenda 
Issue/Policy reinforced through 
media and within networks 
Issue/Policy placed on public 
agenda 
 
Figure 1.4. Structure of hierarchical relationships associated with the first-level agenda-setting 
process 
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receive news media agendas. Therefore this thesis posits that although horizontal networks have 
been created and the possibility of agenda-setting influence for the previously “disenfranchised” 
exists, a hierarchy is maintained whereby elites remain able to direct the media agenda during the 
election campaign. This assertion leads to the following question: how are political and media 
elites able to maintain their hierarchical position in the agenda-setting process amongst networks?   
In order to realistically characterise relationship structures between actors in the agenda-
setting process I now consider how both hierarchical and networked relationships can function 
interdependently. Howard’s (2011) description of the power of digital networks in modern 
political campaigns provides a sound conceptualisation of how these can interact. Although 
Howard’s model considers different actors to those analysed in this study, for example local party 
networks, this model can also describe relationships between media producers and their 
audiences. As shown in Figure 1.5, a reproduction of Howard’s model, this relationship structure 
is headed by a strong traditional hierarchy, usually within the central party or media organisation. 
From this hierarchy comes the main agenda item for promotion. This message is then not only 
disseminated amongst the wider population but, crucially, to smaller networks within or with 
strong ties to the organization. In the analysis undertaken in this dissertation the fully connected 
network corresponds to citizen-users who constitute core audiences or party activists. This group 
is then able to disseminate the message further to the mesh network, in my research this 
corresponds to other citizen-users who may be inclined to be supportive of the political party or 
news organization. 
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Source: Howard (2011: 42). 
 
 In order to promote the message and increase the chances of setting the news media 
agenda these networks must be harnessed by the elite actors and directed to act in a particular 
manner, such as information-sharing in their own personal online and offline networks.  Grewal 
(2008) has described the way in which networks can inherently hold power, which can be 
accessed by members of those networks. In order to achieve this, members of the networks must 
meet the communication standards and standards required of that network. Therefore elite actors 
are tasked with communicating in a manner fitting with the social media space in order to exercise 
power over that network and the communication within it. 
A theoretical basis is therefore provided for asynchronous power structures within the 
process of news media agenda-setting, in which networks are harnessed and directed by a 
hierarchical political or media elite. In this system, a hierarchy remains as political and media 
Traditional campaign 
hierarchy 
(tree network) 
Local team 
(fully connected network) 
Ad hoc volunteers 
(mesh network) 
Figure 1.5. The Power of Digital Networks in Modern Political Campaigns 
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elites are able to exercise control over their own networks to encourage the promotion of their 
messages. While networks of actors are able to exercise power, the majority of successful agendas 
are promoted from the “top”, and begin in the traditional news creation hierarchy. There is a high 
volume of dissensus surrounding issues and events in a general election campaign. Therefore in 
order to exercise control over the agenda, and as discussed by this study’s interviewees, political 
parties and news producers rely upon and direct their activists, supporters, and audiences to 
promote their communications through online and offline networks. 
 
1.4 Theoretical contribution: the role of commodification and authenticity 
 
It is clear that there has been upheaval in the relationships between actors in the political 
communication process, and that this has had an impact upon the news media agenda-setting 
process that takes place during an election campaign. Despite insights from existing studies, the 
question of what the functions and processes of agenda-setting look like in a UK election 
campaign has not been categorically answered. A theoretical underpinning of this dissertation is 
that relationship structures between the actor groups exist in a state of interdependence between 
hierarchies and networks, with the networks called upon to promote messages in attempts by 
political elites and media producers to set the news media agenda. There are two assumptions 
about this process; (1) that the end goal is to set the news media agenda, a short term aim at best 
in an election campaign, and (2) that the central organisations of the elite groups face greater 
challenges to setting the agenda in a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013) as a result of a 
diversification of content and sources. In order to exercise control over the news media agenda-
setting process, elites’ relationships with citizen networks must be harnessed to provide as much 
direction and amplification for their message as possible.  
The existence of such a relationship structure leads to the question, how do media 
producers and political parties control their message through activist or audience networks? As 
will be discussed in Chapter 2, research finds increasing evidence of control within campaign 
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communications (Kreiss, 2012; Stromer-Galley, 2014) and this has led to a commodification of 
citizen-users’ content and actions as tools to help direct information flow and hence control the 
agenda in the hybrid media system. The concept of commodification that I propose builds upon 
the theory of controlled interactivity (Stromer-Galley, 2014) to argue that active or supportive 
citizens (in the case of political elites) and core or potential audiences (relating to news producers) 
are directed to act in a certain manner in order to amplify the elite message and aid the control of 
the news media agenda in the contemporary media system. 
This notion finds support from Jenkins (2014) who asserted his concern that as a result 
of the affordances of digital technology, grassroots activity would face attempts to commodify it 
by corporate entities. If we consider the economic concept of commodification, it is possible to 
apply it to the relationship between citizens and other actor groups; Radin and Sunder (2005: 9) 
describe commodification as the “reduction of the person (subject) to a thing (object)”. In 
economics, in order for commodification to occur, it is required that one party sells an object to a 
second party, usually for monetary gain. From a Marxist perspective, commodification can relate 
to the sale of a person’s labour to an employer and is intrinsically linked to the material benefit 
for the employer (Rosewarne, 2010: 106). In the information environment, the benefits of 
commodification are not always tangible or measured in monetary terms, yet commodities such 
as these exist. One example is the exchange of knowledge. According to Radin and Sunder’s 
definition, commodification can be defined more broadly as the process by which person A 
becomes valuable to person B for a particular ability or skill which they can be encouraged to 
trade for a tangible or an intangible outcome. 
To use the Marxist conceptualisation of the commodification of labour as an analogy: a 
political party communicates in the media system, where control of the news media agenda is 
increasingly difficult. The party is in the business of ‘winning the election’ and part of achieving 
this is strengthening its control of the news media agenda. To achieve this, the party aims to 
mobilize supporters to share its message across media platforms, hopefully ensuring that it 
becomes or remains salient. Supporters are directed on how to do this by the party and offer their 
labour in the form of online or offline activism in this way in the hope of a positive outcome for 
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the party. Similarly, the audiences of traditional news producers may be become a commodity 
through which the organization’s agenda can be promoted, or can be used to attract further 
audiences to their content. Whilst, on one hand, we can argue that party activists have always 
undertaken action at the behest of party leadership, the key differences here are twofold. Firstly, 
activists are being brought into the news media agenda setting process, an area previously 
reserved for political and media elites. Secondly, they are needed as a commodity because of the 
nature of the media system which affords greater challenges to setting the media agenda, and 
hence requires that those inside the system – including citizens – act in an orchestrated manner to 
control key messages.  
For strategies of controlled interactivity to become perceived by citizens as 
commodification, authenticity must be missing from the communication. Authenticity plays an 
important role in enabling actors to meet communication standards on social media, and therefore 
to harness and exercise network power. Enli’s theory of mediated authenticity suggests that 
authenticity is constructed through authenticity illusions6. Therefore I hypothesise that 
authenticity illusions allow citizen-users to perceive their interactions with politicians and news 
producers as equitable; they act out of choice to share information they support. However, without 
the illusion of authenticity, the electioneering behind communication becomes clear to citizen-
users. Inauthentic communications arise one or more relative standards for communication on 
social networking sites are not met. I define these standards as spontaneity, immediacy, and 
predictability (discussed in detail in Chapter 2). The action of being inauthentic in communication 
reveals activists and supporters as commodities to be gained and harnessed; they can be directed 
to act and engage with issues and are useful in the promotion of an agenda.  
Both Stromer-Galley and Kreiss describe this relationship as “transactional”. Kreiss 
states that “campaigns use new media to mobilize sheer numbers of individuals to deliver 
financial, human and political resources” (2012, 26)  and Stromer-Galley supports this, asserting 
                                                          
6 Authenticity illusions refers to the construction of authenticity of actors through scripted performances. 
Illusions are created “through various production techniques, [where] raw material is manipulated in 
order to be compatible with media logics and format criteria” (Enli, 2016: 121). 
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that “campaigns work to build not a partnership with citizens using DCTs [digital communication 
technologies] but a transactional relationship in which support is a currency that campaigns aim 
to grow” (2014: 177). Taking this one step further, gamification of campaigns is on the rise. As 
demonstrated in Tim Pawlenty’s 2012 United States Republican primary campaign and within 
the Conservative Party’s 2015 United Kingdom general election campaign, parties encourage 
supporters to take certain actions to share their message, usually via social media, in return for 
‘rewards’ or ‘points’ (see Figure 1.6). This heightens the transactional nature of the relationship, 
meaning that supporters receive something tangible in return. Therefore commodification of 
citizen-users action forms an important part of controlling the news agenda in a chaotic media 
system. 
 
 
 
A short description of an email campaign undertaken by the Labour Party in 2014 
illustrates this point. Close to the 66th “birthday” of the National Health Service (NHS), the Labour 
Party circulated an email which contained a link to a website where the reader could discover 
what their birth number was when they were delivered by the NHS. At the same time as enabling 
Figure 1.6. Screenshot from conservatives.com showing examples of gamification 
by the Conservative Party 
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citizen interaction and engagement in this way, the party asked for an email address (if you had 
reached the site by other means) and a visit to the site was acknowledged by another party email 
which asked you to forward on the email (complete with a pre-written message) or share your 
birth number on Facebook. This party had multiple goals for the campaign: (1) to reinforce a 
connection between the party and the NHS in the voter’s mind, by explicitly expressing a special 
relationship between the NHS and the Labour Party as its creator; (2) to collect email addresses 
and demographic data which could be added to the party’s database for use in the election 
campaign; (3) to interact with the electorate, instead of distributing party political literature the 
party provided a useful and mildly entertaining link, such as those which are prevalent on the 
internet and which you might regularly share on social media; and (4) to encourage the sharing 
of positive information amongst voters without any overtly partisan underpinnings.  
This example and Figure 1.6 demonstrates three key things pertinent for this dissertation. 
Firstly, they are examples of methods to control citizen-users’ interactivity with parties. Secondly, 
they show how citizen-users are directed to share messages with their networks, and in both 
examples they are rewarded for doing so. Thirdly, the combination of hierarchical and networked 
power is demonstrated: the direction comes from an elite actor but the message is spread amongst 
citizen networks. As a caveat to these examples, I classify them as actions of controlled 
interactivity and not commodification of citizen-users’ action. This is because each 
communication, headlines on the Conservative Party website and an email from the Labour Party 
respectively, meets the standards of its medium and maintains the authenticity illusion. I now turn 
to describing the methodological approach I will use to collect and analyse such communications 
and relationships in more detail. 
 
1.5 Methodological approach and research questions 
 
Sections 1.1 to 1.4 have outlined and defined some of the key concepts and theoretical building 
blocks for this research. They have also brought to light some of the questions facing the study of 
agenda-setting in election campaigns.  These will be extrapolated here to form the specific 
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research questions that this study will answer, alongside an introduction to the methodology that 
will be employed to provide those answers. 
 The questions raised throughout this chapter include those of both a descriptive and 
explanatory nature and fall under two fundamental queries: 
(1) Who sets the news agenda in the contemporary media environment?; and,  
(2) How do they set the news agenda?  
The first question, regarding the descriptive “who”, encompasses the following research 
questions. The first research question (RQ1) is how do power relationships between traditional 
news media producers and political elites function in the 2015 UK general election campaign, 
and how do they impact the agenda-setting process? Given the changing nature of these 
relationships contextualised in this chapter, it is imperative that I am able to observe and describe 
the current relationship structures that exists between elite groups. Logically following from this 
question is the situation of citizens within networked power. Observing and understanding how 
citizens interact with elites and the information that they disseminate is crucial to understanding 
the news media agenda setting process. Therefore the second research question (RQ2) is how do 
traditional news media producers and political parties attempt to successfully harness network 
power? 
The second overarching question requires a thick description of the functions and 
strategies involved in setting the news media agenda. It necessitates a focus on understanding 
how news media producers and political parties integrate media logics to access network power, 
and what the outcome is. This prompts four further research questions: (RQ3) how are social and 
digital media integrated into traditional mews medias’ output, and how does this impact their 
power relationships with political elites?; (RQ4) How are (i) information sourced from social 
media, and (ii) the technological affordances of social media incorporated into the process of 
setting the news media agenda?; (RQ5) Do citizen-users of social media play any role, such as 
intervention in the information cycle, in the process of setting the agenda?; and (RQ6) Do citizen-
users of social media replicate or challenge agendas?  
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It is important that these questions are addressed, and indeed there is a strong body of 
work analysing agenda-setting in election campaigns and a growing sub-set of studies in relation 
to newer media and the internet (see Chapter 2). However, as mentioned above, many studies of 
agenda-setting in elections campaigns focus only on a small number of media platforms, and do 
not take into account or provide explanation for behaviours enacted by elites to retain control in 
the contemporary media system.    
A qualitative mixed-methods approach will be used to evaluate the agenda-setting 
process and understand how political elites and media producers take action to set the media 
agenda. Semi-structured interviews with journalists, influential bloggers, candidates and party 
staff members, and participant-observations of two national broadcast news producers – BBC 
Radio 4’s Today programme and ITV News’ Election 2015 results programme – will provide the 
context and explanation behind the strategies undertaken by political and media elites, and their 
interactions with citizens. A discourse and content analysis of two salient items on the election 
media agenda during the short campaign (March 30 – May 8 2015) provide the case studies with 
which to identify features of the process, including evidence of commodification of citizen-user 
content and actions.  
I used information from the post-election interviews to identify two of the most salient 
news stories from the 2015 general election. These are the first leaders’ debate, and a news report 
about Nicola Sturgeon relating to allegations from a leaked foreign office memo. By analysing 
patterns in the information flows related to these news events in relation to evidence of strategies 
used to direct the agenda undertaken by political and media elites, I am able to show how agenda-
setting functioned. Critically I identify a combination of hierarchical and networked power 
relationships which encompass controlled interactivity and commodification. This dissertation 
focuses upon furthering our understanding only of the process of news media agenda-setting as it 
takes place during an election campaign, through evaluating the ways in which newer forms of 
media have impacted agenda-setting strategies. It does not seek to explain the role of agenda-
setting as a media effect in the outcome of the election.  
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The main contribution of this dissertation is to further our understanding of the news media 
agenda-setting process during a UK general election. I achieve this by evaluating and describing 
the process of news media agenda-setting within a hybrid media system7, and how power is 
exercised to control the media agenda through a process of commodification of citizen-user 
actions and content. I demonstrate that, rather than relationships simply being hierarchical or 
networked, as is often suggested in the literature, a combination of the two exist in a controlled-
network formation. This contribution will advance our understanding of the way in which the 
news media agenda is set, but also describe the dialectical nature of power in a hybrid media 
system. This dissertation further highlights a number of tensions between social media use by 
citizens and by elites within the news media agenda setting process which have not previously 
been described. 
ICTs are constantly evolving and so too are the ways in which actors use them, as well 
as the impact they have on power relations. “Internet time” (Karpf, 2012) tells us that the internet 
is consistently changing and developing new capacities. Therefore a thorough examination and 
understanding of how power functioned in the 2015 general election in the form of agenda-setting 
will not only fill a gap in the literature, but will provide knowledge to apply in the analysis of 
political campaigns and campaign strategies going forward.  
 
1.6. Plan of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation is divided into two substantive parts. Part one (Chapters 2 and 3) introduce the 
theoretical and methodological frameworks. Part two (Chapters 4 to 8) present the empirical 
findings and discussion. 
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on the main themes of this dissertation. From 
this review I conceptualise commodification of citizen-users and argue that scholars should 
                                                          
7 The theory of the hybrid media system is posited by Chadwick (2013). It is a system characterised by 
the interdependence of different media platforms, and the fluctuation of media logics used during content 
creation and dissemination. 
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consider the integrated nature of hierarchical and network power relationships within the news 
media agenda setting process. I argue that the extant body of literature addressing agenda-setting 
in election campaigns in the contemporary media system offers some useful insights, namely the 
rise of intermedia agenda-setting and the increased role of a variety of actor groups. Nevertheless, 
the existing research is limited in its scope by focusing only upon the correlation between a limited 
number of media platforms, and limited methodologically because of a reliance predominantly 
on searching for correlations through content analysis or survey research designs. This 
dissertation therefore seeks to remedy this by widening the scope of agenda-setting research to 
include a holistic approach to studying media agendas on a cross-platform basis. I also use 
qualitative methods in my research design to understand reasons behind actions and decisions, 
complementing existing content analyses. The literature review considers important theoretical 
contributions from literature regarding media systems, election campaigning and power, 
alongside studies of agenda-setting in election campaigns which have sought to answer the 
question of how the media agenda is set in the new media environment.  
Through the empirical contributions of existing studies it can be established that the news 
media agenda-setting process has become more difficult to enact in the contemporary media 
system. Chapter 2 demonstrates that Chadwick’s (2013) theory of the hybrid media system offers 
an understanding of the links between different media platforms, and the impact of this, in the 
UK’s contemporary media system. Furthermore, I argue for an assessment of power as relational 
during the 2015 general election. I set out Grewal’s (2008) network power as the theoretical lens 
through which to view power. I assert that setting the news agenda must not be seen simply as a 
straightforward action through decision-making. Instead, our conceptualisations must include a 
description of the power relationships which enable control to be maintained over the process. 
Additionally, the chapter demonstrates how agenda-setting models for the election campaigns 
which take place in a hybrid media system may benefit from a re-introduction of the two-step 
flow model. A two-step flow process can be exercised through influencers on social media and 
other online tools. Finally, the chapter posits that elites will use newer media to harness citizen 
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action during the campaign. This occurs in the form of “controlled interactivity” (Stromer-Galley, 
2014), or through commodification of citizen-users’ content and actions. 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology and research design. The methodological approach taken 
by this research seeks to overcome some of the limitations of agenda-setting research by 
broadening the scope of analysis to include a cross-media approach to platforms used during the 
2015 general election. It also moves beyond a straightforward content analysis to include 
qualitative data from semi-structured interviews and observations of media producers and 
political party staff and candidates, and thick description of information flows derived from 
qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis. There are many limitations imposed on those 
who choose to carry out internet research, and these will be discussed in more detail within this 
chapter. The methods used and their rationale are also outlined. Briefly, these include: 
 
1. A qualitative content and discourse analysis of communications made throughout a 
defined period during the election campaign on specified sites including Twitter, 
Facebook, political blogs, news media websites, print media, and broadcast media;  
2. Semi-structured interviews with members of key campaign teams with responsibility for 
social and online media, and with established media producers; and 
3. Observations of two media producers, BBC Radio 4’s Today programme and ITV News’ 
Election 2015, during the campaign period. 
 
Chapters 4 to 7 constitute the empirical analysis central to this dissertation. The discussion within 
them will be guided by the theoretical framework and the research questions. Chapter 4 begins 
with a thick descriptive analysis of texts which were produced following the first leaders’ debate 
of the general election, based on qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis. These 
incorporate the discussions of citizens and elites on social media (Twitter and Facebook), and the 
content of party websites, news articles, blogs, broadcasts, and newspapers. The main findings of 
this chapter are that whilst the process of setting the news media agenda remains dominated by 
hierarchical power relationships and established practices, political and media elites do utilise 
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hybrid media logics which take into consideration online and offline platforms. The process itself 
is fluid and fluctuating, comprising variously a combination or legacy and digital practices, 
message control strategies online as part of controlled interactivity, harnessing network power 
through social media, and the impact and use of other news stories to build different agendas. 
Although evidence of both controlled interactivity and commodification of citizen-users was 
noted, ultimately the impetus behind the news media agenda setting process was the engagement 
that political and media elites have with each other. 
Chapter 5 provides a detailed case study focused upon the news agenda which emerged 
around The Telegraph’s exclusive story of a leaked memo from the Foreign Office. The Telegraph 
claimed that Nicola Sturgeon would rather see David Cameron as Prime Minister than Ed 
Miliband. The rise of the SNP and the success of Nicola Sturgeon was highlighted in the post-
election interviews by many journalists and party candidates/staff as being the most salient and 
impactful story of the election. Using the results of a discourse analysis and evidence gained from 
interviews and observations, the political information flow for this topic was mapped, and the 
hierarchical/networked components of the relationship structures were assessed. The extent to 
which activists and audiences were mobilised, and how they were mobilised, is addressed in this 
chapter in order to understand and describe the processes and functions of news media agenda-
setting. The main findings of this chapter are that elites act to join and direct communications 
within social media networks. They recognise the inherent network power and want to use it to 
control the flow of political information. However, they are not, usually, organically a member 
of those networks. Therefore, the interaction that they actually achieve is an artificial re-
enactment; it is not true “network power” but an attempt to continue the existence of their 
hierarchical power through the use of citizen-user networks. 
Chapters 6 and 7 offer in-depth descriptions of news-making practices at the Today 
programme and ITV News’ Election 2015 based on interview and observation data. The main 
findings are that despite attempts at digital innovation by both teams, hierarchical power 
structures and legacy news-production practices dominated. The journalists that I observed and 
interviewed recognised the utility of integrating digital and legacy media logics and practices to 
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tell a story effectively. However their creation and dissemination of content was characterised by 
a continuation of traditional news-making practices, hierarchical power relationships, and 
selective use of social media to enhance their news agendas through commodification of citizens.  
Chapter 8 draws together the main findings to clarify the conclusions made, to outline the 
limitations of the study, and to offer prescriptions for the areas within which future research 
should focus. 
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Chapter 2 Hierarchy or networks?: 
deconstructing the processes and 
relationships which set the news media 
agenda 
 
Increasingly we swim in a sea of diversity, and we need to understand the currents in this sea, 
both those that enhance communication and those that pollute the sea. (McCombs, 2014: 20) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The communication gestalt in which agenda-setting occurs contains numerous actors and 
relations of power. These create and challenge media agendas, which in turn transmit salience to 
public agendas. This process is a well-researched phenomenon. Substantial evidence has been 
found for the first- and second-levels of agenda-setting8 and emerging theory and evidence reveals 
a third9. Analyses of agenda-setting focus upon the transmission from the media agenda to the 
public agenda of objects at the first-level of agenda-setting (McCombs, 2014: 5), of attributes at 
the second-level of agenda-setting (ibid.: 40), and of networks of objects and attributes at the 
third-level (Guo, 2016). This process of transmission has been shown conclusively to occur; 
agenda-setting as a media effect has a significant influence over the issues which reach the public.  
Whilst existing literature contributes to our understanding of agenda-setting as a process 
of transmission, this thesis fills a gap in the literature by developing our knowledge of the front-
end of this process. It answers the question of how the news media agenda is set in the new media 
environment, including what strategies are used by actors to promote their agendas and how 
different forms of power are exercised to set the news media agenda. I investigate what role 
intermedia agenda-setting can play, and what strategies political and media elites can use, in order 
                                                          
8 The first-level of agenda-setting refers to the “relative salience of issues or subjects” (Weaver, 2007: 
142), described as objects. The second-level of agenda-setting refers to “the characteristics and traits that 
describe the object”, described as attributes (McCombs, 2011: 5). 
9 The third-level of agenda-setting is Network Agenda-Setting (NAS). 
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to retain and exercise power over the news media agenda in the 2015 UK general election. This 
is important; understanding who sets the media agenda allows for identification of influence over 
the public agenda. A further contribution made by this thesis is to theorise and test reasons for the 
success or failure of an actor to set the media agenda as a result of the authenticity of their 
communications on social media. I build on existing knowledge of controlled interactivity 
(Stromer-Galley, 2014) to assess strategies of message control. I further propose a conceptual 
development: ‘the other side of the coin’ to controlled interactivity, commodification of citizen-
users’ content and action. 
McCombs (2014: 79) noted that there are already 400 studies of agenda-setting. The first-
level of agenda-setting in particular has been applied and examined in a variety of contexts, 
although many of these studies centre on elections campaigns. Tran (2014) estimates the number 
of studies undertaken within an election context to be around half of all agenda-setting research. 
McCombs and Shaw’s (1972) seminal work, the Chapel Hill study, was set in the context of the 
1968 US presidential election. Since its theoretical development in the early 1970s, the theory has 
been applied to traditional and newer media to further test it empirically. It has also undergone 
revisions and additions. This review discusses and critiques research undertaken in a number of 
key areas:  
1. the development of the network agenda-setting model (NAS) (Guo and 
McCombs, 2011a, 2011b; Guo and McCombs 2016; Meraz, 2016; Vargo and 
Guo, 2016);  
2. studies on the role of newer forms of media on agenda-setting (Lee, 
Lancendorfer, and Lee, 2005; Jungherr, 2014);  
3. considerations of the role of actors other than journalists (Hopmann, et al., 2012);  
4. the effect of media and audience fragmentation upon the agenda-setting process 
(Boyle, 1996; Schoenbach, de Waal, and Lauf, 2005); and  
5. the role of intermedia agenda setting (Lee, 2007; Sweetser, Golan, and Wanta, 
2008; Shehata, 2010; Russell et al., 2015). 
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This study lies at the intersection of these topics. Studies of agenda-setting take into account a 
wide variety of actors and media platforms, and the corpus continues to grow as new forms of 
media and news production practices proliferate (Groshek and Groshek, 2013; Paulussen and 
Harder, 2014; Rogstad, 2016). This research has furthered our understanding of agenda-setting at 
all three levels. However, gaps exist in our knowledge. Foremost amongst these is the literature’s 
tendency to focus upon the impact of the internet as though it exists in isolation from other media, 
rather than looking across media platforms. Whilst intermedia studies partially remedy this, 
further research is required to understand how media and political elites respond to, and interact 
within, the networked media system. Additionally, there is a methodological reliance upon 
content analysis to demonstrate relationships between different media and political organizations 
or media platforms. I contribute to this body of literature by utilising a qualitative approach 
analysing information flows and case studies to identify behaviours, and observations and 
interviews to ascertain the underlying rationale behind elite decision-making and the impact of 
intermedia strategies. 
 Additionally, in this chapter I broaden the scope of discussion from agenda-setting to 
studies in pertinent areas which provide theoretical grounding for this dissertation. Firstly, 
understanding the context of communications provides the grounding to produce a theory of the 
news media agenda setting process. This includes an assessment of work by Jenkins (2006), 
McNair (2006), and Chadwick (2013). I describe how setting the news media’s agenda occurs in 
a hybrid media system where power to do so is dispersed and message control is harder to enact. 
Secondly, I consider the development of election campaign strategies as a response to the 
contemporary media environment. News media agenda setting is a crucial part of election 
campaigning and reporting. Kreiss (2012), and Stromer-Galley (2014) all offer important 
contributions to understanding how the management of campaign strategies has become 
controlled in response to the realities of a more chaotic media system with increasingly porous 
boundaries between platforms. However, a gap exists in our understanding of how citizens receive 
these communications and calls to action. To fill this gap I consider the role played by 
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authenticity, defining this concept in relation to communication standards and developing the 
theory of commodification of citizen-users.  
Finally, this chapter takes into consideration how we can conceptualise power 
relationships within the contemporary media system, and how this can be applied to setting the 
media agenda. Specifically, I incorporate Grewal’s theory of network power (2008) alongside the 
continuation of hierarchical power structures. I evaluate how elite actors work to harness network 
power through the production and dissemination of authentic communications, drawing on the 
work of Castells and other power theorists. Unlike the existing body of work on agenda-setting 
which emphasises the transmission of salience between media and public agendas, the scope of 
this study is to describe and explain the process function at the back-end, the setting of the media 
agenda. Explaining how issues, objects, or attributes were transmitted from the media agenda to 
the public agenda is beyond the scope of this research. I isolate one facet of agenda-setting – the 
media agenda – and establish how the process of creating object salience at this level functions. 
  
2.2 Agenda-setting during election campaigns: considering the role of actors in a 
changing media system 
 
2.2.1 Recent developments in agenda-setting theory  
 
Political campaign teams and news producers have at their disposal a wide variety of information 
production and dissemination tools. These exist across offline and online sites. Recent studies 
have described and explained the impact of ICTs on election campaigning, and on agenda-setting 
during an election. Scholars have investigated how the agenda-setting process functions in 
election campaigns in relation to both the roles played by different media platforms and different 
actor groups (Hopmann et al., 2012; McCombs, 2004; Vargo, Guo, McCombs, and Shaw, 2014).  
The current literature on this topic has three limitations. Firstly, it often lacks the holistic approach 
required when researching in the contemporary media system. Secondly, the impact of campaign 
strategies on the media agenda is not fully explored. Thirdly, research is often based on 
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conceptualisations which no longer reflect power relationships as they exist within the 
contemporary media system.  
Initial investigations into agenda-setting during an election were carried out by McCombs 
and Shaw (1972) in a small-scale study conducted in Chapel Hill during the 1968 US presidential 
campaign. Their study built on findings from earlier research by Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and 
McPhee (1954) in the US and Trenaman and McQuail (1961) in the UK, which stated that citizens 
with the greatest amount of mass media exposure knew the most about election candidates 
(McCombs and Shaw, 1972: 177). McCombs and Shaw hypothesised that “the mass media set 
the agenda for each political campaign, influencing the salience of attitudes towards political 
issues” (Ibid.). Their findings demonstrated the first-level of agenda-setting, hierarchical object 
salience, by correlating interview responses from 100 undecided voters with a content analysis of 
local media output pertaining to the election.  
Although this dissertation starts from the agenda-setting theory developed by McCombs 
and Shaw, testing their original hypothesis evaluating only mass media is not applicable to the 
United Kingdom’s contemporary media system. Since the expansion of agenda-setting theory, 
the production and dissemination of news has advanced to incorporate a wider variety of media, 
technologies, and actors. It is important that studies of agenda-setting take into account this less 
predictable landscape, with its porous boundaries between roles, media, and processes. Studies 
must consider the ways in which political and media elites reconfigure their access to power to 
retain control over information flows (Chadwick and Collister, 2014: 2423).  
Agenda-setting research continues to focus on the transmission of object and attribute 
salience. McCombs and Guo (2011a, 2011b) have theorised a third-level of agenda-setting, 
network agenda-setting (NAS). NAS begins to look across the borders of media platforms. 
However, its core focus is the way in which objects and attributes form a network on the media 
agenda, and the salience transfer of these networks to the public agenda (Guo, 2016: 5). This a 
progression from the analysis of hierarchical structures produced in McCombs’ previous work, 
and findings from this body of research show unequivocally that these media agenda networks 
can transfer to the public agenda (see Figure 2.1).  
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The NAS model fills a gap in our understanding that other models of media effects 
cannot; it explains why certain nodes become linked in the public’s understanding of an issue. 
This is an important contribution to the literature on agenda-setting; issues, objects, and attributes 
do not exist in a vacuum independent of each other. The way in which the public cognitively 
construct information about an issue can be explained by how that item is linked to other nodes 
in the media agenda. For example, the news media may discuss foreign policy (the object) 
consistently in conjunction with characteristics or traits (the attributes) such as terrorism, Islam, 
or other nations. The public will come to cognitively construct a schema linking these objects and 
attributes which mirrors the network created by the media. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Guo (2016, 6) 
 
Researchers have begun to test the NAS more broadly. Hellmueller and Mellado (2016) 
explore the relationship between journalistic role performance and agenda building in a 
comparative analysis of United States and Chilean news coverage. Their methodological 
approach incorporates content analysis and network analysis. The journalistic roles they evaluate 
include the watchdog model, where journalists question and criticise sources, and the loyal-
facilitator model, where journalists “cooperate with those in power and protect the status quo” 
(ibid.: 120). The authors ascertain that there is a connection between the watchdog model and a 
high use of political and document sources in the creation of the media in the US (ibid.: 129). 
This is compared to Chile which had a loyal-facilitator model at the centre of its journalistic role 
performance network alongside the use of a greater number of sources.  
MEDIA AGENDA PUBLIC AGENDA 
Object a 
Attribute a1 
Attribute a2 
Object b 
Attribute b1 
Object a 
Attribute a1 
Attribute a2 
Object b 
Attribute b1 
Figure 2.1. The Network Agenda Setting (NAS) model 
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A flaw in this study is that the authors do not consider that a higher usage of political 
sources may not only suggest a strengthened watchdog role or fact-checking. This finding could 
indicate indexing.10 From this study’s methods and conclusions I argue that in order to establish 
what these behaviours are, and how they impact the media agenda, a qualitative focus is required 
to observe and describe journalistic behaviours.  
 
2.2.2 Theories explaining the context of communication 
 
Understanding how the media system functions is crucial to explaining the process of 
setting the news media agenda in the 2015 UK general election campaign. One contribution to 
knowledge of these changes is the theory of convergence culture. Jenkins (2006: 2) described 
cultural convergence, wherein “old and new media collide, where grassroots and corporate media 
intersect, where the power of the media producer and the power of the media consumer interact 
in unpredictable ways”. Jenkins focuses particularly on the production and consumption of media, 
with technology an enabler of convergence culture. Crucial amongst the assumptions of 
convergence culture are attempts to understand participatory culture. Specifically the way in 
which citizens, defined as fans and consumers, are able to take part in the creation and sharing of 
content (Ibid: 24). Jenkins’ conceptualisation of participatory culture is challenged by Fuchs, who 
argues that Jenkins’ neglects to consider ownership of content (Fuchs, 2017: 68). The notion of 
ownership in participatory culture is significant as it reveals relations of power. Jenkins’ 
interpretation discloses how citizens become empowered to take part in politics, with participation 
extending beyond discussions in online public spaces to sharing and critiquing political 
information. These actions in turn impact how political and media elites are able to control their 
messages and the process of news production. Yet without ownership of content within the 
                                                          
10 Indexing refers to the hypothesis put forwards by Bennett (1990) which expects to find that the content 
of mass media coverage on a given topic will reflect the debates had within mainstream government 
(Bennett, 1990: 106). 
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conceptualisation of participation, citizens and the content they share and produce become a 
commodity used for the benefit of elite organizations. Jenkins’ culturalist focus misses this point. 
Although Jenkins’ work is centred on cultural analysis, he ends his book with a case study 
of the 2004 US presidential election: 
 
The 2004 elections represent an important transitional moment in the relationship 
between media and politics as citizens are being encouraged to do much of the dirty work 
of the campaign and the candidates and parties lost some control over the political 
process. (Jenkins, 2006: 22) 
 
This describes a shift in the power relationships between actor groups during the election 
campaign in favour of citizens. Yet this argument is contradictory; citizens being encouraged to 
do “the dirty work” on behalf of the campaign conversely suggests that parties have increased 
their control. This is an area on which my research will elaborate, analysing the extent of the 
reconfiguration of power relationships in the production and dissemination of news stories. 
Lessons from Jenkins’ work can, however, still be applied to this research. His emphasis on the 
convergence of popular culture and political culture (Ibid.: 12) is an important element for the 
production of authenticity on social media, discussed below, and also for the way in which elites 
try to exert power through social media networks.  
A further issue with the theory is that it simplifies the process of participation by all actor 
groups in media production and dissemination. Chadwick (2013: 57) states: 
 
One problem with the ‘convergence culture’ approach is its equation of ‘online’ with 
‘grassroots’ activism. The rise of online media elites, the increasing use of the logics of 
online media by those working in older media together with the ongoing intervention by 
non-elites in the construction of political news and information brings this dualism into 
question. 
 
Online and offline media logics have become increasingly integrated into the news-making 
practices of traditional media organizations. Klinger and Svensson (2015) refer to a “network 
media logic” to extrapolate differences and overlap with mass media logics. Assuming that citizen 
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output is a challenge to traditional media output because of its quality of ‘being online’ neglects 
the way in which online content is integrated into news-making assemblages. Some citizens’ 
content may be supportive of elite narratives and re-circulate elite messages. This critque is 
supported by Couldry (2011: 487), who states that “the term ‘convergence culture’ blurs 
important processes of differentiation and stratification and therefore blocks a better 
understanding of the politics of convergence.” Convergence culture does acknowledge the 
interdependence of different forms of media, and the changing roles within the production and 
consumption of news. However, it does not provide a conceptualisation of the nature of power 
relationships between political, media, and citizen actor groups within the contemporary media 
system.  
Bruns (2008) builds on the conceptualisation of participatory culture and the roles of 
different actors in a converged media culture. Stating the impact of these developments on the 
media system; convergence will lead media producers and platforms that do not fit into the 
‘convergence jigsaw’ to fail (Bruns, 2008: 31). Based on Bruns’ explanation of the effect of 
convergence on media producers, I expect that elite actors would produce content which meets 
communication standards for social networking sites and enables their content to travel. Cultural 
convergence, therefore, offers a way of looking at citizen participation through digital media, and 
the theory suggests an increased role for non-elites which may challenge traditional power 
relationships. However, Jenkins’ neglect of ownership in his conceptualisation of participatory 
culture ignores the commodification of citizen content. Therefore the study tells a contradictory 
story about the nature of power within relationships affected by cultural convergence. The utility 
of convergence culture to describe the media system within which the process of setting the news 
media agenda takes place, and its application to power relationships within that, is limited.  
  An alternative explanation of the impact of ICTs on the media system is McNair’s (2006) 
theory of ‘cultural chaos’. The author presents the case for an increase in diversity within the 
media system and places emphasis on the agency of actors within that media system. He suggests 
that we need to reorient the way in which we study journalism from a control paradigm, where 
the media are instrumental in the furthering dominant ideologies and “pro-elite media bias” 
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(McNair, 2006: 3), to a chaos paradigm. The chaos paradigm does not deny the fact that elites 
want control over these areas but proposes that their ability to exercise control “is increasingly 
interrupted and disrupted by unpredictable eruptions and bifurcations arising from the economic, 
political, ideological, and technological factors on communication processes” (Ibid.). This work 
strengthens a common theme in the literature on media systems: elites’ lose control over 
communications but they continue to attempt exercises of power in areas that they have 
traditionally dominated. Table 2.1 details the differences between the control paradigm and the 
chaos paradigm. 
 
Figure 2.2. The constituents of chaos 
Control Environment Chaotic Environment 
Control Chaos 
Information scarcity Information surplus 
Sealed (closed) Leaky (open) 
Opacity Transparency 
Exclusivity Accessibility 
Homogeneity Heterogeneity (diversity) 
Hierarchy Network 
Passivity (Inter)activity 
Dominance Competition 
Source: McNair (2006: 199) 
 
The chaos paradigm provides a theory which describes the way that the outcomes of 
content production methods have become unpredictable, with news no longer being constructed 
or manufactured but “emerg[ing]” [emphasis in original] (Ibid.: 49) from the interactions which 
take place in a communication environment. A variety of actors may act within these spaces in an 
effort to create or shape the news, but as a result of the chaotic environment it is extremely difficult 
to achieve any success. McNair provides an understanding of the resultant cultural changes within 
news production that have rendered the media system disorderly and increased the difficulty of 
controlling the output and reception of communications. Through the lens of the chaos paradigm 
setting the news media agenda is seen as an unpredictable process. 
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This outlines a paradox faced by political and media elites. They are perceived to lose 
control over communication production and dissemination whilst simultaneously having access 
to a greater variety of sources and tools to produce and share content. Comprehending this tension 
is important for understanding the process of setting the news media agenda; elite actor groups 
are threatened with a loss of power over an area that they traditionally dominate, but they also 
have the potential to access interactions and information which may enable them to retain this 
power. McNair, however, does not include empirical analysis of the spaces and actors from which 
this power could be derived, focussing instead on the broader argument that “Communication is 
the medium through which power resources are disseminated, and leaky channels of 
communication therefore mean less secure power centres” (McNair, 2006: 200). In this case 
McNair establishes that traditional power centres have become less secure, but he does not 
explicitly demonstrate where power sits or how it is used. 
Whilst the chaos paradigm describes the impact of technological developments on the 
culture of news production it has the opposite pitfall to that of convergence theory; it does not 
acknowledge how political and media elites utilise different platforms or media logics 
concurrently in order to exercise control over information flow. By failing to take this affordance 
into account, the chaos paradigm cannot provide a full description of the media system within 
which the news media agenda setting process occurs. It is important to acknowledge such cultural 
turns, but it is necessary to understand these in relation to the shifting nature of media logics. 
Media logics, defined by Altheide (2004: 294) as “the assumptions and processes for constructing 
messages within a particular medium,” have evolved so that whilst different media remain visibly 
separate from one another, they can come together easily and frequently. This process is not 
afforded for by either convergence culture or cultural chaos, nor is it explained or tested 
empirically in detail. As newer and older media logics interact, the roles of political elites, 
traditional media producers, and citizens in the news media agenda setting process are challenged. 
Chadwick (2013) offers an alternative conceptualisation of the media system that draws 
together these elements. The theory of the hybrid media system highlights the interdependence of 
different media platforms, and the fluctuation of media logics used during content creation and 
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dissemination. It also theorises on why political and media actors work to retain power over their 
traditional domains of content production. Chadwick (2013: 4) states that: 
 
Hybrid thinking rejects simple dichotomies, nudging us away from “either/or” patterns 
of thought and toward “not only, but also” patterns of thought… It reveals how older and 
newer media logics in the fields of media and politics blend, overlap, intermesh, and 
coevolve. 
 
In a hybrid media system different media platforms are interdependent and mutually influence 
each other. This has ramifications for the news media agenda setting process as it signifies 
changes to the power held by, and relationships between, actors that existed in a pre-hybrid 
system. From Chadwick’s conclusions I surmise that power over the news media agenda may 
potentially belong to any actor, but that it is most likely to belong to those who have the ability to 
direct information flows to meet their own goals. 
Criticisms of this work focus upon the narrative of political power as it functions in a 
hybrid media system. Chadwick claims that power functions in a relational manner, coming 
together through hybrid practices and logics, and presents evidence from a number of elite sources 
and case studies in support. But in his conclusions the author stops short of describing “exactly 
how old and new media and political powers were realigning” (Schillemans, 2014: 1111). 
Furthermore, the theory of the hybrid media system leaves normative questions unanswered 
(Napoli, 2015: 267). Inferences from these critiques are that the narrative of political power is not 
fully-formed by the author. However, I argue that Chadwick’s goal was not to provide a finite 
answer to questions regarding power in a hybrid system. Instead it aims to provides a theoretical 
framework for further empirical work in this area. As a theoretical framework, the hybrid media 
system provides a starting point for investigations into the structure of power relationships.  
The Hybrid Media System arrives at its conclusions through detailed and analytical case 
studies and interviews with journalists, clearly exhibiting the ramifications of hybridity in media 
production and dissemination. Regarding this method, the case studies presented are 
representative of a cross-section of different areas in which hybridity has a bearing. They are 
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thoroughly described and evaluated, and offer strong evidence for the theory Chadwick sets out 
to test. They do raise further questions for investigation: does the political information cycle exist 
in 2015 as it did in 2010? How does the shift in news-making assemblages affect the media 
agenda? Whilst this dissertation does not seek to overtly address these issues, it will assess 
information flowing through the political information cycle and, through observations, note news-
making assemblages.  
 The theory of the hybrid media system offers two important bases which ground this 
dissertation. Firstly, the shift from news cycles to political information cycles provides an 
important perspective on how the media agenda can become increasingly open to impact by a 
multitude of actors (Chadwick, 2011; 2013). Secondly, an understanding of power as relational 
allows for a conceptualisation of power that ebbs and flows through networks, hierarchies, and 
amongst actors. Chadwick draws on the work of David Singh Grewal who theorised on ‘network 
power’. Network power is power that emerges through social coordination; it exists within 
networks and is accessed through the expression of shared standards (Grewal, 2008: 4).  
I turn first to political information cycles. Chadwick uses live media ethnographies11 of 
the “bullygate” affair and the first live televised prime ministerial debate in the 2010 election to 
show how the prospect of intervention in the news media agenda by citizens – specifically those 
involved or interested in politics – is augmented (Chadwick, 2011a; 2013, 88-89). The cause, in 
a fragmented media environment, is the coming together of new and old media logics to form 
news assemblages. This provides evidence that the agenda-setting and framing powers once 
retained by political and media elites are under threat from other actors. The effect of this on the 
news media agenda setting process is the shift away from established methods of crafting a media 
agenda through controlled activity in a non-hybrid environment, to a process which must 
incorporate new media logics and assemblages - creating an agenda in response to the individuals 
involved and to the media used.  
                                                          
11 Chadwick (2011a: 3) describes this method as “close, real-time observation and logging of a wide 
range of press, broadcast, and online material, as the story broke, evolved, and faded.” 
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Enli and Simonsen (2017) provide examples of the meshing of media logics in their work 
analysing social media logics and their impact on the behaviour of journalists and politicians. In 
their study, Enli and Simonsen operationalise connectivity as the Twitter hashtag. They compared 
the use of hashtags by politicians and journalists and found that both actor groups used hashtags 
“in correlation with their professional norms and traditional roles” [italics in original] (Enli and 
Simonsen, 2017: 12). Whilst this study lacks a clear definition of what constitutes agenda-setting 
on social media – the authors implicitly suggest that the hashtags themselves comprise a social 
media agenda – it does demonstrate the meshing of media logics by elites as expected in a hybrid 
media system. 
 The second point raised above, understanding power as relational through the concept of 
network power (Grewal, 2008; Chadwick, 2013: 207), contributes to this dissertation’s 
conceptualisation of power. The UK has a media system where power relationships are being 
continually reconstructed as a result of actors’ interactions with social and technological 
networks. Pérez-Latre et al. (2011: 66) conduct a literature review of research into social media 
and find that “there is definite social trend towards people using technologies to get what they 
need from other people, instead of relying on traditional institutions like companies.” Citizens in 
online networks can draw upon resources and information from other members of their network, 
loosening the traditional control of elite actors. For politicians and journalists looking to set the 
news media agenda this necessitates gaining access to, and enacting control over, these networks.  
Marwick and boyd (2010) conducted research in Twitter’s early years to examine the 
decision-making behind influential users’ tweets. Their findings demonstrate evidence that their 
subjects’ tweets were often strategically released to manage their networks. I ascertain from their 
study that Twitter users with large followings are aware of their networked audience when they 
tweet, and carefully curate their output: “Managing the networked audience requires monitoring 
and responding to feedback, watching what others are doing on the network, and interpreting 
followers’ interests” (Marwick and boyd, 2010: 130). Although a criticism of their study is that 
Marwick and boyd do not specify the type of actors contained in their sample, those with large 
numbers of followers, over 15,000, show evidence of strategic maintenance of their audience. 
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Similarly, this dissertation hypothesises that political and media elites will look to exercise control 
over their online networks as a tool in the promotion of the messages. This will be taken as a 
action in order to set the media agenda during the election campaign. 
 
2.3. News media agenda setting and the role of authenticity in managed election 
campaigns 
 
McCombs and Shaw’s theory of agenda-setting focuses on the hierarchical power 
relationship between the media and the public. This focus renders other critical actors, political 
elites and citizens, passive in the agenda-setting process. As outlined in Chapter 1, the relationship 
structures through which power is exercised in order to set the news media agenda during an 
election campaign remain hierarchical, but there is an increased role to play for controlled 
networks of citizens. Election campaigns in many western liberal democracies occur in states that 
have reached near saturation point for the adoption of digital technologies; a study by Eurostat 
(2015) found that in 2014, almost “9 out of 10 individuals in Denmark, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom used the internet”. This has changed the 
landscape of communication, including how media is consumed and produced and challenging 
established roles in these processes. As a result political and media elites have developed new 
approaches in order to harness ICTs and retain power in areas where they traditionally held it, 
including agenda-setting.  
Recent literature has focused upon changes to campaigning and the strategies of control 
that have been developed as a result of the changes described above. For example, Stromer-
Galley’s (2014) theory of controlled interactivity furthers our understanding of directed 
interactions between political parties and their supporters during campaigns. Within a political 
party team, harnessing supporters and activists is integral to running a successful campaign. In a 
hybrid media system where older and newer media logics interlink and message control is less 
certain (Chadwick, Dennis, and Smith, 2016: 8), actions taken by supporters and activists need to 
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be directed by the campaign to maximise their efficacy and reach the campaign’s goals, including 
setting the news media agenda.  
 
2.3.1 Studies of agenda-setting during election campaigns 
 
In order to augment the scope of studies of agenda-setting in election campaigns, scholars 
take into account the role played by political parties, contrary to the more narrow media-only 
focus of earlier research. One recent extension of McCombs and Shaw’s original methodology 
was undertaken by Hopmann et al (2012). During the 2007 Danish national election, the authors 
collected data from broadcast news coverage and party press releases and subsequently undertook 
a content analysis to enable them to compare these data. The study demonstrates the centrality of 
political elites in the agenda-setting nexus during an election campaign. The authors recognise 
the increase in importance of the role of political parties’ in setting the news media agenda during 
election campaigns (Hopmann et al., 2012: 175). This recognition is important; it increases our 
understanding of the agenda-setting process by recognising motivations for political actors. 
This paper further identfies discrepancies and differences in the levels of influence that 
political parties can have over the news media agenda. It aims to understand why some parties 
were more influential in election news coverage than others. Their first key finding offers a 
springboard for development for this dissertation as Hopmann et al. demonstrate that political 
parties’ issue agendas, as established through the systematic analysis of their press releases, had 
an impact upon the broadcast news agendas (Ibid.: 182). Therefore parties have agency in this 
process and the role played by political parties in setting the news media agenda merits further 
investigation.  
The second finding, however, is tautological: “the more elaborate [hypothesis] on the 
relevance of parties suggest that a hierarchy exists: the more relevant a party is, the more success 
it will have with its press releases” (Ibid.: 183). The more relevant a political party is, the more 
likely it is to meet news values and be included in reports. Stories about powerful individuals and 
organizations are more likely to be accepted by journalists (Harcup and O’Neill, 2017: 1471, 
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1482). Solely analysing press releases in 2014 ignores the cornucopia of communications released 
by parties of all levels of relevance across online and offline media platforms. Although these 
findings support the theory of agenda-setting’s traditional conceptualisation of issue salience and 
transference, and apply it to a party-media relationship, they neglect the impact that less 
“relevant” parties could have through social media. 
Whilst limited, the strengths of Hopmann et al.’s study therefore lie in its demonstration 
of the role of political parties in the process of setting the news media agenda. It also implicitly 
demonstrated that political parties sought to control the media agenda during election campaigns. 
Kreiss (2012) builds on this in his research on the development of management in United States 
presidential campaigning. Whilst acknowledging the earlier work of scholars who recognised the 
new opportunities afforded to campaigners online (Barber, 1997; Bimber and Davis, 2003; 
Jenkins, 2006; Jenkins and Thorburn, 2004), Kreiss places the decisions and agency of political 
actors at the centre of his interpretation. The organization of election campaigns by party staff 
using computational methods and tools– actions Kreiss describes as ‘computational management’ 
– is found at the heart of the drive to direct party activists both offline and online. This provides 
further evidence that the environment and citizens are directed and controlled, or managed, by 
those involved in the campaign or news production. The impact on the news media agenda setting 
process is yet to be fully explored. 
Such tactics have inspired campaigners within the UK; the willingness of British parties 
to embrace US tactics is evident in the hiring of two major players in Barack Obama’s 2012 
presidential campaign. The Labour Party and the Conservative Party hired David Axelrod and 
Jim Messina respectively to advise them on communications in the 2015 UK general election. 
The three main UK political parties also developed strong computational strategies for the 2015 
campaign: 
 
Labour use[d] a version of Nation Builder software and retooled its Contact Creator 
System, while the Conservatives … attempt[ed] to rebuild their Merlin system in-house. 
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The Lib-Dems ha[d] perhaps the most robust system in the shape of the Voter Activation 
Network (VAN) - the same platform Obama used in 2012.12 (Nesta, 2014) 
 
Computational management is a strategy which allows political and media elites to control and 
direct the actions taken by their activists and supporters or audiences. Considering the challenges 
faced by elites who want to retain control of information and promote their message, and set the 
media agenda, managing citizen activity and the messages they receive through computational 
methods may allow them to achieve this. This is a strategy which is built upon hierarchical power 
relationships between elites and citizens, but which allows elites to use the networked connections 
that exist between supporters. It opens up possibilities for elites to share in network power but it 
also raises issues of authenticity in action and content, a critical characteristic that will be 
discussed below.  Effectively the process encourages activism while working to limit supporters 
to approved activities, as in Stromer-Galley’s (2014) theory of controlled interactivity.  
Strategies of management within campaigns, a part of which is constituted by 
computational management, form a key element of a political party’s approach to agenda or 
message promotion across all media platforms during a campaign. Studies like Hopmann et al 
(2012), therefore include a greater variety of actors in their analysis of agenda-setting. However, 
within the wider communication landscape, the scope of these studies is too narrow. By analysing 
only the relationship between broadcast news media and party press releases, the findings of 
Hopmann et al. – whilst empirically demonstrating a role of political parties in agenda-setting – 
cannot be used to explain the news media agenda setting process in a hybrid media system.  
Shehata (2010) builds on this need for a more holistic approach to studying agenda-setting 
during elections, and also outlines the impetus for strategies of computational management. 
Shehata paraphrases Stanyer (2007) and recognises that “political actors can no longer rely on the 
loyalty of citizens, just as media companies cannot rely on the loyalties of audiences” (Shehata, 
2010: 184). This argument is important for this research as it identifies that decisive and controlled 
                                                          
12 Nation Builder, Merlin, and the Voter Activation System are databases which store voters’ details and 
which are used by political parties in get out the vote efforts, they also enable communications to targeted 
groups of supporters and log campaign and supporter activity. 
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actions over communications, an exercise of power, need to be taken by political and media elites 
to retain their supporters and audiences. The necessity of bringing citizens into the fold by 
engaging with them during a campaign period is evident.  By studying individual-level effects of 
the media agenda during the 2006 Swedish national campaign through a panel study, Shehata 
found that despite concerns regarding the “individualization of media usage” there was a 
correlation between the media agenda and the public agenda13 (Shehata, 2010: 198). This “strong 
correspondence” clearly demonstrates that there is a continued hierarchy within the power 
structure of agenda-setting, the media agenda has an impact upon the public agenda. Considering 
this, it is vital to understand who sets the media agenda and how in an election campaign. 
Existing agenda-setting research does provide some insights into the relationship between 
social media and traditional media, with investigations of the association between Twitter content 
and media or party agendas expanding knowledge on this topic. A study by Vargo et al. (2014) 
demonstrated this correlation. They looked at agenda melding through the use of computational 
social science methods and empirically testing the NAS. This study compared the network issue 
agendas of Romney and Obama supporters in 2012 with the news media’s coverage. It found 
significant positive relationships between media content and supporters tweets, albeit with 
differences in the types of media (horizontal or vertical14) affecting Obama supporters and 
Romney supporters (Vargo et al, 2014: 310). Although a component of this study’s methodology 
is content analysis, used to identify network media agendas, a contribution of this work is its shift 
away from simply relying upon content analysis to demonstrate a relationship. The authors 
incorporated computational techniques and network analysis to establish the network public 
agenda15. 
                                                          
13 The public agenda is the sum of objects, generally considered as a hierarchy, which are most salient 
amongst the general publics’ view of current affairs. 
14 Vertical media “reach out to broad general audiences such as daily newspapers and network radio and 
television” (Shaw and Weaver, 2014: 145). Horizontal media “reach out for audiences with special 
interests” (Ibid.) 
15 The network public agenda differs from the public agenda in that the former term describes the ways in 
which objects and attributes are networked in the minds of the public whilst the latter describes a 
hierarchy of objects of attributes. 
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Margolis and Resnick’s (2000) ‘normalization theory’ brings focus to the retention of a 
hierarchical power structure in a media system. According to the authors, “cyberspace is taking 
on the characteristics of ordinary life” (2000, 3), for example the role of new media and online 
tools in election campaigns mirrors the role of older media. From this perspective, power relations 
are top-down and newer media are used to promote the message and push agendas, mirroring the 
usage of more traditional media. Their argument that “the evidence shows that those who have 
been powerful in the past – the established organizations, the wealthy, and the privileged – are 
moving into cyberspace and taking their advantages with them” (Ibid.: 208), is persuasive. The 
majority of most read online news producers are established media organizations. Figure 2.3 
displays evidence that seven out of the top 10 most-read news sites are provided by large 
traditional media organizations with strong, established audience bases. The news websites 
included which are “online-only” (Huffington Post and Yahoo! News Websites) are also notably 
large media organisations with a global reach, as predicted by the normalization thesis. 
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Figure 2.3. Most read news websites by UK users (in millions) in April 2013 and April 2014. 
 
Source: Statista (2015a) 
 
At the heart of the normalization theory is a conceptualisation of continued elite power 
structures and relationships. Theoretically, elite actors can transfer their offline actions to online 
spaces without any loss of control. Politicians and journalists can use the internet in an election 
campaign as a tool like any other; the internet and its affordances have been co-opted into existing 
practices and are now a normal part of campaigning repertoires. To a certain extent this is true. 
Statistics show that it is now standard practice for parties and candidates to have websites and for 
many candidates to use social media. During the 2015 UK general election campaign, 2,375 out 
of 3,849 prospective parliamentary candidates (61.7%) were active on Twitter.16 Additionally, the 
                                                          
16 Peader Grogan and Donie O’Sullivan. (2015). “Tracking election candidate activity on Twitter”, LSE 
Blogs, available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/generalelection/tracking-election-candidate-activity-on-twitter/. 
Accessed on 27/04/2015. 
17.21
6.75
5.21
4.73
3.73
3.31
3.15
2.7
2.69
2.56
20.82
7.04
7.27
5.66
3.4
4.81
3.4
0 5 10 15 20 25
BBC
MailOnline
The Guardian
Telegraph
Trinity Mirror Nationals
Yahoo! News Websites
Huffington Post
The Independent
Newsquest Media Group
CNN Digital Network
News and current event websites ranked by users in the United Kingdom 
(UK) in April 2013 and April 2014 (in million users)
Apr-13 Apr-14
60 
 
majority of traditional media producers also have an online presence, and produce content 
specifically for online consumption. With individuals increasingly turning to the internet to 
consume news17 from familiar sources, the normalization theory can explain why it might be 
possible for elites to retain power over their traditional areas of control.  
Nevertheless, the normalization theory is restrictive when seeking to understand agenda-
setting during election campaigns. Looking at power relations through the lens of normalization, 
we see power predominantly remaining in elite hands. Other exercises of power by other actors 
online become non-existent or insignificant. Citizens are merely a passive audience receiving 
communications, as in the era of mass media. Based on the other literature discussed here, I argue 
that this is not the case. Moreover, normalization is problematic when applied to newer media. 
The speed at which the technology and its uses can change, and the different uses for which newer 
media platforms are designed, mean that the normalization theory cannot be applied to this 
context. In the contemporary media system, media logics are adapted and integrated to suit the 
needs of the content producer and campaigners act pragmatically by integrating newer and older 
media tools to optimise their reach and promote their agendas (Vargo et al., 2014; Russell, 
Hendricks, Choi and Stephens, 2015; Lee, 2007). Therefore, the cyberspace world that Margolis 
and Resnick described in 2000 was simply the foundation of our contemporary media system, 
with hybridity of media platforms and practices becoming the new normal since their work was 
published. Theoretically, Wright (2012) sees a danger in discussing technological developments 
and their societal impacts as a dichotomous choice between normalization or revolution, namely 
that  
 
A more nuanced understanding of ‘revolution’ and ‘normalization’ is required, one that 
places it in a broader range of potential impacts, if we are to assess fairly how new media 
impact politics, and deliberation in particular. (Wright, 2012, 245) 
 
                                                          
17 The Pew Research Centre recently demonstrated that during the 2012 US Presidential election, 47% of 
respondents used the internet as their primary news source (Caumont, 2013).  
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The flexible and interdependent nature of the media system makes control of information 
and the process of setting the news media agenda increasingly difficult. This condition challenges 
agenda-setting as a retained area of power over which elites typically have control. Political elites 
therefore take actions to strengthen their control in this area. Stromer-Galley’s (2014) theory of 
controlled interactivity provides a behavioural dimension to the explanations provided by the 
theory of computational management (Kreiss, 2012). She describes the strategies employed by 
political parties and candidates to direct citizen activity in order to enhance their campaigns. 
Kreiss and Stromer-Galley both provide strong evidence that activists and supporters are directed 
to act in a desired manner. There is scope here for further investigation. Do citizens passively act 
in the manner directed by elites, or do citizens act independently in their interactions with 
campaign activity? 
 
2.3.2. Controlled Interactivity and Authenticity 
 
The theory of controlled interactivity was developed by Stromer-Galley, building on her 
earlier investigations into interactivity. In 2000, Stromer-Galley published work conceptualizing 
a duality in interaction, in which she concluded that “most political candidates are inclined 
towards a façade of interaction” (Stromer-Galley, 2000: 112). The duality explained in this work 
was between computer-mediated human interaction, described as “interaction between two or 
more people through the channel of a computer network” (Ibid.: 117) and media-interaction which 
is interaction “with the medium itself… without ever directly communicating with another 
person.” (Ibid.: 118). This work’s central assumption was that the internet is not used to reduce 
communication barriers during election campaigns. Drawing from this, Stromer-Galley argued 
strongly for the need to also consider media-interaction alongside computer-mediated human 
interaction in studies which analyse campaign interactions.  
Using a longitudinal approach and a qualitative lens, candidate websites from elections 
in 1996 and 1998 were analysed alongside interviews with campaign staff. This approach 
produced results that showed patterns across elections and different levels of state office. The 
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author noted that although channels for human interaction, for example email addresses or contact 
forms, increased from 1996 to 1998, they remained a “one-way, top-down communication 
paradigm” (Ibid.: 122-123). Crucially, Stromer-Galley identified loss of control “over the content 
of their site and over the communication situation in general” (Ibid.: 124) as one of the main 
reasons for campaigns’ focus on media interaction. Concluding, the author wrote that  
 
The use to which they put websites is primarily to provide information about the 
candidate – controlled, highly crafted information, similar to a campaign brochure or 
television advertisement. A second use is more novel: to provide a façade of interaction 
with the campaign and the candidate through media interaction. (Stromer-Galley, 2000, 
127) 
 
This work was followed in 2004 by a conceptual piece providing clarity on the concept 
of ‘interactivity’. This article built on the distinction between “interactivity between people” or 
“interactivity-as-process” and “interactivity between people and computers or networks” or 
“interactivity-as-product” (Stromer-Galley, 2004: 391). She developed the dualism of interaction 
in this article, warning of the risk of conflating the two types, and separating the different research 
questions that studying each can necessarily answer. She moved our understanding of online 
interactivity forwards through her insistence that studying media interaction allows us to see the 
“possible social and individual level effects” (Ibid.: 392). In doing so she rejects Rafaeli’s (1988) 
early definition that reciprocity is a critical component of interactivity. 
I agree with Stromer-Galley on this issue to a certain degree, keeping in mind that this 
particular article was released in 2004. Reciprocity is not a required characteristic of interactivity-
as-product. I argue, however, that in the context of social media in 2015 reciprocity is a requisite 
characteristic of computer-mediated human interaction as social networking sites are premised 
upon interaction between users and with the content shared by users within social networks. 
Studying interactivity allows us to see the ways in which elites work to exercise power in the 
news media agenda setting process; citizens can be mobilized to amplify the desired agenda or 
issue through newer media tools. Stromer-Galley developed the theory of controlled interactivity 
in her 2014 book. Through immersion in five US presidential campaigns, from 1996 to 2012, and 
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interviews with key political campaigners, the author arrives at the theory of controlled 
interactivity: “when we examine campaigns for their symbolic behaviours … much of what is 
offered as interactivity is a simulacrum” (Stromer-Galley, 2014: 5). Controlled interactivity 
explains campaigns’ use of digital communication technologies (DCTs) as a top-down activity, 
“DCTs are used to direct and control citizen-supporters to work in concert to achieve campaign 
aims” (Ibid.: 5).  
 Message control is a key part of controlled interactivity. Stromer-Galley identifies that  
 
part of the purpose of many of the applications campaigns built for Facebook, Youtube… 
were to facilitate the two-step flow and push super-supporters to work on behalf of the 
campaign, whether it was for GOTV efforts or … helping manage the chaotic messaging 
in the hybrid media environment. (Ibid.: 169) 
 
The author describes ways in which journalists and political elites “tried to amplify their 
message by tweeting about it or encouraging supporters to tweet about events or attacks on 
opponents so as to make a message ‘trend’” (Ibid., 146). Freelon has taken forwards Stromer-
Galley’s work and applied controlled interactivity empirically to the 2012 United States 
presidential campaigns, focussing on message control. He notes that current research on 
controlled interactivity “largely focuses on the architecture and implementation of digital 
campaign communication tools as opposed to the interactive processes that occur within them” 
(Freelon, 2017: 169-170). His work attempts to fill this gap with a study which quantifies 
controlled interactivity on Facebook during the 2012 US presidential election. Freelon focuses 
specifically on message discipline, an outcome I argue is important in the news media agenda-
setting process. Whilst agenda-setting differs from message discipline in its focus on salience 
transfer from elite to public agendas, the news media agenda setting process requires message 
discipline for the activation of network power.  
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Using a lexicon analysis18, Freelon demonstrates that differing levels of success for 
controlled interactivity on Facebook posts from the Obama and Romney campaigns. He 
highlights how controlled interactivity is a top-down process but exists in places where there is 
still space for agency of citizens (Ibid.: 169), which opens the possibility of challenging a 
campaign’s message or introducing new information into the debate. Freelon also highlights how 
“different types of interactive campaign environments and communication tools enact different 
degrees and genres of control” (Ibid.: 169). The results of his study describe a high degree of 
message control on both Romney’s and Obama’s Facebook pages. The author argues that this 
provides “evidence that the space’s interactivity was effectively controlled” (Freelon, 2017 :177). 
Freelon’s study is important as it provides a positivist test of the theory of controlled interactivity, 
complementing existing studies of controlled interactivity which have focused on structural 
elements. 
Whilst Stromer-Galley’s work is important for understanding the mechanisms through 
which citizens are directed to share messages, she does not deal with the issues of why they choose 
to do so. Beyond being supporters of a candidate or party, a choice which in itself may have many 
reasons, there is an assumption in the theory that citizens interacting with a campaign through 
controlled interactivity will always act according to the campaign’s desires if the criteria for 
control are met. This may be the case, and research assessing citizen choice within the framework 
of controlled interactivity would be pertinent here. However, I identify authenticity of 
communication as being a key factor in a citizen’s decision to interact with a campaign, or media 
producer, and share their message. By successfully mediating authenticity, as in Enli’s discussion 
of Obama 2012 (2015: 109-130), the authenticity contract – as described below – with citizens is 
upheld. The content of the tweet or post meets the standards for communication on a given site, 
and citizens have the confidence derived from network power to share the message further. 
Stromer-Galley’s work also includes a case study of the Obama campaign. Obama’s 
presidential campaigns are seen as a watershed moment in digital campaigning and so this is both 
                                                          
18 Lexicon analysis “detects the presence of different topics in a corpus of texts by searching for keywords 
associated with each topic” (Freelon, 2017: 172). 
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congruent with the body of literature and relevant.  Both studies assess the ways in which the 
candidates constructed their image. Stromer-Galley focuses on uses of social media to construct 
the candidates overall image and promote through social networks, whilst Enli focuses on the 
uses of social media to specifically make the candidate appear authentic19. I argue that these two 
foci work together in strategies of message control within the news media agenda-setting process, 
and both will be present in successful examples of setting the news media agenda.  
Authenticity plays an important role in enabling actors to meet communication standards 
on social media, and hence exercise network power. Enli has written extensively on the subject 
of authenticity. Her theory of mediated authenticity suggests that authenticity is constructed 
through authenticity illusions, which are the construction of the authenticity of actors through 
scripted performances. Illusions are created “through various production techniques, [where] raw 
material is manipulated in order to be compatible with media logics and format criteria” (Enli, 
2016: 121). Audiences accept these due to the authenticity contract made with media producers – 
“an informal agreement regarding where the line is drawn between reality adjustment and outright 
fakery” (Enli, 2015: 132). Enli finishes her investigation by suggesting seven characteristics of 
mediated authenticity drawn from her case studies: predictability, spontaneity, immediacy, 
confessions, ordinariness, ambivalence, and imperfection (Enli, 2015: 136-137). 
Enli’s work is premised on a series of case studies which present authenticity scandals, “mediated 
communication [which] fails and further introduces problems for audiences, as well as society at 
large” (Enli, 2015, 18), and authenticity puzzles, “when the media producers present a puzzle for 
the audience” (Ibid., 18).  The case studies include The War of the Worlds radio programme, 
Susan Boyle and reality television, and, as mentioned above, Obama’s presidential campaigns. 
The goal of the case studies is to use each puzzle or scandal to “illuminate a change in the relation 
between producers and audiences” (Ibid., 19). Central to Enli’s argument is that the development 
of new media technologies necessarily results in a renegotiation of the authenticity contract. There 
                                                          
19 Definitions of authenticity are a “moving target” (Enli, 2015: 2). In general authenticity is defined in 
opposition to fake or unreal events, information, and personalities. I describe my definition of authenticity 
of communication below, which will be used in this dissertation as a theoretical frame. 
66 
 
is no universal definition of authenticity within the literature, a fact which necessitates building 
an understanding of authenticity from relevant research on social media. This dissertation uses 
Enli’s mediated authenticity as the primary theoretical lens for this purpose. The characteristics 
which constitute authenticity of communication on social media, and which are analysed in later 
chapters, are informed by Enli’s characteristics alongside knowledge from other scholars studying 
the traits of newer media and authenticity which connect elites to citizens.  
 To be authentic as a mediated persona, whether a politician running in a campaign or a 
media producer promoting a story, is to uphold your end of the authority contract and to 
demonstrate those relevant characteristics of authenticity as required. Each medium has 
communication standards that should be met to be perceived as authentic. Standards are the rules 
of communication on a given site. These can be formal protocols “embedded in technological 
artefacts… [which] make sure that its specifications are incessantly applied” (Coretti and Pica, 
2015: 953). Standards are also the informal rule for communicating on, and with, a network. I 
define authentic communications on social media as those that meet the standards required by 
Twitter and Facebook, outlined below. The standards used in this dissertation are drawn from 
Enli’s characteristics. I define authenticity of communications on social media as constituting 
three of Enli’s characteristics as standards: (1) spontaneity; (2) immediacy; and (3) predictability. 
 This definition also follows work by other scholars studying authenticity of elite actors. 
Marwick and boyd (2010) asked Twitter users with a large number of followers what made their 
tweets authentic (“what makes an individual seem authentic on Twitter?” (Ibid.: 118)). Their 
respondents reported that a mixture of self-censorship and revealing personal information was 
critical in creating authentic communications (Ibid.: 125-126). The sample of Twitter users is not 
delineated in the article, but it appears from the discussion that the respondents are individual 
users who report using variations of confessions, ordinariness, ambivalence, and imperfection to 
communicate authentically with their imagined audience. These characteristics do not meet the 
professionalism with which media and political elites typically communicate on social 
networking sites, with notable exceptions (Enli, 2017). In contrast, spontaneity, immediacy, and 
predictability are applicable to expectations of elite communications held by citizens. Figure 2.4 
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contains the definition of each of these characteristics and demonstrates their applicability to 
social media content, drawn from current literature. 
 
Figure 2.4 Defining the characteristics of authentic communication on social media 
 
Enli’s definition 
(2015: 136-137) 
Additional 
work: 
connecting with 
citizens 
authentically 
Applicability to 
Social Media 
Definition 
Spontaneity Performances are 
rehearsed, 
directed, and pre-
planned to seem 
improvised and 
spontaneous. 
Montgomery 
(2001) described 
the perception of 
“unrehearsed 
discourse” 
(Montgomery, 
2001: 447) as 
necessary for 
authentic 
communication 
from political 
elites (study of 
UK election 
broadcast). 
 
Tweets and 
Facebook posts 
should not 
appear planned, 
even if they are.  
Authentic 
communications 
appear to be 
unrehearsed, 
spontaneous 
responses to 
events or actors. 
Immediacy The immediate is 
closely related to 
“liveness” and 
imparts a sense of 
togetherness 
whereby the 
producers and the 
audiences are 
interconnected in 
a shared “now” in 
which they 
construct meaning 
and authenticity 
together. 
Coleman and 
Wright (2008) 
reviewed work on 
political blogs 
and representative 
democracy. They 
noted that 
competition for 
time and attention 
has become an 
increasingly 
central concern 
for information 
dissemination and 
elites need to 
connect with 
citizens at a faster 
pace. 
 
Tweets and 
Facebook posts 
must be 
produced to 
react quickly to 
events and 
actors, updating 
with new 
information as 
soon as possible.  
Authentic 
communications 
are timely and 
contribute 
information to 
an event in a 
seemingly live 
manner. 
Predictability Mediated 
authenticity is 
crafted via a 
consistent use of 
genre features and 
conventions for 
mediated 
communication. 
Coleman (2006: 
458) described 
how “politicians 
require 
authenticity to 
gain their 
mandate, 
comprising both 
Tweets and 
Facebook posts 
must be written 
consistently 
within the genre 
of their network. 
Citizens expect 
to see tweets 
Authentic 
communications 
are predictable 
in that they 
contain the 
discursive 
features and 
technological 
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Trustworthiness 
of mediated 
content is often 
evaluated on the 
basis of previous 
experiences with 
the media. 
sincerity and 
consistency”. 
Consistency in 
communication 
style is an 
important means 
of constructing 
trust and 
connecting with 
citizens. 
containing 
markers such as 
retweets, 
hashtags, URLs, 
AV, and @ 
mentions, the 
tone may be 
more informal. 
Facebook posts 
may also contain 
URLs, tagged 
users, and AV, 
but the tone may 
be less informal 
and hashtags 
will rarely be 
used. 
standards that 
users expect to 
see. 
 
 
 The benefit of sharing ‘authentic’ content for message control within the process of 
setting the news media agenda is that it enables the producer to tap into social networks and their 
inherent network power:  
 
The support from the user network, in the forms of, for example, retweets or other 
mentions, is indeed an authenticity illusion because it provides tweets and updates with 
credibility, and thus makes users less critical than if the support is lacking. (Enli, 2015, 
93) 
 
Successfully mediating authenticity and combining this with strategies to enable controlled 
interactivity should therefore lead to increased message discipline among citizen-users through 
the manifestation of two-step flow and the use of network power, discussed further below. Both 
parties – media producer and citizen – agree to the authenticity contract. To engage successfully 
in the news media agenda setting process these factors must be present. However, when the 
authenticity contract is broken, for example when a tweet does not meet the communication 
standards required by Twitter users, I hypothesise that strategies of message control though 
controlled interactivity will not enable the actor to be successful in setting the news media’s 
agenda. I conceptualise this state as commodification of citizen-user content and action, where 
the direction of their agency is obvious and as a result they choose not to work with the elite actor, 
risking the potential for them to challenge or subvert information online. It will be possible to 
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identify when the authenticity contract is broken through comparison of the features of units of 
communication text with the standards outlined in Figure 2.4. Furthermore, assessment of citizen-
users reactions to, and comments on, the text will enable me to highlight breakdowns of the 
authenticity illusion. 
 With the establishment of controlled interactivity and authenticity as central to the 
theoretical framework of this thesis, questions are raised regarding how elite actors incorporate 
social media into their content outputs during a campaign. I seek to answer this question from a 
hybrid media perspective, considering how hybrid media logics are used to create authentic 
communications which travel across media platforms. Underpinning this is the concept of power: 
how do elites interact with each other? Who has power in the news media agenda setting process? 
How is power exercised through these relationships? I now turn to a discussion of that concept. I 
begin by looking at power specifically within studies of agenda-setting, and broaden this to 
question the way in which power relationships between actors have been evaluated within the 
media system more generally. 
 
2.4 Power in the news media agenda setting process  
 
2.4.1 Power in studies of the impact of the internet on agenda-setting 
 
Since the development and adoption of social networking sites, scholars have sought to 
understand their impact on the agenda-setting process (see Lee et al, 2005; Martin, 2014; Tran, 
2014). These studies have made many empirical advances, showing how fragmentation of news 
producers, content and audiences, and intermediality have impacted the agenda-setting process. 
These two foci are currently central within research on the influence of the internet on agenda-
setting during election campaigns. The first concentrates on changes in the media environment 
which have caused a fragmentation of news producers and their audiences, and as a result have 
rendered the agenda-setting process more difficult (Boyle, 1996; Schoenbach, de Waal, and Lauf, 
2005). The second analyses intermedia agenda-setting, the process of information from other 
news organisations or platforms having an impact upon each other’s agendas (Russell et al., 2015; 
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Sweetser, Golan, and Wanta, 2008; Lee, 2007). While these developments have generally been 
studied in isolation they exist in tandem, raising key questions yet to be addressed on the cross-
media interaction of fragmented audiences. This makes the questions “who sets the media 
agenda?” (which actors are involved), and “how is the media agenda set?” (what is the process of 
agenda-setting) particularly difficult to answer. 
However, one failing of this body of literature is that existing analyses of ‘internet 
agenda-setting’ are annexed from analyses of processes and relationships that exist in or between 
media. While understanding the effect of single media platforms and comparing between 
platforms is important, I argue that in neglecting the context of hybridity or intermediality these 
platforms operate within such studies cannot sufficiently explain how the media agenda is 
defined. There is also a need to build on existing literature through providing explanations of the 
dialectical nature of power that influences the news media agenda are missing from the literature. 
Without taking into account the hybrid nature of the UK’s media system and using a 
methodological approach which analyses cross-media information flow, it is not possible for 
studies to provide a complete description of the news media agenda setting process and relations 
of power in UK election campaigns. Not only has the nature of the media system changed, but 
the changes to processes of news production and dissemination are irrefutable. It has altered the 
way consumers receive and react to news stories. As outlined above, elites have had to adapt their 
news media agenda-setting process in order to try to retain their dominance. This results in the 
simultaneous use of power through hierarchical and networked channels. 
Tran (2014) explicates these differences and the difficulties and opportunities that the 
internet generated for agenda-setting research. He describes how “the wide variety of online 
communication channels” allows citizens to blend together a variety of media agendas to suit their 
own taste (2014: 221). This weakens the influence of the mass media. At the same time reciprocal 
relationships between the public, media, and social actors have increased (Ibid.). This creates a 
theoretical puzzle, which is at the heat of this thesis. While an increase in fragmentation of media 
production and consumption and an increase in intermediality have different impacts on the ways 
in which power is exercised in the agenda-setting process, they appear to work simultaneously. I 
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will argue that understanding the impact of these seemingly opposing forces reveals how and why 
power can function in the dialectical sense, combining hierarchical and networked forms. 
ICTs have become ubiquitous in everyday life (Fuchs, 2017: 86). News production and 
dissemination practices have adapted to these technologies to both produce content that audiences 
will consume, and to enable journalists to break news continuously (Saltzis, 2012). Moving from 
an era of mass media to the information age (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999), the news industry 
has incorporated online tools into their production and dissemination repertoires (Machin and 
Niblock, 2006). This serves as a way to not only break news quickly, particularly for traditional 
print organisations, but also to engage with and integrate the opinions and creative output of their 
audience (Schoenbach et al, 2005; Agarwal and Barthel, 2013). This process also functions 
inversely, with newer media providing a voice for citizens through lower barriers to media 
production such as blogs, micro-blogging platforms, and video-upload websites. Citizens also 
have an increased opportunity to talk back to media producers and political elites – using these 
same methods, whether or not their input is directly sought (Gillmor, 2004; Stanyer, 2009; 
Giglietto and Selva, 2014). 
In his review of online agenda-setting literature, Tran (2014) concludes that “Mainstream 
mass media entities still exert their agenda-setting power, but they are no longer a sole force.” 
Studies of power relationships have attempted to explain this phenomenon by analysing the 
impact of the internet on the agenda-setting process during an election campaigns. For example, 
work by Meraz (2009, 2011a, 2011b) centres on the relationship between blogs, print news 
producers, and their online blog outputs, addressing the question of who sets the media agenda. 
She demonstrates a symbiotic relationship wherein traditional news producers were more likely 
to impact blog output, but blogs did play a role in the redistribution of communication power from 
elites to citizens (Meraz, 2011b: 120). This suggests dispersal of communication power and 
therefore is important as evidence for elites’ loss of control over messages. 
Other research has found evidence for the opposing exercise of power through continued 
hierarchical relationships. In their study of the 2000 South Korean general election, Lee et al. 
(2005) concentrated on the role of intermedia agenda-setting between internet bulletin boards and 
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newspaper coverage. They found that “the Internet may be regarded as another source that 
influences the traditional news media in terms of intermedia agenda-setting” (Lee et al., 2005: 
68). Although this appears to describe power as dispersed throughout the internet they draw a 
more balanced conclusion, acknowledging the role of citizens whilst maintaining that media 
producers have dominance. The authors state that “this research has demonstrated that the Internet 
bulletin board may function as a channel that journalists are able to access in order to ascertain 
the climate of opinion in the shortest time” (ibid.). Therefore, these findings illustrate a two-step 
flow from the mainstream media to bulletin boards and then to the public; an interaction of 
hierarchical and networked power. Lee et al’s contribution recognises the impact of intermediality 
on the news agenda. This is meaningful for our understanding of the process of setting the media 
agenda. Their analysis of the way in which citizen discussion online can feed into news reports 
reflects a reality of news production which bears further investigation. Further studies of this 
intersection are required and this thesis contributes to moving our understanding forwards. 
More recent research has demonstrated the relevance of these findings to the UK general 
election that this thesis takes as its case study. In a micro-level study on the impact of the internet 
in the 2009 German federal election campaign, Jungherr (2014: 243) asked whether the number 
of tweets would follow their own pattern or reflect the amount of media coverage of actors. 
Jungherr (2014: 242) proposed a “logic of Twitter” grounded in Chadwick’s theory of a hybrid 
media system, which states that “the volume of comments on Twitter should rise when the volume 
of traditional news media coverage of political actors rises”. His findings are complex and add 
weight to the theoretical puzzle regarding power relations. On days where a media event took 
place, a debate or polling day, tweets closely followed the coverage from mainstream media. On 
the other days analysed, Twitter users tended to post in reaction to information from the Internet 
(Ibid.: 252). Jungherr’s inclusion of hybridity as a key theoretical element in his research is a 
particular asset of this study. The significance of his study lies in the evidence it provides that 
citizens on Twitter are at times led by, and at times independent from, mainstream media agendas. 
Although providing important insights, the studies discussed above are limited in scope 
for applicability of findings for election agenda-setting across media platforms as a whole. Studies 
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seeking to understand online or intermedia agenda-setting during elections must ensure they look 
across the wide variety of sources online to fully comprehend the process. This dissertation will 
build on the findings of these studies to analyse the process of setting the news media agenda. 
This argument is supported by Martin (2014: 28), who demonstrates how “research has not yet 
provided conclusive statements about the impact of information technology on both the media 
and public agendas, and their relationship in the agenda-setting process”. He seeks to remedy this 
by presenting findings from two studies of agenda-setting in two different elections. The first took 
place in the 2008 Indiana primary election using a content analysis of the Indianapolis Star, its 
website indystar.com, and readers’ comments available ‘below the line’ on indystar.com. The 
findings demonstrate extremely strong correlations between the print and online content, and a 
“distinct pattern of daily agenda setting from media to public as measured through the feedback 
comments” (Martin, 2014: 34). However, this was a short-term, immediate agenda-setting 
influence and was limited in scope as it only measured those who chose to consume the content 
of the Indianapolis Star. 
Martin’s second study focusses on the US Senate elections. He used McCombs and 
Shaw’s (1972) original methodology involving surveys and a content analysis to compare media 
and candidate agendas through news content and press releases. Two key findings emerged. 
Firstly, that the websites of traditional news organizations “maintain[ed] a strong agenda-setting 
influence on the public” in spite of the changes on how news is produced, consumed, and 
disseminated (Martin, 2014: 47).  Secondly, evidence was found to support the notion that 
candidates increase their efforts online to “influence the public’s consumption of election 
information” (Ibid.: 48). Whilst Martin’s studies use only content analysis to demonstrate 
correlations, they do provide strong evidence that a hierarchical power relationship exists. Yet, 
elites still need to increase their efforts in order to influence the agenda and control what citizens 
consume. This dissertation seeks to build on the literature outlined here by evaluating and 
understanding the power relationships through which these efforts occur. 
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2.4.2. Power Relations: Tension between theories of hierarchies and networks 
 
As online technologies have developed, networks of communities have come to exist in 
these spaces. In these spaces power can be exercised in a number of different ways. For example, 
in a hierarchical manner, such as through an official forum moderator, or be networked, moving 
from dispersed to directed depending on the news of the day or the actions taken by influential 
users (for example Twitter). Castells’ work underlines the workings of power in this system: 
 
Whoever the political actors and whatever their orientations, they exist in the power game 
through and by the media, in the whole variety of an increasingly diverse media system, 
which includes computer-mediated communication networks. (Castells, 2010: 507)  
 
That is to say that, regardless of the position a person or organization holds within society, the 
potential to affect information flows is inherent in all actors. Considering the concurrent 
professionalisation of political communication (Davis, 2000: 39-40), I expect to find evidence of 
predominant control of communication by elites working within a hybrid media system. Political 
and media elites will strategize to activate the latent potential of citizen networks in ways which 
may appear to relinquish some of their communicative agency to non-elites, whilst substantively 
maintaining a tight grip. Stromer-Galley (2014: 18) sees this as a continuation of a hierarchical 
power dynamic. Yet the position of the networked dynamic should not be easily dismissed and 
requires further investigation. 
The concept of power underlies all discussion within this dissertation, and is the thread 
that links the previous sections of this chapter. The literature available on power is vast and the 
concept itself is essentially contested (Beetham, 1991; Keohane and Nye, 2001; Haugaard, 2002: 
45; Latour, 2005; Lukes, 2005). However, there some particularly important interpretations which 
this review will assess, namely Grewal (2008), Foucault (1982), and Castells (2010). The 
predominant empirical understandings are the three faces of power: (1) Dahl’s (1963) decision-
making; Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962) agenda-setting; and (3) Lukes’ (1974; 2005) preference-
shaping. These conceptions do have some use for understanding the different forms of action that 
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an exercise of power can take. Setting the news agenda in an election, for example, may require 
a repertoire which encompasses all of these conceptualisations. Nevertheless, their 
conceptualisations are structural and top-down. They do not allow us to understand the reciprocity 
of power between actors in networked relationships. 
Throughout this chapter I have referred to Grewal’s (2008) theory of network power 
which uses relations of sociability to understand power that operates through social structures 
(Grewal, 2008: 44-45). Power in Grewal’s theory is relational and exists within social networks. 
It is effectively available for those able to join those networks. This is achieved by meeting the 
communication standards and standards required. Grewal describes clearly why actors may join 
a network: 
 
Where we can identify a pattern of consistent social behaviour that operates like a 
standard – regulating access to others by providing a framework for social coordination 
through conventionality – we should expect to see a positive feedback dynamic that 
makes it increasingly attractive for others to adopt the same behaviour. (Ibid.: 66) 
 
When we considered the fragmentation of audiences and the intermedia characteristics of news 
media agenda setting in a hybrid media system, it is clear to see that the power that lies within a 
network is pivotal to the news media agenda setting process. Tapping into the power of social 
networks, such as Twitter and Facebook, may offer elite actors a way to direct information flow 
in this more chaotic communication environment. I will analyse elite engagement with networks 
to assess their ability to use network power to direct their messages as part of the news media 
agenda setting process. 
An example of elites using social networks in this was is found in the work of Enli and 
Simonsen (2017) who analyse connectivity to assess the impact of “social media logic” on the 
professions of journalism and politics. The authors found that social media logic is strongly 
related to established media logics used within traditional media. By operationalising connectivity 
as the hashtag on Twitter, Enli and Simonsen analysed how ten Norwegian journalists’ and ten 
Norwegian politicians’ performed their roles on Twitter. Enli and Simonsen describe Twitter 
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hashtags as being endowed with power and agency (Ibid.: 3). This study therefore suggests that 
using hashtags is a way in which journalists and politicians can join, direct, or reframe discussions 
on the social networking site. Given that elite actors on average have a greater number of 
followers than citizen-users, journalists and politicians can have more impact through their use of 
hashtags (ibid.: 2).  
The findings of this study point to clear attempts by the elite actors to use the power 
inherent in the network, whilst also meeting and retaining established professional norms.  Overall 
a strategic use of hashtags in general was noted. Furthermore the politicians used a much higher 
number of hashtags than the journalists, with a total of 4,482 compared to 3,407 (Ibid.: 5). 
Politicians’ type of usage also differed to that of journalists. Politicians used more hashtags in 
retweets, whereas journalists used more hashtags in original tweets. According to the authors, 
“this tells us that, when contributing to a discursive hashtag network, the journalists aimed to 
contribute with a unique message, comment, or statement that in turn could be retweeted by other 
users” (Ibid.: 9). By sharing their own original content with a hashtag, journalists were aiming to 
introduce their own information into the online discussion, looking to take the lead in setting the 
agenda by working with existing network standards (pre-existing hashtags) (Ibid.: 10). I expect 
to find that in the UK general election campaign both groups of elite actors use hashtags in this 
way to try to direct social media discourse, and also encourage their supporters or audiences to 
use the organizations’ hashtags or share their tweets within their own networks. 
Arguments for relational power have developed in research over time. According to 
Foucault, power is relational: “if we speak of the structures or mechanisms of power, it is only 
insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise power over others” (Foucault, 1982: 786). 
Foucault’s concept of power was developed in the pre-Internet era, and hence he highlighted what 
he saw as the intrinsic separation of the exercise of relationships of power and the exercise of 
relationships of communication, although he did recognise that they are “relationships which 
always overlap one another, support one another reciprocally, and use each other mutually as a 
means to an end” (Foucault, 1982: 787). The work of Manual Castells helps us to overcome this 
tension and revisit relational power for the digital age.  
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In The Rise of The Network Society, Castells claims that “The network morphology is 
also a source of dramatic reorganization of power relationships. Switches connecting the networks 
… are privileged instruments of power” (Castells, 2010: 507). Structural power is inherent here 
in Castells description and whilst a division between communication and the exercise of power 
may have existed in the mass media era, the new media environment is characterised by the 
integrated nature of technologies and online media. Therefore, since exercises of communications 
and power can be symbiotic, this separation is no longer inevitable, particularly in the realm of 
agenda-setting. Through the reciprocal networks of communication described by Castells, the 
exercise of power includes communications as a key tool, and action has evolved to include the 
meshing of all three faces of power. 
Another tension within the literature is that Foucault’s understanding of power opposes 
an intrinsic element of the three faces of power; the three faces endow specific people or 
organizations with power, but, by definition, relational power could allow anyone, at any time, to 
exercise power over another, regardless of status. Although in practice Foucault recognised that 
relational power is organised in ways such that certain actors manage others’ conduct to a greater 
extent than others. The point is that hierarchy must be explained in every instance, historically; it 
is not a given. It can be argued that power only becomes visible and viable when it is effectively 
exercised by one actor over another. From this perspective it may be more useful for this thesis 
to analyse how power is exercised through networks, alongside hierarchical relationships.  
Grewal’s theory of network power allows us to do this. 
Gallagher (2008) interprets Foucault’s understanding of power as diverse and dispersed, 
situated not within individuals but with the relationships between them. Many of the studies 
discussed here challenge this by investigating the correlations between different forms of media, 
but what remains clear is the continued existence of hierarchy in relationships between actors 
during election campaigns. This is supported by authors who maintain that communications 
networks are hierarchical in the contemporary media system, and argue that media producers must 
continue to rely upon elite sources and the first or second face of power. For example, Graber 
(2006: 19) asserts that because journalists continue to rely on political elites as sources, their 
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hierarchical relationship remains. Yet Castells has argued convincingly for an approach which 
takes into consideration the “network society". He states that  
 
A network-based social structure is a highly dynamic, open system, susceptible to 
innovating without threatening its balance… the network morphology is also a source of 
dramatic reorganization of power relationships. (Castells, 2010: 501-502) 
 
If we understand power as relational, the flatter actor networks (Beckett, 2010, 2012; 
Thorson, 2013) which characterize much of interaction online could enable the exercise of power 
to be either more effective or more easily challenged. Castells’ arguments contradict the notion 
that hierarchical power structures remain fixed. “The rise of the network society”, as Castells 
explains, has reorganized existing structures. New technologies have led to “a network of 
producers and users who can communicate their experiences, cumulatively, learning by using and 
by doing” (Castells, 2010: 36). Yet the research presented here has shown that within agenda-
setting processes and election campaigning at least, a hierarchy does persist. Studies of agenda-
setting discussed throughout this review have tended to prioritise one actor over another, placing 
politicians, journalists, and citizens in a hierarchy. The same treatment is given to media 
platforms, even in studies of intermediality a hierarchy is often described. Yet, the process of 
setting the news media agenda is not so straightforward. Media logics and practices become 
hybridised, which leads me to question whether a similar phenomenon has happened to exercises 
of power. Going forwards, any notion of power relations between political elites, traditional media 
producers, and citizens in the contemporary media system must consider and include the 
networked nature of media platforms. It is these relationships of power between actors in the news 
media agenda setting process which require further investigation. Therefore, I seek to uncover 
how hierarchical power and network power co-exist within this fluid process.  
 
2.5. Conclusion  
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This chapter has addressed some of the current research on agenda-setting and election campaigns 
which seeks to answer questions regarding the news media agenda setting process and the 
relationships of actors involved. It has also incorporated a review of the relevant key themes of 
media systems, election campaigning, and power which are integral to understanding the process 
during the 2015 UK general election. I have established the context for communications in the 
election campaign as a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013), which facilitates the intermeshing 
of different media platforms and logics. I noted that due to the hybridization of media, the news 
media agenda and associated narratives become increasingly difficult to control. Additionally, 
literature on election campaigning shows that political and media elites use management 
strategies to control the activism of supporters and audiences, which leads to the question of 
whether this can be applied in a UK context, and what impact such tactics have on agenda-setting. 
Finally, power is exercised in two specific ways. Established hierarchical power relationships 
remain between politicians and journalists but face greater challenges on social media. In order 
to overcome this, elites attempt to access and use the network power that exists on social 
networking sites.  
Existing research into agenda-setting does not fully describe and explain how this 
important media effect functions in a contemporary election campaign. Whilst individual studies 
of the relationships between two media platforms and the actors using them – or a focus on the 
internet and related tools –do further our knowledge of the effect of ICTs, there is the need to look 
holistically at political information flows through the media system. This should occur 
simultaneously with a methodological development which does not rely on content analysis but 
analyses information flows across platforms and seeks to understand the behaviour of actors 
involved.  This would provide an extra dimension in understanding both why certain actions are 
taken in the news media agenda-setting process and how the agenda is set. 
Of the themes that run throughout this research, power is central. This study seeks to lay 
bare power relations and how they impact the news media agenda-setting process, alongside the 
way in which they are being received, challenged, or subverted by the different actor groups 
during the election campaign. Although it is accepted that power will be exercised through 
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strategies that reflect the three faces approach, this thesis places Grewal’s (2008) theory of 
network power at the centre. Alongside other understandings of relational power, such as that 
described by Foucault (1982), network power can be specifically applied to the structures of social 
networking sites and doing so enables an understanding of the ways in which becoming part of 
these networks may help political and media elites retain control over the news media agenda 
setting process. Relations of power between elites are specifically of interest in this process. 
Whilst research has framed either politicians or journalists as leading agenda-setting, I argue that 
the process is an ongoing negotiation for power between these two actor groups. This leads me to 
my first research question: (1) How do power relationships between traditional news media 
producers and political elites function in the 2015 UK general election campaign, and how do 
they impact the agenda-setting process? 
With message control central to campaigns, but under threat from a wider variety of 
actors, being able to use the networked power to direct information flows online – and activate 
two-step flow – offers elites a way to retain control over agenda-setting in this space. This gives 
rise to my second and third research questions: (2) How do traditional news media producers and 
political parties attempt to successfully harness network power?; and (3) How are social and 
digital media integrated into traditional news media producers’ outputs, and how does this impact 
their power relationships with political elites? 
However, in order to realise network power, an actor must become part of the network 
authentically. That is to say they must meet the communication standards of a given network, and 
the authenticity contract as described by Enli (2015) must be upheld. I define authentic 
communication on social media as meeting the standards of spontaneity, immediacy, and 
predictability. Meeting these criteria will enable elites to more fully enact message control, and 
hence agenda-setting, through controlling the interactivity of their networks with the information 
they are promoting (Stromer-Galley, 2014). Conversely, if communication standards of a network 
are not met then I expect to find that the authenticity contract is compromised and actions taken 
by elites in social media spaces therefore become inauthentic. This results in citizen-users being 
less likely to share information as directed by a political or media elite. Inauthenticity reveals 
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strategies of controlled interactivity to citizens. Whilst under controlled interactivity citizen-users 
may have felt they were working alongside a campaign, through inauthentic action they become 
privy to their commodification. This may produce a negative reaction, whereby citizens challenge 
or subvert messages online and the elites lose control of the agenda. 
My final three research questions are drawn from these expectations: (4) How are (i) 
information sourced from social media, and (ii) the technological affordances of social media 
incorporated into the process of setting the news media agenda?; (5) Do citizen-users on social 
media play any role, such as intervention in the information cycle, in the process of setting the 
agenda?; and (6) Do citizen-users on social media replicate or challenge agendas? These questions 
will guide my research to analyse the role of each actor group in the news media agenda setting 
process as enacted through social media. They will also enable me to describe the procedures by 
which journalists and politicians use hybrid media logics to access network power.  
 Understanding power as relational, existing through networks within a hybrid media 
system, therefore makes room for citizens rejecting power as expressed through agenda-setting 
but can still accommodate the existence of a hierarchy. With both hierarchical and networked 
relationships existing within an increasingly chaotic media environment, this thesis hypothesises 
that controlled interactivity strategies that appear as authentic may be an important part of the 
news media agenda setting process. The aim being to harness networks of party activists or media 
audiences to promote agenda items and desired messages during a campaign. It is expected that 
social media in particular will play a role in this through the process of two-step flow (Katz and 
Lazarsfeld (1955). However, the risk of commodification remains if the action does not meet 
communication standards and hence breaks the authenticity contract.   
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Chapter 3 Methodology and Research 
Design 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis uses qualitative methods to analyse and describe the process of setting the news media 
agenda in the 2015 UK general election. Bryman defines qualitative research as a “strategy that 
usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data” 
(Bryman, 2004: 19-20). Bryman elucidates the indicators of qualitative research, which include 
(1) an inductive approach to theory and research; (2) “an emphasis on the way individuals 
interpret their social world” (ibid.: 20); and (3) the embodiment of “a view of social reality as a 
constantly shifting emergent property of individuals’ creation” (ibid.). These indicators underpin 
the design of this dissertation’s methodology. I chose a qualitative methodology to enable me to 
understand the decisions taken by individuals who wanted to be a part of the news media agenda 
setting process. Some descriptive statistics are used but this dissertation moves away from the 
methodological reliance on quantitative analysis prevalent in agenda-setting research. 
 This chapter begins by recapping the key theoretical assumptions of this dissertation and 
the rationale for its qualitative approach. It then describes each method used to collect and analyse 
data, and their relevance to the research.  The research consists of semi-structured interviews with 
political and media elites, observations of two news production teams, and case studies of two 
news events which occurred during the election campaign. The analytical approach comprises 
qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis of content produced and disseminated by all 
actor groups. This data will be triangulated with information from interviews conducted with 
political actors – candidates and staff – and with journalists and bloggers, and from observations 
of journalists at BBC Radio 4’s Today programme and ITV News’ Election 2015. The output will 
be a thick description which will detail power relationships and the news media agenda-setting 
process. By combining these three methods, this dissertation can evaluate communications, 
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understanding them within the behavioural context of elite interactions and actors’ own beliefs 
about the media system.  
This dissertation analyses the relationships and structures of inter-elite communication 
power as well as elite-citizen power relationships. In this way it is situated within a broad body 
of literature comprising research on interactions between actors during elections. From seminal 
studies such as Margaret Scammell’s Designer Politics: How Elections are Won (1995), to more 
recent work such as Rasmus Kleis Nielsen’s Ground Wars (2012) and Cristian Vaccari’s Digital 
Politics in Western Democracies: A Comparative Study (2013), scholars have sought to 
understand how political campaigners, media producers, and citizens interact during election 
campaigns and what impact the media system has on those interactions.  
Researching communication processes across online and offline media poses difficulties. 
Online research, in particular, poses problems for both data collection techniques and the quality 
of the resulting datasets. Two of the most ingrained problems for researchers are: (1) the problem 
of rapid change in the online environment; and (2) the problem of flawed datasets and untested 
research methods. A number of studies will be considered in this chapter and their approaches to 
understanding the relationship between actors online will be assessed. Research by Jungherr 
(2014) is included in which the author studies intermedia agenda-setting by comparing the 
relationship of political coverage on Twitter with coverage in the traditional media during the 
2009 German Federal Election. Abascal-Mena, Lopez-Ornelas and Zepeda-Hernandez (2013) 
studied communications on Twitter during the 2012 Mexican General Election, their study 
demonstrates the value of computational methods in social science research designs. Work by 
Anstead and O’Loughlin (2015) provides a good example of a mixed-methods approach and 
successfully integrating tools to understand how social media data were used by media producers 
and other elites during the 2010 UK General Election campaign. I critically evaluate their methods 
used and conclusions drawn, using these to question current approaches and to suggest ways in 
which this thesis can begin to overcome some of the problems faced when studying agenda-setting 
in election campaigns. 
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Using a research design that incorporates mixed-methods and a qualitative approach 
enabled me to collect data and to react quickly to breaking news stories during the campaign. I 
use an “integrated analysis” of the data developed by Moran-Ellis et al. (2006: 54). It involves the 
generation of a number of different datasets, followed by the identification of themes and analytic 
questions across the data. These provide “threads” for further investigation which will “generate 
a multi-faceted picture of the phenomenon” (ibid.) For this research the datasets include interview 
transcripts, participant-observation field notes, tweets, Facebook posts, online and offline news 
media articles, and broadcasts. 
Using mixed qualitative methods will enable me to understand the behaviours, strategies, 
and reasons behind actions taken by political and media elites. Within research on agenda-setting, 
case studies and content analysis are prevalent as the most common methods used. Comparative 
intermedia approaches analysing relationships between two media platforms or organizations are 
also common. To contribute to the progress of this field, this dissertation uses a qualitative 
research design based on pragmatism and flexibility. I take a cross-media approach to my analysis 
of interactions in the UK’s media system; a driving force of this study was the need for researchers 
to consider the agenda-setting process across the media system. The methodology reflects this 
assumption and is part of growing a body of work which uses cross-media research to investigate 
communication and the “interrelatedness of media” (Hasebrink and Hepp, 2017: 364). 
The methodology of this dissertation is also informed by Salmons (2016) description of 
deep data. The availability of ‘big data’ gives researchers the opportunity to collect and 
quantitatively analyse vast datasets, and doing so produces a “broad but shallow” outcome 
(Salmons, 2016: xiii). Analysing a ‘big data’ corpus of tweets was a consideration when designing 
this research. However, approaching the dissertation from an interpretivist standpoint led me to 
select qualitative methods, which offer the opportunity to not only observe online interactions but 
also to ask questions of subjects in order to understand their behaviour. This was achieved through 
the use of interviews and participant-observations. In arguing for a turn towards qualitative 
methods in political communication research, Karpf et al (2015: 1890) highlight how “Qualitative 
approaches help us answer the how and what questions that must be addressed in order to answer 
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the why and so what questions.” I combine qualitative methods with analysis of content produced 
by political parties, news producers, and citizens in order to understand the roles each play in the 
news media agenda setting process. 
This chapter begins by outlining the theoretical and methodological underpinnings which 
inform this research. It describes the challenges faced when conducting research online and the 
steps taken to overcome these. The second part of this chapter describes the methodological 
approach to data collection and analysis which will answer the research questions posed in 
Chapter 1. The methodology comprises qualitative mixed-methods, including observations, semi-
structured interviews, and discourse analysis. It recognises the limitations inherent in internet 
research and posits ways of overcoming these to collect data for analysis. 
3.2. Designing research for thick description: Identifying commodification and 
controlled interactivity?  
 
This dissertation places Grewal’s (2008) theory of network power at the centre of its theoretical 
framework. The theory of network power is also measured in relation to the continuation of 
hierarchical power relations between elite actors. Brought together, this conceptualisation offers 
a reflexive interpretation of power, making room for citizens to respond to media agendas within 
networked relationships whilst accommodating the continued existence of a hierarchical order 
comprised of media and political elites. Methodologically, observing network power poses some 
challenges. It must be established that, firstly, network power relations exist between citizen-
users, and secondly, that elite actors have tried to harness that power and, in doing so, have 
subsequently been successful or unsuccessful. To this end I employ thick description (Geertz, 
2003) to ensure correct identification of power relationships and exertions, an accurate analysis 
guided by the research questions, and internal validity20. Described by Geertz (2003: 158) with 
regard to ensuring reliability in ethnography:  
 
                                                          
20 Internal validity in qualitative research is defined as “whether there is a good match between researchers’ 
observations and the theoretical ideas they develop” (Bryman, 2004: 273). 
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The ethnographer ‘inscribes’ social discourse; he writes it down [emphasis in original]. 
In doing so, he turns it from a passive event, which exists only in its moment of 
occurrence, into an account, which exists in its inscriptions and can be consulted. 
 
By inscribing a thick descriptive account of information flow across media platforms I will be 
able to demonstrate actions taken by elites to harness network power, the success of these actions 
on social media sites, and citizens’ responses to elite communications. 
A multitude of different power relationships can exist between actors and can be active 
during the agenda-setting process. Therefore selecting methods to collect data which will enable 
me to observe and understand the different configurations of power is paramount in this research 
design. In order to reach the required depth of detail in data, I selected observation of news teams 
and interviews with journalists. These methods were used by Williams et al. (2011) to understand 
how audience content was included in the BBC’s news output and enabled them to describe how  
“the rise of UGC [user-generated content] at the BBC has largely involved harnessing audience 
material in order to fit within existing long-established processes of journalistic production” 
(Williams et al., 2011: 94).  
Political parties have a variety of relationships to manage. To set the agenda they must 
engage with traditional media organizations as well as with activists and party supporters. 
Additionally, their campaigns must try to capture the attention of undecided citizens; those who 
may not support a party or be particularly engaged in politics. The use of interviews with 
candidates and party staff, combined with an analysis of the information outputs of political 
parties, will enable me to analyse how parties and individual politicians use online media to 
manage their relationships and promote their content. The work of Enli and Skogerbø (2013) sets 
a precedent for the use of these qualitative techniques. The authors explored the reasons behind 
the social media use of individual politicians: “The research design can be described as 
explorative, qualitative and longitudinal, aiming to identify development and emerging practices 
of social media strategies and user patterns practice in Norwegian politics” (Enli and Skogerbø, 
2013: 760). These relationships may be activated in a number of ways by elites seeking to exercise 
agenda-setting power in a hybrid media system. This necessitates an understanding of power 
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relationships which is multidimensional, incorporating networked and hierarchical power 
structures.  
Recapping the theoretical framework described in Chapter 2 outlines the necessity for 
thick description drawn from a variety of methods to constitute this dissertation’s methodology. 
I am seeking to understand how the news media agenda is set during the 2015 UK general election 
campaign taking place in a hybrid media system. Within this, I expect to find evidence of 
controlled interactivity or commodification of citizen-users. I further expect that commodification 
of citizen-users will be related to inauthenticity in communications, that is to say producing social 
media posts that do not meet the standards of a social networking site outlined in Chapter 2 render 
a communication inauthentic. Inauthentic communications do no grant the originator access to 
network power.  
This is a complicated process. Mixed methods are necessary to assess it and find, or 
otherwise, evidence of commodification of citizen-users and the impact on setting the news media 
agenda. In order to analyse not only the communications released during the election campaign, 
but to understand how and why elites create communications to travel cross-platform and become 
a part of the news media agenda setting process, requires the behind-the-scenes quality of 
participant-observation and interviews. The triangulation of these methods with content and 
discourse analysis will reveal the full picture of the news media agenda setting process. 
 
3.3. Facing the challenges of online research: choosing a qualitative approach 
 
A central theme of this dissertation is that developments in ICTs challenge the established role of 
political elites, traditional media producers, and citizens in both content consumption and 
production. According to Karpf’s (2012) theory of “Internet time”, “the Internet’s effect on media, 
social, and political institutions will be different at time X from that at time X + 1, because the 
suite of technologies we think of as the Internet will itself change within that interval” (Karpf, 
2012: 640). I agree with Karpf that our methodological toolkit must grow to include 
interdisciplinary approaches, mixed-methods, and computational social science. This is 
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particularly important when accurately capturing data during a fast-paced election campaign. This 
research design takes into consideration the difficulties imposed in capturing datasets across 
media platforms, and also Karpf’s recommendations for the use of more creative and pragmatic 
methods when collecting data from an unstable online space.  
The aforementioned developments in ICTs pose a number of problems for those seeking 
to understand political communications holistically. Firstly, information can flow in a number of 
directions – see Figure 3.1 which shows a typology of communicative practice compiled by 
Jensen and Helles’ (2010). Information flows move not only in a one-to-many pattern, but one-
to-one, many-to-many, and – as Jensen and Helles (2017) later acknowledged – many-to-one. 
These available pathways make our a priori assumptions about actor relationships in campaign 
communications unreliable. Therefore when designing and executing this study I was prepared to 
find a number of combinations of power relationship structures between political elites, media 
producers, and citizens.  
 
Figure 3.1. Six communicative practices 
 Asynchronous Synchronous 
One-to-one Email, text message Voice, instant messenger 
One-to-many Book, newspaper, audio and video 
recording, Web 1.0/webpage, 
download 
Broadcast radio and television 
Many-to-many Web 2.0/wiki, blog, social 
network site 
Online chatroom 
Source: Jensen and Helles (2010) 
 
Secondly, information flows move faster than in previous elections, evolving or 
challenging the narrative of news stories. Chadwick’s (2011a) thick descriptive study of the 
“bullygate affair”21 was produced using data from online spaces. This research clearly shows the 
wider remit for action available to citizens in news content creation or the challenging of agendas. 
It additionally highlights changes to the news cycle. The methodology of this study demonstrates 
                                                          
21 ‘Bullygate’ refers to a political scandal which occurred when then Prime Minister Gordon Brown was 
accused by an ex-employee of bullying his staff. 
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that it is important to use complementary qualitative methods to understand the strategizing 
behind actions or decisions, alongside textual analysis to understand information flows across 
media platforms. With “Internet time” changing the nature of media from one election to the next, 
we cannot assume we know how actors will behave, or why they take certain actions and 
decisions. Researchers must observe and speak to campaigners and news producers to get a deeper 
understanding of their behaviour. 
Further developments which must be accounted for include an increase in cross-platform 
communications, for example the interdependence of newer and older media, such as television 
broadcasts and social media used strategically in campaign repertoires. Researchers should 
therefore approach their field with – as Karpf posits – the basic pillars of openness and 
pragmatism in mind. “Internet time” tells us that the internet is consistently changing and 
developing new capacities. As a result, designs for internet research not only need to be open and 
honest about the limitations faced when studying political communication in an online 
environment, but also need to be more flexible and pragmatic. With these goals in mind, the 
research design presented here was devised to ensure that potential flaws in the online dataset are 
accounted for.  
This dissertation uses data collected from both Twitter and Facebook in its analysis. This 
process is explained in section 3.4.1. To illustrate some of the challenges facing researchers on 
social media sites I consider a number of studies that focus upon or incorporate data collected 
from Twitter in their findings. Twitter is a popular source of data for scholars working within the 
field of political communication and elections because of its relatively open nature, the ease of 
data-scraping, and the opportunities it offers to ‘listen in’ to citizens’ and elites’ conversations. 
The social networking site had increased its number of monthly active UK users from 30 million 
at the beginning of 2010 to 304 million by June 2015 (Statista, 2015d). In 2015, Twitter allowed 
users to post tweets of 140 characters. Users can follow other users and see their tweets in a 
timeline, and also use hashtags – ‘#’ – to follow and contribute to conversations on specific 
subjects.  
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Twitter has had an impact on both the way in which elites communicate with citizens and 
the reach that they have among voters, that is to say, the number of people a message can 
potentially reach. Figure 3.2 demonstrates this importance through a comparison of the numbers 
of followers of the accounts of the leading UK newspapers and political parties and the number 
of people they can reach through print circulation or party membership. The data – collated just 
prior to the 2015 General Election – clearly shows how the majority of newspapers had a higher 
reach online than through print circulation. Furthermore, Twitter output had the potential to reach 
more voters than membership did, particularly for smaller political parties. Therefore Twitter, and 
other social media sites, provide a vast array of data which internet researchers can mine. 
Unfortunately harvesting data from social media websites can pose a number of problems, as the 
below review of election studies and their methods demonstrates. 
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Figure 3.2. Number of Twitter followers of selected newspapers and political parties compared to readership or party membership (data correct on 
21/04/2015) 
Newspapers Political Parties 
 
Number of 
followers 
Circulation 
Circulation as a 
% of Followers 
 
Number of 
followers 
Party 
Membership 
Membership as a 
% of Followers 
The Guardian 3,512,475 185,429 5.60 Labour 201,617 c.190,000 94.24 
Financial 
Times 
2,920,255 219,444 7.51 Conservatives 150,480 c.149,80022 99.55 
The 
Independent 
1,149,728 61,338 5.34 The Green Party 128,536 c.44,000 34.23 
The Sun 736,053 1,978,702 268.8223 
Liberal 
Democrats 
91,503 c.44,000 48.08 
Daily 
Telegraph 
937,172 494,675 52.78 UKIP 96,071 c.42,000 43.72 
 
Source: Follower numbers collected from each organizations’ Twitter account. Newspaper circulation sourced from Turvill (2015). Party membership figures sourced from 
Nardelli (2014) 
  
                                                          
22 The Conservative Party “does not routinely public membership estimates”, this figure comes from the latest available data released by CCHQ in 2012 (Keen and Audickas, 
2016: 10) 
23 The Sun was the only newspaper to have a circulation larger than its number of Twitter followers. 
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3.3.1. Methodological lessons from existing research 
 
Jungherr’s (2014) study focuses on the logic of political coverage on Twitter during the 
2009 German Federal Election and its relationship with political coverage in the traditional media. 
It is a study of intermedia agenda-setting. His key questions focus on the relationship between the 
actions taken by citizens on Twitter and their relation to actions taken by news media, political 
parties, and candidates. The key measure of the study is “whether the volume of Twitter messages 
increased in parallel to increases in media coverage of political actors or if fluctuations of political 
Twitter messages followed another rhythm” (2014: 243). 
Jungherr asserts that “non-traditional actors have the possibility of becoming part of the 
discourse” (ibid.: 242), which is expected to happen in the form of a correlation with traditional 
media output. In order to test this, the author examined datasets from the German Longitudinal 
Election Study (GLES) 2009 Campaign Media Content Analysis, the GLES 2009 Campaign 
Media Content Analysis: TV, and “A dataset collected by Pascal Jürgens and the author during 
the campaign for the federal election in Germany 2009, documenting all messages by politically 
vocal Twitter users in Germany” (Jungherr, 2014: 243). Jungherr chose datasets that should 
produce reliable findings. However, a weakness, highlighted by the author, is the potential for 
bias by only collecting tweets containing hashtags. The author is open when discussing this 
limitation: “The active use of hashtags presupposes a certain level of Twitter proficiency; users 
below this level are thus excluded from the analysis” (Jungherr, 2014: 244). However, the key 
caveat is that using hashtags acts a filter to analyse messages that “users posted with the clear 
intention of contributing to political discourse” (ibid., see also D’heer and Verdegem, 2014: 725), 
ensuring relevancy and applicability of data. Therefore the use of hashtags was not a hindrance 
in compiling a dataset for this study. During the 2015 UK General Election campaign the 
promotion of specific hashtags related to media events and within traditional or online media was 
widely used, directing the audience to take part in discussion in a controlled manner. 
Abascal-Mena et al. (2013) also carried out an election study using Twitter which 
demonstrated the value of computational methods in social science research designs. Focussing 
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upon the 2012 Mexican General Election, the authors created a computer program to extract all 
tweets containing the hashtag #AMLO24 with the aim of analysing the interactions of voters on 
Twitter before, during, and after the election. Once extracted, a discursive analysis was carried 
out upon the dataset using a computational method, to understand the nature of voter discussion 
and its change over time. The authors’ findings were useful for understanding how citizens-users 
construct tweets. Abascal-Mena et al. (2013: 12) concluded that they were “able to find sequences 
that convey, in a remarkable way, mood traits like ethnographic, semantic and psychological 
elements that are constant throughout the corpus”. This study demonstrates the utility of reliable 
computational methods for data collection and analysis, and also the continuing importance of 
discourse analysis as a means for understanding relations between actors in an online 
environment. 
Both studies described here acknowledge the problems inherent in collecting and 
analysing data from Twitter in a reliable or replicable fashion. Each tries to overcome it in their 
own way, through quantity of tweets collected, the ‘right’ approach being taken in terms hashtags 
or key words being used, or the length of time set aside for data collection. The number of different 
approaches and use of newer methods is to be lauded. However, both studies do maintain rigidity 
in their internet research according to pre-defined specifications. When sourcing data from a 
social media website during an election, with its speed of change and difficulty archiving outputs, 
researchers must be always alert for the occurrence of the next ‘media event’ in order to capture 
citizens’ reactions in real time, or close to real time. If working proactively, they must be both 
willing and able to adjust their methods as the campaign progresses. This flexibility allows for a 
more rounded and complete dataset to be collected that will, in turn, provide a more 
comprehensive picture of voter and elite communications online. 
Anstead and O’Loughlin (2015) use a mixed-methods approach in their work on semantic 
polling25. Their study provides an example of a successful meshing of tools to understand how 
                                                          
24 AMLO is an acronym for candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. 
25 Anstead and O’Loughlin (2014: 209) define semantic polling: “The semantic polling process has three 
elements. First, it involves the harvesting of large datasets from social media services online (in 2010, this 
meant datasets almost exclusively from Twitter). Second, those datasets are analysed using computer-
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social media data were used by media producers and other elites during the 2010 UK General 
Election campaign. The authors’ approach to understanding semantic polling in the 2010 General 
Election uses not only a qualitative analysis of news media output which discusses social media 
during the election, but also “interviews with social media researchers, opinion pollsters and 
journalists working in the area” (ibid.: 205). Their methodology allows them to draw conclusions 
about the impact of social media analysis during the election as presented in media coverage. 
Hence they are able to see how information on one platform is represented on another, and 
concurrently to collect evidence as to decisions taken regarding usage of the data by speaking to 
those directly involved.  
Finally, there are lessons to be taken from the most recent development in agenda-setting: 
the third-level of agenda-setting or network agenda-setting model (NAS). NAS studies have been 
forward-thinking when developing a methodological approach to test network agenda-setting 
(Guo, 2012). Their use of content analysis of media coverage, surveys and mind-maps to ascertain 
public opinion, network analysis and the Quadratic Assignment Procedure to explore matrices of 
data, as well as network visualization tools, is a novel approach to understanding agenda salience. 
Mind-mapping, as used by Guo and McCombs (2011b) is a particularly noteworthy 
methodological innovation. Undertaken in two stages, participants were first asked to list up to 
five attributes each of two Texas gubernatorial candidates and secondly to make connections 
between the assertions if they felt there were any. Mind-mapping in this way allows researchers 
to explicitly obtain how participants’ link attributes or objects, and is therefore preferable to the 
implicit outcomes of survey methods as a measure of public agendas. 
Scholars have also tested NAS with big data from social media, finding support for the 
model (Vargo and Guo, 2016). Vargo et al. (2014) studied agendas in the 2012 United States 
presidential election and built on earlier findings (Vargo, 2011) that “traditional newscasts and 
newspaper articles can forecast the total amount of Twitter chatter an issue receives” (Vargo et 
                                                          
based natural language techniques to attribute some kind of numeric indicator of sentiment to it, most 
often relating to the number of positive to negative comments about specific politicians, parties, or 
policies. Finally this information is put into a format, numerical or graphical, suitable for public 
dissemination.”  
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al., 2014: 297). In their study, the authors used Shaw and Weaver’s (2014) differentiation between 
“vertical” and “horizontal” media to test which had a larger agenda-setting effect. Vertical media 
“reach out to broad general audiences such as daily newspapers and network radio and television” 
(Shaw and Weaver, 2014: 145). Horizontal media “reach out for audiences with special interests” 
(Ibid.) and may constitute “magazines, many cable television programmes, talk show hosts, blogs, 
websites, and Twitter” (Ibid.). Vargo et al (2014) highlight the importance of NAS for establishing 
linkages between issues or attributes. They also raise the criticality of the ability of the model to 
measure the centrality of issues within a network. This ability allows researchers to understand 
contextual positions rather than obtain a simple hierarchical list as with the first- and second-
levels of agenda-setting. 
Whilst big data studies of social media and traditional media coverage are useful in 
showing the networks of objects and attributes on the media and public agendas, and how salient 
the media agendas are, they cannot show either the creation of the media agenda or explain how 
information is directed across media platforms by elites in order to set the news media agenda. 
NAS is the most useful way of assessing agenda-setting effects in the UK’s media system and it 
offers some methodological insights that this research can benefit from. The third-level of agenda-
setting is relevant to the theoretical perspective of this dissertation, which understands that many 
different sources of information and actors can influence and build the media agenda.  
In today’s media system, with the number of producers, consumers, and media sites 
fluctuating regularly, researchers must consider which mix of methods is most likely to produce 
reliable and valid results and revelations. During the 2015 general election, I used a mixed 
approach utilising computational techniques to collect online data, inductive qualitative content 
analysis to methodically sort data and to understand the main themes, and a discourse analysis of 
the dataset. This approach proved valuable in providing a transparent and flexible methodology 
suited to researching in a hybrid media system. When combined with participant-centric 
qualitative methods, such as semi-structured in-depth interviews and participant-observations, a 
holistic picture of campaign communications and an understanding of actors’ decision-making 
was achieved. By using this mix of methods I was able to analyse the dynamics of 
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communications between actors and fully understand how messages were received and 
remediated, and the intention behind the strategies used by different groups of actors.  
3.4. A research design for the 2015 general election 
This research was designed in such a way to allow observations and interpretations to be made 
about the ways in which politicians and journalists harness newer media tools to set the media 
agenda during the 2015 UK General Election campaign. It is guided by the research questions 
outlined in Chapter 1. This section describes the research design used in this thesis, outlining each 
method and the rationale for its selection. During the election campaign I aimed to be pragmatic, 
remaining flexible and observant so as not to miss crucial media events and developments in news 
agendas as they happened. As a caveat, it is recognised that there are many limitations regarding 
the replicability of this research design. It is important to note that the findings are context-specific 
to the 2015 UK General Election given its selective and interpretivist nature. However, they help 
to establish the applicability of this methodology within a general election context.  
 
3.4.1 Data collection 
 
Data comprising content from social and news media was collected from 30 March 2015 to 8 May 
2015 covering the official campaigning period following the dissolution of Parliament. The data 
collected consists of the following texts: tweets; Facebook posts and comments; print news 
articles; blogs; online news articles; television news broadcasts; and radio current affairs 
broadcasts. Table 3.1 list the sites in full alongside the processes used to collect and store the data, 
and the total number of texts collected and analysed. There are differences between the totals of 
numbers collected and analysed as, although information was collected consistently throughout 
the campaign, specific items were chosen for analysis post-campaign.  
As a researcher, my own interpretations of the importance of events were at the centre of 
decision-making during data collection. To mitigate the subjectivity I approached the process in 
a pragmatic manner; during the data collection phase of research I was careful to be flexible in 
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the collection of information and avoided pre-determined moments for collection beyond 
prescribed media events. I worked to ensure that I collated news stories and information from 
citizen as they arose, but was also aware that my own opinions would impact on my choice of 
data. In order to overcome bias, in addition to collecting data on arising news stories I pre-selected 
some campaign events which were central to the campaign, and which would be of national 
importance: the leaders’ debates and the parties’ manifesto launches. Figure 3.3 gives details of 
these events.  
 
Figure 3.3 Dates and times of prescribed media events for data collection 
Event 
Political/Media 
Organization  
Date Time 
The Battle for 
Number 10 
Channel 4/Sky News 26 March 2015 21:00-22:30 
The ITV Leaders’ 
Debate 
ITV 2 April 2015 20:00-22:00 
Labour manifesto 
launch 
Labour Party 13 April 2015 11:10 
Conservative 
manifesto launch 
Conservative Party 14 April 2015 11:20 
Liberal Democrat 
manifesto launch 
Liberal Democrat 
Party 
15 April 2015 10:20 
UKIP manifesto 
launch 
UK Independence 
Party 
15 April 2015 11:20 
BBC Election Debate BBC 16 April 2015 20:00-22:00 
Question Time 
Special 
BBC 30 April 2015 20:00-21:30 
Results Night Cross-organization 7-8 May 2015 19:00-06:00 
 
I collected tweets each day using the hashtag #GE2015. The process of online data 
collection on a typical election day during the campaign comprised three parts: (1) running the 
TAGS search function26 on Twitter; (2) ensuring the RSS feeds from selected websites were 
                                                          
26 TAGS is described by its creator as a “free Google Sheet template which lets you setup and run automated 
collection of search results from Twitter” (Hawksey, 2014). To search using TAGS, the user accesses a link 
from the TAGS website which opens a form in a spreadsheet in Google Documents. The form contains 
fields for search terms and parameters. The user completes these, using operators like AND or OR to search 
for multiple terms, and then runs the programme from Google Documents. The results are collected in a 
spreadsheet in a second tab. The results can be exported to a Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet and saved to the 
user’s computer.  
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saving all political and election stories; and (3) regularly saving data from Facebook and websites 
without RSS feeds using Evernote. I did this at 3-hourly intervals, beginning at 06:00, to ensure 
that no key information was missed, and also to keep on top of the information being produced. 
On a day without a media event I ended this process at 21:00. Figure 3.4 is a flowchart which 
gives an example of the process for data collection during the day of the first leaders’ debate.  
Whilst tweets were collected in an entirely automated procedure, in the manner described 
in the above footnote, Facebook posts and comments cannot be scraped and saved in such a 
straightforward manner. For this reason, I employed a ‘kludgy’ workaround of the type proposed 
by Karpf (2012). I systematically visited each designated Facebook page and scrolled to the last 
post I had collected. I then opened up all comments on that post, keeping a record of these at 
every visit which included the timing of the last post I collected to ensure completeness in the 
dataset. I then clipped the new posts and comments to Evernote. Evernote is an app which allows 
the user to store ‘clippings’ from websites and save them in files in the app. It also allows the user 
to add tags to the information to further categorise it. For example, all posts that I saved from the 
Labour Party’s Facebook page were added to the “Facebook – Labour” file in my Evernote app, 
and then were tagged with a relevant description such as “leaders’ debate 02 April”. Following 
the end of the election campaign I exported the posts to be analysed to Microsoft Word 
documents. This decision was taken as the formatting available in Word lends itself better to 
analysis than does the formatting available in Evernote. 
The use of Twitter data in analysis differed from other datasets. Due to the large volume 
of tweets collected, I focused my assessment on tweets that were highlighted through content and 
discourse analysis.  This decision was taken after data collection once it became apparent that 
sampling was incomplete and in order to avoid the pitfall of missing important evidence by 
sampling from a large volume of tweets. This method ensured I was analysing tweets which 
played a role in the news media agenda setting process. Examples include those that were used in 
news reports or which introduced new information into the information cycle.  
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Online texts were systematically collected from the sites and spaces using automated 
computational methods and RSS feeds utilising key search terms, as well as manual recording 
when necessary. The content listed in Table 3.1 was chosen to ensure a mix of readership/audience 
numbers both online and offline, and any overt ideology. The number of sites was limited bearing 
in mind the restrictions that this study has in terms of time and manpower, but it is important to 
note that if an important story broke that was not on a site listed I endeavoured to collect that 
information regardless. 
An issue was encountered during data collection with relation to timing and the saving of 
data from social networking sites. I endeavoured to collect Facebook posts and comments and 
information from websites without an RSS feed in a systematic manner to ensure that no 
information was missed. For example, I revisited each Facebook page in the same order every 
three hours and noted the time and place of my last visit. However I did not revisit posts already 
collected and therefore, and as may be expected with such a manual method of data collection, 
some comments and updates were not recorded. This could pose problems for the completeness 
07:00 
Purchase newspapers 
06:00 
Run/check RSS feeds 
Scrape data to Evernote 
Run TAGS search for 
key terms 
09:00 
Run/check RSS feeds 
Scrape data to Evernote 
Run TAGS search for 
key terms 
15:00 
Run/check RSS feeds 
Scrape data to Evernote 
Run TAGS search for 
key terms 
12:00 
Run/check RSS feeds 
Scrape data to Evernote 
Run TAGS search for 
key terms 
20:00 
Programme starts 
Run TAGS search for 
key terms 
18:00 
Run/check RSS feeds 
Scrape data to Evernote 
Run TAGS search for 
key terms 
20:00 – 22:00 
Programme running 
Update TAGS search 
for duration 
23:00 
Run/check RSS feeds 
Scrape data to Evernote 
Set TAGS search for 
overnight (if relevant) 
Figure 3.4. Flowchart of data collection actions for the ITV Leaders’ Debate on 2 April 2015 
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of my dataset. During analysis, some months later, I endeavoured to overcome this problem by 
revisiting the posts chosen for analysis and cross-referencing the number of comments or updates 
at that date with the number recorded at collection. I found minimal increases, and in many cases 
there was a decrease in the number of comments over time. This is potentially accounted for by 
individual users deleting their comments or deactivating their accounts. Therefore the issue with 
timing during data collection does not pose a risk to the reliability of my sample. 
 
3.4.2 Analysis of the datasets 
 
The cases for analysis were selected by pinpointing two of the most important aspects of the 
campaign. This was achieved by asking the experts at hand – the interview participants. In 
discussions following the election, the interviewees were asked what they viewed as the most 
important or prevalent news stories of the election campaign. This information was used as a 
starting point to begin analysis on a specific subset of the data collected across media platforms. 
This decision was taken as a way of handling the large dataset and ensuring that the most 
important cases were analysed. The interview participants highlighted the leaders’ debates and 
the rise of the Scottish National Party (SNP) as two of the most important stories which emerged 
during the campaign. 
Given the large dataset of media texts collected, following interviewees’ advice was an 
efficient way of deciding which cases deserved close analysis. Once identified, a basic qualitative 
content analysis was carried out to establish main themes. This was inductive and allowed me to 
establish recurrent narratives within the discourse. Units of analysis were individual news articles 
(online or offline), tweets, Facebook posts, comments on a Facebook post, and television and 
radio broadcasts. Following the example of Jacobson (2013) categories were generated 
inductively. This decision was taken following the example of Jacobson’s study which made it 
“possible to rationally analyse a large data set” (ibid.: 343). Inductively creating the categories 
for coding allowed me to establish recurrent narratives within the discourse. The induction of 
categories was motivated by a grounded theory approach.  
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The units that were analysed using qualitative content analysis were Facebook posts and 
comments, online and print news articles, and television and radio broadcasts. The same coding 
framework was applied to Facebook posts, online and print news articles, and broadcasts, 
delineated by case study. However, Facebook comments were coded using different frameworks 
relevant to their subject matter. This decision was taken as the general frameworks were not 
suitable for this analysis. The comments were limited to one highly-specific topic instigated by 
the Facebook post, and they also expressed sentiments I wished to capture which the general 
frameworks did not allow for.  
When inductively creating the categories and applying the general frameworks I initially 
coded each unit for the main subject(s) discussed, followed by actor(s) and/or organization(s). 
This enabled me to immediately identify object salience, which denotes the first-level of agenda-
setting. This led to the second category; I coded for sentiment towards the subject(s), actor(s), 
and/or organisation(s), denoting the second-level of agenda-setting. I further used the content 
analysis to note intermedia features in the unit; specifically I coded for the presence of information 
from social media and the actor responsible for creating that information. This category was 
informed by the reseach questions.27 This final stage of coding enabled me to identify linkages 
across social and mainstream media and to create timelines of information flows which were used 
in analysis for Chapters 4 and 5. While qualitative content analysis provided the methodical 
approach needed to tackle very large datasets, by identifying the paths of salient discourses and 
related information flows through the hybrid media system using these methods, it was possible 
to establish which actors had most influence over political information online. The code books 
used for the analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5 are included in Appendices B7 and C7 
respectively. 
To achieve a thick descriptive analysis of the agenda setting process and the roles played 
by different actors I began by identifying the first emergence of a news story or party message 
                                                          
27 RQ4: How are (i) information sourced from social media, and (ii) the technological affordances of 
social media incorporated into the process of setting the news media agenda?; RQ5 Do citizen-users of 
social media play any role, such as intervention in the information cycle, in the process of setting the 
agenda?; and RQ6 Do citizen-users of social media replicate or challenge agendas? 
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and then used the dataset to track it across different platforms. I noted who became involved in 
framing the message, how they did so, and what effect this had on the news agenda. This approach 
also gave me the opportunity to assess how information from social media, as well as the networks 
themselves, were used and what the personal networks of those actors looked like. Overall, this 
was a successful approach in mapping the composition of the news events and understanding the 
process of news media agenda setting that occurred around them. 
I examined the language used by elites in their construction of discourse around events 
and shaping of the news media agenda, and I looked across media platforms to assess if the same 
discourse was replicated or challenged. As discourse is concerned with “establishing one version 
of the world in the face of competing versions” (Gill, 2000: 176), this allowed me to establish 
attempts by elite actors to promote their “version of the world” on the media agenda. Relatedly, 
Foucault’s understanding of discourse illuminates the notion that “discourse forms a version of 
[an object]. Moreover, the version of the object comes to constitute it” (Bryman, 2004: 370). 
Therefore, should a specific actor’s “version” of an object become the way in which citizens speak 
about it on social media this will increase the actor’s power to set the news media agenda. 
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Table 3.1 Sites of data collection of texts for discourse and content analysis 
Type of media Media producer 
Number of units28 
collected  
(number analysed) 
Method of 
collection 
Mode of analysis Limitations 
Broadcast 
(television and 
radio) 
5 News Tonight 2 (2) 
Box of Broadcasts 
Qualitative content and 
discourse analysis 
alongside data collected 
from print and online 
sites. 
Deferred liveness: One of 
TV’s primary qualities is 
liveness, by watching 
programmes later, the 
sense of how they felt at 
that moment may be 
missed, especially if the 
audience was dual 
screening. 
BBC News at One (or 
equivalent)29 
3 (3) 
BBC News at 6 (or equivalent) 3 (3) 
BBC News at 10 3 (3) 
BBC Radio 4’s Today 
programme  
3 (3) 
Channel 4 News 3 (3) 
ITV News at Ten 3 (3) 
ITV News & Weather at 1.30 
(or equivalent) 
3 (3) 
ITV News & Weather at 6.30 
(or equivalent) 
3 (3) 
Sky News at 7pm 2 (2) 
Sky News at 11pm 2 (2) 
Press (daily)30 
Daily Mail 19 (3) 
Purchase of 
newspaper 
Content and discourse 
analysis alongside data 
collected from broadcast 
and online sites. 
Cost/availability of 
product. 
Daily Mirror 17 (3) 
Daily Telegraph 19 (3) 
The Guardian 18 (3) 
The Sun 18 (3) 
                                                          
28 ‘Unit’ type is dependent on the medium it is derived from and comprises a television or radio broadcast, a news article or comment piece in a print newspaper, a news article 
or comment piece in an online news or political website or blog, a Facebook post or comment on a Facebook post, or a tweet. 
29 “Or equivalent” refers to programmes who use a different name when broadcast at a slightly earlier/later timeslot or for variations across days, such as on the weekend. 
30 Newspapers chosen according to readership; see ABCs national daily newspaper circulation February 2014 available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/table/2014/mar/07/abcs-national-newspapers. Accessed on 12/09/2014. 
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The Times 18 (3) 
Online (news 
producers and 
political parties) 
bbc.co.uk/news 149 
RSS Feed created, 
alerts to be set up. 
Where no RSS Feed 
exists, relevant 
articles or comments 
‘clipped’ using 
Evernote. 
Content and discourse 
analysis alongside data 
collected from broadcast 
and print sites. 
 
Channel4.com 41 
Conservatives.com 18 
Dailymail.co.uk 97 
Greenparty.org.uk 17 
Guardian.com 245 
http://www.itv.com/news/ 287 
Labour.org.uk 5 
Libdems.org.uk 11 
mirror.co.uk 96 
news.sky.com 68 
Sunnation.co.uk 96 
Telegraph.co.uk 177 
Thetimes.co.uk 99 
Ukip.org 10 
Online (blogs) 
BuzzFeed UK Politics 70 RSS Feed created, 
alerts to be set up. 
Where no RSS Feed 
exists, relevant 
articles or comments 
‘clipped’ using 
Evernote. 
Content and discourse 
analysis alongside data 
collected from broadcast 
and print sites. 
 
ConservativeHome 39 
Huffington Post UK 106 
LabourList 80 
Lib Dem Voice 30 
Order-order.com 88 
Online (Social 
Media: Facebook) 
BBC News 20 (4) 
Content and 
discourse analysis 
alongside data 
collected from 
broadcast and print 
sites. 
Manual saving of 
information using 
Evernote. 
 
BBC Radio 4/ BBC Radio 4 
Today 
8 (0) 
BuzzFeed UK Politics 36 (3) 
Channel 4 News 23 (5) 
Conservatives 16 (4) 
Guido Fawkes 27 (2) 
Huffington Post UK 26 (3) 
ITV News 49 (4) 
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Labour Party 30 (4) 
LabourList 47 (6) 
Liberal Democrats 7 (3) 
Sky News 26 (4) 
The Daily Mail 21 (5) 
The Green Party 12 (1) 
The Guardian 37 (2) 
The Mirror/ The Mirror Politics 69 (0) 
The Sun 23 (1) 
The Telegraph 79 (14) 
The Times and The Sunday 
Times 
10 (2) 
UKIP 8 (1) 
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3.4.3. Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with participants from three groups of actors: (1) 
MPs, candidates, and members of the campaign teams from the main political parties; (2) 
journalists from established news producers; and (3) journalists from high-profile, national blogs. 
These groups were chosen in order to establish the approach to news media agenda-setting taken 
in election campaign strategy and coverage by each main influential group involved in campaign 
coverage. A full list of interviewees can be found in Table 3.2. The findings from these interviews 
were used in conjunction with the results of the discourse analysis and observations in order to 
make complete and accurate explanations regarding the nature of the news media agenda setting 
process in the election campaign. Interviews with a variety of campaigners and journalists were 
conducted in order to provide cross-party evidence and to avoid the pitfall of bias. 
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Table 3.2 Participant details for semi-structured interviews 
    Interview Dates 
Name/Anonymised 
Reference 
Organization/
Anonymised 
Reference 
Profession Role Interview 1 Interview 2 Interview 3 Interview 4 
Jamie Angus BBC Journalist Editor – Today 09-Sep-14 09-Feb-15 28-Jul-15 N/A 
Daniel Boffey The Observer Journalist Policy Editor 08-Sep-14 N/A31 N/A N/A 
Alex Chandler ITV Journalist Editor – Election 2015 11-Nov-14 03-Mar-1532 16-Apr-15 02-Jul-15 
Carl Dinnen ITV Journalist Political Correspondent 06-Oct-14 09-Feb-15 30-Jun-15 N/A 
Martin Horwood 
Liberal 
Democrats 
Politician MP for Cheltenham 11-Nov-14 04-Feb-15 18-Nov-15 N/A 
Chris Luffingham The Green Party Party Staff 
Director of National 
Campaigns 
29-Jul-15 N/A N/A N/A 
Holly Lynch Labour Politician MP for Halifax 10-Aug-15 N/A N/A N/A 
Jason Mills ITV Journalist Head of Digital 25-Oct-14 N/A 25-Jun-15 N/A 
Alexandra Rucki 
The Evening 
Standard 
Journalist Online Reporter 08-Aug-14 N/A N/A N/A 
Andrew Sparrow The Guardian Journalist 
Political Correspondent (daily 
live blog) 
13-Dec-2014 11-Mar-15 22-Jul-15 N/A 
Jim Waterson BuzzFeed Journalist Deputy Editor 14-Oct-14 04-Feb-15 26-Jun-15 N/A 
Alex Wickham 
Guido Fawkes’ 
Blog 
Journalist News Editor 08-Aug-14 24-Feb-15 30-Jun-15 N/A 
Patrick Wintour The Guardian Journalist Political Editor 09-Sep-14 N/A N/A N/A 
Anon01 LabourList Journalist Editor – Political Blog 17-Dec-14 27-Mar-15 26-Nov-15 N/A 
                                                          
31 There was an attrition rate and three interviews were not completed with every participant. This was due to participants not confirming next interview dates despite 
numerous attempts to get in touch. 
32 An extra interview was held with Alex Chandler on an ad hoc basis during an observation at ITV. 
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Anon02 Labour 
Political 
Consultant 
Advisor to a main political 
party 
30-Sep-15 N/A N/A N/A 
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Interviews were undertaken beginning in August 2014 and continued until December 
2015. They included an initial interview and two follow up interviews per informant: one prior 
to, and one immediately after, the election. Potential interviewees were researched and contacted 
initially by a formal letter (see Appendix A1 for a sample of this letter), and if no response was 
received then a follow-up email or phone call was issued. There was an attrition rate, with 25% 
of participants whose first interview took place in 2014 not responding to requests for follow-up 
interviews. Additionally, 20% of all participants only took part in one interview after the general 
election. A snowball sampling technique was used to select interviewees. At the end of each 
interview, the participant was asked to provide the name of one or two colleagues who would be 
suitable for the study. The sampling resulted in a total of 15 participants. This mix of targeting 
and self-selection has produced a gender bias in the results, specifically only one female journalist 
and one female politician are present in the sample. However, the size of, and technique to 
compile, the sample are in line with guidelines for semi-structured interviews. 
Prior to each interview I prepared an individual interview guide with questions guided by 
my research goals and grouped by theme (see Appendix A2 for a sample). Semi-structured 
interviews were chosen as my research had a clear focus, providing a starting point for discussion. 
Within the framework of the interview guide I used a mixture of questions types which changed 
over the course of the three rounds of interviews. For example interview one included introductory 
and more direct questions, and rounds two and three focussed on follow-up questions and those 
that enabled further probing. During the interviews I ensured that all questions in the guide were 
covered, as well as ensuring that interviewees had space to express their opinions, beliefs, and 
expectations. I followed up on pertinent statements that they made. 
 At the beginning of each interview I ensured that participants understood the nature of 
the study and confirmed if they would like to be on or off the record. I recorded each interview 
using a Dictaphone app on my mobile phone and transcribed from these files after the interview. 
For the second and third round interviews, I used information from the prior interview to design 
a new interview guide for each participant. This method let me delve deeper into their thoughts 
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on subjects raised in the previous interview as well as further questions specific for my research. 
Each interview was between 20 minutes and 90 minutes in length. 31 interviews were conducted 
in person, either in the informants place of work or in a neutral location such as a café, and two 
interviews were conducted via Skype. 
Semi-structured interviews “allow[s] respondents the chance to be the experts and to 
inform the research” (Leech, 2002: 668). Additionally, Bryman (2004: 321) states that “the 
emphasis [of the interview] must be on how the interviewee frames and understands issues and 
events – that is, what the interviewee views as important in explaining and understanding events, 
patterns, and forms of behaviour.” Therefore, by conducting semi-structured interviews, evidence 
can be gathered which can be used to support or challenge the findings established in the discourse 
analysis and observations. This method was chosen for its flexibility; a personalised interview 
guide was designed for each interview to maximise discussion relating to the defined research 
questions, however there was also the opportunity for the respondent to air their own opinions or 
for follow up questions to be asked where appropriate. Therefore the data collected is qualitative 
and enables the researcher to fully understand the drivers behind mechanisms of control used by 
elites to control agendas in a hybrid media system. Furthermore, the occurrence of interviews 
over time show differences in the approaches taken by participants to the online environment, 
making allowance for ‘internet time’ and capturing responses to what happened during the 
campaign, as well as portraying preparations for the election. 
  
3.4.4. Participant-observation 
 
I spent time as a participant-observer with two news media teams – the production team of BBC 
Radio 4’s Today Programme and the production team of ITV’s Election 2015 results programme 
– from January 2015 to 8 May 2015, the day after polling day. In total 32 hours of observation 
across 8 days was accrued across both sites. My role can be classified as that of Observer-as-
Participant (Gold,1958) or Total Researcher (Gans, 1968): “In this role, the researcher is mainly 
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an interviewer. There is some observation but very little of it involves any participation” (Bryman, 
2004, 301). At each site I was situated with the teams and observed their interactions, meetings, 
and decision-making. I had the opportunity to speak to team members, but I did not take part in 
any work for the teams such as a participant-as-observer might have done. There were some 
difficulties encountered in this role where I wanted to intervene and offer my opinion, but I 
refrained in order to maintain my role as objective observer. For example, at my first observation 
day with the Today programme the morning news team were discussing a story regarding the 
issue of Julien Blanc, a “pick up artist” who gives seminars to men on how to meet women for 
sex. There was a, now successful, petition to the Home Office to revoke his visa on the grounds 
of his sexist and misogynistic nature. The piece that Today ran during the programme I observed 
came across as very light-hearted. They barely mentioned his violent behaviour, instead focussing 
on the humorous stories of a Radio 5 Live presenter who attended one of his classes. They did 
not broach the sexist or violent messages he promotes. I followed this story on Twitter during and 
after the broadcast and many people expressed anger about the coverage for this reason. My 
dilemma was, as I sat in the debrief meeting, that only one member of the team was 
knowledgeable on Julien Blanc and I wanted to support her and tell the team about Blanc’s nature. 
They ended up agreeing that “sometimes things just go that way”. As an impartial observer I 
could not become involved in their conversation, despite my own beliefs and disappointment in 
the way they covered this story. 
 I gained access to the programmes to be observed following my round one interviews 
with Jamie Angus, then Editor of the Today programme, and Alex Chandler, Editor of ITV News’ 
Election 2015. After interviewing each editor I put the request to them regarding observation and 
outlined my proposal for at least three days of observation with each time to take place between 
January 2015 and polling day. Both editors agreed in principle, and I followed this up with an 
official proposal and ethical approval (see Appendix A3). I gained agreement from Angus to 
observe the team on four days, including the broadcasts on days following observations, and from 
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Chandler to observe the team on four days including sitting with the news team overnight on 
results night.  
During the periods of observation I shadowed members of each team, ensuring that this 
included observing a range of journalists in different roles, attended editorial meetings where 
decisions were taken on the content, structure, and direction of the programmes, informally 
interviewed journalists about their experiences, responsibilities, and thoughts on election 
reporting, and at ITV I attended meetings between the Editor and other senior colleagues who 
were not involved in the creation of Election 2015 but were stakeholders. I made jotted notes 
using an iPad, which I typed up into full field notes following each observation. 
According to Nielsen (2012: 11) “Where interviews provide data on what people say and 
what they say they do, participant-observation provides primary data on what they actually do.” 
Therefore, observation is crucial in providing evidence for the existence or otherwise of methods 
employed to direct political information flow in a hybrid media system. Observations were a 
counter-balance, establishing not only the veracity of information collected from interviews but 
also providing evidence to substantiate the content and discourse analyses. During the period of 
observation, therefore, I was able to observe the behaviour of media elites during the election 
campaign, and understand first-hand the aims of the teams with regard to the media system, 
methods employed, and the extent to which strategies were perceived as successful.  
  Given the natural setting of the observation, problems of reliability and validity may be 
encountered. In order to address these problems, the subject of data collected from the observation 
was defined as far as possible beforehand, whilst remaining pragmatic and recording any other 
notable behaviours as they arose in my field notes. Pre-defined areas for observation included 
processes undertaken by the teams to promote messages in the online environment, reaction to 
political information produced by citizens online, and reaction to breaking news during the 
campaign. The overall aim of the observations was to monitor staff making decisions and taking 
actions, providing opportunity for a description of their behaviour and engagement with citizens 
and with political elites.  
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3.5. Mapping the structure of the dissertation 
As a clear visual aid for readers of this work, Table 3.3 maps the research questions, the chapters 
in which they are answered, and the methods used to answer them. The work is divided into two 
parts. Firstly, Chapters 4 and 5 answer research questions 4, 5, and 6, and do so through the use 
of information flow analysis incorporating qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis. 
Some data from interviews is incorporated in these chapters as triangulation. Secondly, Chapters 
6 and 7 answer research questions 1, 2, and 3 and do so through the use of data from semi-
structured interviews and participant-observations. 
Table 3.3 Mapping research Questions, methods of analysis, and related chapters 
Research Question Data Method(s) of 
Analysis 
Chapter(s)  
RQ1. How do power 
relationships between 
traditional news media 
producers and political elites 
function in the 2015 UK 
General Election, and how do 
the impact the news media 
agenda setting process? 
 
Interview transcripts 
Field notes from 
participant-
observation 
Integrated analysis, 
identifying themes 
and analytic 
questions 
6 and 7 
RQ2. How do traditional 
news media producers and 
political parties attempt to 
successfully harness network 
power? 
 
Interview transcripts 
Field notes from 
participant-
observation 
Integrated analysis, 
identifying themes 
and analytic 
questions 
6 and 7 
RQ3. How are social and 
digital media integrated into 
traditional news media 
producers’ outputs, and how 
does this impact their power 
relationships with political 
elites? 
 
Interview transcripts 
Field notes from 
participant-
observation 
Integrated analysis, 
identifying themes 
and analytic 
questions 
6 and 7 
RQ4. How are (i) information 
sourced from social media, 
and (ii) the technological 
affordances of social media 
incorporated into the process 
Texts collected from 
online and offline 
news sites, broadcasts, 
and social media 
Information flow 
analysis, 
incorporating 
qualitative content 
analysis and 
discourse analysis 
4 and 5 
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of setting the news media 
agenda? 
 
RQ5. Do citizen-users of 
social media play any role, 
such as intervention in the 
information cycle, in the 
process of setting the news 
media agenda? 
 
Texts collected from 
online and offline 
news sites, broadcasts, 
and social media 
Information flow 
analysis, 
incorporating 
qualitative content 
analysis and 
discourse analysis 
4 and 5 
RQ6. Do citizen-users of 
social media replicate or 
challenge elites’ agendas? 
1. Texts collected 
from social media  
2. Information from 
social media included 
in texts collected from 
traditional news media 
producers 
Information flow 
analysis, 
incorporating 
qualitative content 
analysis and 
discourse analysis 
4 and 5 
 
3.6. Conclusion  
This chapter has set out the research design for this dissertation. The discussion has highlighted 
problems inherent in internet and communications research during election campaigns which may 
hinder a researcher’s ability to gain a full and accurate picture of the relationships between actors 
in a hybrid media system during this critical time. These are the nature of datasets collected online, 
their potential unreliability, the difficulties collecting data, and the large volumes that may be 
collected. Furthermore, I recognised that ‘internet time’ means an ever-changing environment 
from which to collect and analyse data, which must be taken into consideration. 
In order to overcome these challenges, the research design follows the prescriptions of 
Karpf (2012) and remains both transparent and pragmatic; responding to any changes or important 
events as they emerge. Furthermore, it recognises the need for interdisciplinarity, particularly that 
which enables computational social science, in order to fill the gaps in our methodological 
capabilities. In the contemporary media system, where platforms are increasingly interdependent, 
drawing on the knowledge and skills of our colleagues in other disciplines can help us to 
overcome many of these challenges. 
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Finally, a qualitative mixed-methods approach is used in order to provide the research 
with a full and robust account of communications between political elites, news producers, and 
citizens during an election campaign. This research design adds a holistic approach to agenda-
setting research through the analysis of information as it moves across multiple media platforms, 
and by generating and analysing supporting evidence from content and discourse analyses with a 
deeper behavioural understanding gleaned from interviews and periods of participant-
observations. By utilising mixed-methods, I can be both methodical and pragmatic – there is no 
reason that these should be mutually exclusive. This research design used specifically for the 2015 
UK General Election incorporates large scale data collection from the online environment in order 
to analyse information flow. This is complemented by qualitative tools; qualitative content 
analysis, discourse analysis, semi-structured interviews and participant-observations. These 
methods can answer the question of why certain communications strategies are used and how the 
news media agenda setting process functions during the 2015 UK general election. 
 
 
  
116 
 
 
Chapter 4 Debating the debate: 
Exploring the process of setting the news 
media agenda in the first Leaders’ 
Debate 
Researcher: Assuming we have leaders’ debates, what do you think the impact will be 
on reporting? 
Jamie Angus: I mean Cameron’s got a reasonable point which is that they sucked the life 
out of the campaign [in 2010] … I think what Cameron means by that is [the debates] just 
detracted enormously from substantial coverage of policy. I’m not really saying whether 
that’s a good thing or a bad thing but I think that that’s true. So I think that if there are 
debates, it will suck up a huge amount of coverage again on telly. It’s undoubtedly going 
to be the case that another round of TV debates will feature … journalists interviewing 
each other for days in advance and days afterwards about what happened in an hour on 
primetime telly. (Jamie Angus, interview 2, February 2015) 
 
Jamie Angus, then Editor of the Today programme, explains concerns about holding 
leaders’ debates during the election campaign. 
  
Election debates are big media events. They provide parties and journalists with a wealth of 
information to report, promote, and challenge. Unavoidably they set the news agenda in both the 
build-up and the post-debate analysis. Angus’ concerns that they “sucked the life” out of the 2010 
campaign referred to the way in which election reporting focussed on the debates and not on 
issues. In fact, the 2010 debates “transformed the narrative” of the campaign (Wring and Ward, 
2010: 806) as they gave rise to news reports centred on Cleggmania33 and shifted focus from the 
Conservative Party’s challenge. 2010 also witnessed a phenomenon repeated in 2015: online 
discussion about the debates on social media. Whilst spin rooms and “journalists interviewing 
each other… about what happened” were a (meta) feature of traditional media coverage, the 
“debate about the debate” also happened on social media (Kalsnes, Krumsvik, and Storsul, 2014). 
This chapter looks at these debates about the debate to examine how the process of setting the 
news media agenda functioned around this media event. 
                                                          
33 Cleggmania refers to the impact of Nick Clegg’s performance in the 2010 leaders’ debates. This was 
credited with increasing the Liberal Democrats standing in opinion polls, although this did not translate 
into votes on polling day. Carvalho and Winters (2015: 425-426) describe Clegg’s attributes reported by 
viewers including a polished performance, perceived trustworthiness, and giving the least evasive 
answers.  
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4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents a detailed descriptive analysis of the news media agenda-setting process 
which occurred before and after the first leaders’ debate of the election campaign. There are two 
high-level findings relating to power that will be discussed in this chapter. Firstly, the process 
was dominated by politicians and journalists, with information overwhelmingly sourced from 
elite actors. Although there was a concurrent engagement with social media, content produced by 
citizen-users played a minimal role in the process of setting the media agenda. Secondly, the 
findings demonstrate that use of social media was limited to promoting or challenging the elites’ 
content. Examples of successfully setting the news media agenda demonstrate how network 
power on social media is used in conjunction with the traditional power relationships that exist 
between politicians and journalists. 
The pre- and post-debate periods were characterised by intensive competition to set the 
news media agenda. As predicted in the opening quote to this chapter, the solipsistic practice of 
“journalists interviewing each other” did occur. Fortunately for this research, media organisations 
and political parties released other information and content consistently throughout the period of 
analysis; a number of different agenda items competed for space giving plenty of scope for 
investigation. Over a 48-hour period from midnight on 2 April 2015 to 23:59 on 3 April 2015 I 
gathered a dataset comprising online news articles, Facebook posts from political parties and 
media organisations, broadcasts from TV and radio, the print editions of newspapers, and a sample 
of tweets posted using #leadersdebate. The methods of data collection are described in Chapter 3, 
and details of the dataset are given in Appendix A. Using these data I identified the key stories 
surrounding the leaders’ debate through a frequency count of the topics of news reports from 
newspapers, online news websites, and broadcast news segments. In total 45 topics were 
identified from 223 individual articles and broadcast segments. I selected stories for analysis from 
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the five most frequent subjects (see Table 4.1). Figure 4.1 gives a timeline of each specific 
communication used in the cases analysed in this chapter. 
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Table 4.1. Five most frequent topics of news articles and broadcast segments 
 
Newspaper/Online 
Articles 
Number of Broadcast 
Segments 
Cross-platform total 
 Frequency 
% 
(n=96) 
Frequency 
% 
(n=92) 
Frequency % (n=188) 
General 
information34 
24 25.00 20 21.74 44 24.40 
New 
politics/Coalition
35 
18 18.75 26 28.26 44 24.40 
No clear winner36 16 16.67 20 21.71 36 19.15 
Promoting the 
debate37 
24 25.00 10 10.87 34 18.01 
Nicola Sturgeon - 
positive38 
14 14.58 16 17.39 30 15.96 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 Article/Segment gave logistical or formatting information about the debate, for example time of broadcast or the name of the presenter. 
35 Article/Segment focused on the impact of the debate on a coalition outcome, or spoke about the debate as an example of how no one party could form a majority 
government. 
36 Article/Segment neutrally reported how opinion polls showed there was no clear winner in the debate. 
37 Article/Segment was a promotional piece for the debate, for example stressing its importance or impact in the campaign. These were mostly found on ITV platforms. 
38 Article/Segment reported positively on Nicola Sturgeon’s performance, for example praising her oratory style, appeal to voters, or policies. 
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Figure 4.1. Timeline of communication texts analysed in this chapter 
Date Time Publisher Medium Content 
02 April 2015 0600 Liberal Democrats 
(@LibDems) 
Twitter Tweet: sharing information on polls from Ipsos Mori 
0600 BBC Radio 4 Today Radio Student’s comment dismissing Liberal Democrats on grounds of coalition 
0600 ITV (Good Morning Britain) Television Segment with body language expert praising Cameron’s leadership qualities 
0628 The Times Website Article incorporating “Cameron as underdog” agenda 
0630 The Telegraph Website Article incorporating “Cameron as underdog” agenda 
1037 The Telegraph 
(@TeleWonderWomen) 
Twitter Journalist request for audience to name the female leaders 
1120 The Telegraph Facebook Sharing of an old article with a negative sentiment towards Sturgeon 
1134 The Telegraph Website Article which questions who the female leaders are 
1230 Liberal Democrats 
(@LibDems) 
Twitter Tweet: sharing information on polls from Ipsos Mori 
1307 UKIP Facebook Post with image, includes details of the debate and calls to action to watch, like, 
and share 
1330 ITV News Television Quote in report suggests Bennett could play a role in a coalition. 
Quote in report from Nick Clegg on inevitability of coalition. 
1559 SNP Staffer 
(@RiaRobertson) 
Twitter Tweet: shares an image of Sturgeon and Wood backstage. 
1800 BBC News Television Report includes Clegg’s preference for coalition. 
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1817 The Telegraph Website Story reporting that female leaders are plotting to “gang up” on Cameron. 
1900 Channel 4 News Television Michael Gove quoted warning about the dangers of a coalition. 
2055 Gary Linekar 
(@GaryLinekar) 
Twitter Tweet condemning Farage’s comments on HIV and health tourism 
2130 ITV News Website Story reporting that Twitter users are calling for more women in politics 
2200 BBC News Television Report that Sturgeon performed well in the debate 
Osborne quoted as saying Cameron was “in charge” 
2206 Conservatives 
(@Conservatives) 
Twitter Tweet promoting #cameronincharge 
2220 Ed Miliband 
(@Ed_Miliband0 
Twitter Tweet condemning Farage’s HIV and health tourism comments 
2226 Conservatives (@CCHQ) Twitter Tweet: image of Miliband in Sturgeon’s pocket 
2228 The Telegraph Website Article stating that there was a clear choice between leaders in the debate 
2230 ITV News Television Interview with William Hague who uses the term “clear winner” and a language 
of “choice” 
2249 Sky News Facebook Post reporting on Farage’s HIV and health tourism comments 
2300 Sky News Television Report that Sturgeon performed well 
Interview with Stewart Hosie of the SNP 
Segment on Twitter discussion 
2304 The Telegraph Website Reporting and SNP victory and that Miliband “flops” 
2308 Conservatives Facebook Video: Miliband in Sturgeon’s pocket 
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2355 Conservatives Facebook Post stating that there is a clear choice between leaders 
- Channel 4 News Website Report on the YouGov poll that Sturgeon performed best in the debate. 
3 April 2015 0020 The Telegraph Website Report featuring the Cameron as underdog agenda 
0600 BBC Radio 4 (The Today 
Programme) 
Radio Interview with Michael Gove in which he praises Sturgeon but says that Cameron 
was most commanding. 
1224 The Mirror Website Report on Farage’s HIV and health tourism comments 
1315 The Telegraph Facebook Post: negative story about the SNP. 
1351 Conservatives Facebook Post: Video mash-up of Miliband and Sturgeon 
1523 BuzzFeed Website Report on Conservatives’ use of #cameronincharge 
1935 The Telegraph Facebook Post: Report that Farage and Clegg were side-lined in the debate 
- BBC News Website Report on Farage’s HIV and health tourism comments 
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Of these five topics, I selected ‘new politics/coalition’ and ‘Nicola Sturgeon – positive’ 
for further analysis. I chose not to examine ‘General information’, ‘no clear winner’, and 
‘promoting the debate’ as there was either consensus around the information given or the news 
media agenda was already set. I analysed the related content by tracking the information flows 
across these platforms and using the findings to identify the power relationships between actors. 
More precisely, the analysis was guided by the research questions: (RQ4) How are (i) information 
sourced from social media, and (ii) the technological affordances of social media incorporated 
into the process of setting the news media agenda?; and (RQ5) Do citizen-users of social media 
play any role, such as intervention in the information cycle, in the process of setting the news 
media agenda?   
The findings of this chapter are established through a detailed descriptive analysis of 
specific news agendas. I evaluate how information moved across media platforms and which 
actors impacted the emergence and promotion of specific agenda items. By ascertaining the most 
and least salient agenda items to emerge over the 48-hour period, and tracing the information, 
actors, and relationships involved, I was able to understand how the news media agenda setting 
process functioned in relation to the leaders’ debate. The three agenda items I identified for further 
analysis are interlinked. These are: (1) a positive approach to Nicola Sturgeon’s debate 
performance; (2) the seemingly inevitable prospect of coalition through a “coalition of chaos” 
narrative; and (3) The Conservative Party’s line on David Cameron’s performance, referred to 
here as “Cameron in charge” after the party’s choice of wording. A short fourth case is also 
included which examines outcomes for UKIP. UKIP made gains on social media, but were still 
unable to set the news media agenda. 
The key findings demonstrate that social media functioned predominantly as a push 
medium for the elite actors in the news media agenda-setting process. This push medium outcome 
was a strategy of message control and provides support for the theory of controlled interactivity 
within the news media agenda-setting process. My findings also show the risk of message control 
strategies being interpreted as commodification of user content by citizens. Stromer-Galley argues 
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that “the way politicians and their staff use DCTs ultimately are meant to benefit the candidate; 
greater genuine democratization is not on their agenda” (Stromer-Galley, 2014: 3). My findings 
show that social media was used in this manner by political and media elites.  
However, the results also demonstrate that when elites’ social media outputs do not meet 
the required communication standards for the platform the content loses its quality of authenticity. 
As defined in Chapter 2, authenticity for elite organizations online during an election campaign 
includes spontaneity39, immediacy40, and predictability41 (Enli, 2015). The outcome for 
inauthentic communications was that they revealed commodification of user content and 
interaction to citizens. As further outlined in Chapter 2, authenticity of communication is required 
for an actor to become part of a communication network and to exert power through that network. 
I find that failure to achieve this is linked to a failure to control the news media agenda.  
The first main finding presented in this chapter is that non-elite social media users did 
play a role in the news media agenda-setting process but that they did not intervene in the agenda 
to change the course of narratives, framing, or the final media agenda items. Information sourced 
from social media overwhelmingly originated with the journalists’ traditional sources; other 
journalists, politicians, political party staffers, and other elites such as celebrities. Citizen voices 
were incorporated into news reports only to add colour or opinion in the form of vox populi. 
Additionally, conversation amongst social media users on elite Facebook posts did not uniformly 
follow the organizations’ agendas. There was often an independent focus by users on different 
topics, regardless of the subject of the original post. 
Successfully setting the agenda on a social media platform did not equal a prime position 
in the overall process. I found that it is not sufficient to simply have a strong following on social 
media and successful direct message control amongst your own network. Other factors must also 
be in place. Social media must be a part of a cohesive, cross-platform approach recognising the 
                                                          
39 Authentic communications appear to be unrehearsed, spontaneous responses to events or actors. 
40 Authentic communications are timely and contribute information to an event in a seemingly live manner. 
41 Authentic communications are predictable in that they contain the discursive features and technological 
standards that users expect to see. 
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hybridisation of media logics. This finding does not dismiss the examples of these phenomena 
found in other research (see Freelon and Karpf, 2015; Chadwick, 2011; 2013). These studies have 
shown that it is possible for decisive intervention from citizen users of social media to change or 
challenge news agendas. However, during the first leaders’ debate of the 2015 general election 
campaign I did not find evidence of this; the news media agenda-setting process remained 
dominated by elites and hierarchical power relationships. 
This is the second main finding. Hierarchical power relationships remained dominant but 
this did not negate the need for elites to harness network power, which became important in the 
process when an agenda item was contested. For example, the Conservative Party were able to 
effectively promote their agenda regarding a Labour-SNP coalition. This was achieved through a 
combination of repetition of key messages to journalists and by distributing content on Facebook 
and Twitter. This content was then shared widely amongst their networks of supporters. The 
content met the communication standards of each social networking site – spontaneity, 
immediacy, and predictability – and was therefore perceived as authentic by its audience. Further 
support for this finding comes from an opposing example, that of the Conservative Party’s lack 
of success in promoting a different agenda item as a result of their content being perceived as 
inauthentic, specifically this second example failed to meet the standard of spontaneity. 
Third and finally I find that, broadly, social media reproduced the competing agendas, 
but evidence also exists of contestation or inversion where commodification of user content and 
interaction was identified. This finding is especially relevant to use of Twitter. Social media 
certainly played an important role in the news media agenda setting process, particularly post-
debate. Nevertheless, traditional news media reports were more likely to include content produced 
by influential users than citizen users’ content. In the 183 online news texts analysed, 49 instances 
of information from social media were found in 29 of the texts. Of these, most information came 
from the accounts of politicians, political parties, journalists, or media organisations (28.6% per 
actor group). Individual citizen content accounted for less than half of this. Table 4.2 shows the 
number of social media items from each actor group included in the texts.  The most important 
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interventions made on social media were elites’ tweets. Although news media elites and political 
parties made efforts to produce content for social media, helping them to strengthen their message 
control and harness network power, evoking traditional processes and power relationships 
remained central to the news media agenda setting process. The dialectical use of power was fully 
embedded in the process. 
 
Table 4.2. Number of tweets used in news reports per actor group 
 Frequency 
%  
(n=49) 
Politician/party42 14 28.57 
Journalist/media 
organisation43 
14 28.57 
Individual citizen44 6 12.24 
General twitter45 5 10.20 
Other organisation46 7 14.29 
Celebrity47 3 6.12 
 
4.2. Case Selection 
 
On 2 April 2015 ITV hosted a seven-way leaders’ debate. Participants included the incumbent 
Prime Minister and Leader of the Conservative Party David Cameron, the incumbent Deputy 
Prime Minister and Leader of the Liberal Democrats Nick Clegg, and the Leader of the 
Opposition, Ed Miliband of the Labour Party. Leaders’ debates are a relatively new addition to 
UK election campaigns, with 2015 being the second time they featured.48 This debate was unique 
as the four leaders of smaller parties participated alongside the three major party leaders. The line-
                                                          
42 Category includes any UK politician, candidate, or political party account. 
43 Category includes any journalist or news organisation account. 
44 Category includes any private citizen account. 
45 Category includes generalized references to ‘the story’ on social media. 
46 Category includes other organizations comprising polling organizations, a social media records 
organization, and betting company accounts. 
47 Category includes any celebrity account. 
48 The first time the United Kingdom held leaders’ debates was in the 2010 general election campaign, 
which saw Gordon Brown, then Prime Minister and Leader of the Labour Party, face David Cameron and 
Nick Clegg in three separate debates. 
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up therefore also included Nigel Farage, Leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP), Nicola Sturgeon, First Minister of Scotland and Leader of the Scottish National Party 
(SNP), Leanne Wood, leader of the Welsh nationalist party Plaid Cymru, and Natalie Bennett, 
leader of the Green Party of England and Wales. Figure 4.2 shows the format of the podium line-
up of the party leaders.  
The inclusion of so many party leaders was a point of both contention and celebration, 
arising after months of wrangling between No. 10 and the broadcasters. The seven-way format 
attracted a lot of attention in the press and amongst broadcasters, some of whom were concerned 
that the debate would degenerate into arguments and noise. The event, chaired by ITV news reader 
Julie Etchingham, was reasonably decorous despite the large number of candidates present. The 
leaders’ debate was a media event, defined here using Dayan and Katz’s description which 
specifies “historic occasions that… transfix a nation” and “include epic contests of politics” 
(Dayan and Katz, 1994: 1). It was watched by an average audience of 7 million people (The 
Guardian, 2015) and 1.5 million tweets were sent about the debate “with an average of 8,657 per 
minute” (BBC News, 2015d). The debate followed a structured format covering four topics, with 
questions from the studio audience taken on the economy, the NHS, immigration, and the future 
of the UK. 
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Figure 4.2. Podium positions of the seven party leaders 
 
Source: Etchingham (2015, 31/03/2015) 
 
Overall it was noted in the news media that the debate was unremarkable as it did not 
break new ground, nor have a large, measurable impact on the campaign.  Opinion polls were 
divided over the winner, with the accolade being attributed variously to Cameron, Miliband, 
Farage, and Sturgeon. Unsurprisingly, much of media and political elites’ energy was spent on 
speculating over winners and losers (Iyengar, Norpoth, and Hahn, 2004). Over the 48 hour period 
of analysis, the main questions asked by journalists evolved from “who will win?” and “how will 
we know who’s won?” to “who won?”. This chapter, however, does not focus on horserace 
logics49 but instead looks at the more complicated process surrounding how emerging stories were 
used, and how information was controlled across platforms in the process of setting the news 
media agenda. 
 
4.3. Progressive coalition or Scottish invasion?: the impact of Nicola Sturgeon’s 
strong performance 
 
 
                                                          
49 See Cushion et al., 2016 for an accurate account of horserace narratives in 2015 election coverage 
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A key element of the news media agenda setting process was the interplay of influential news 
stories that were used in conjunction to build a strong agenda. In this section I analyse two agenda 
items; the success of each on the media agenda helped to increase the salience of the other.  These 
were (1) Nicola Sturgeon’s successful performance in the leaders’ debate; and (2) the prospect of 
a Labour-SNP agreement in government, or the “coalition of chaos” as it was referred to by the 
Conservative Party. The process which enabled these items to be become part of, and remain 
central to, the news media agenda consisted of a combination of the following: legacy 
newsgathering practices; a hybridisation of media logics; limited harnessing of network power; 
and controlled interactivity in message dissemination. In short, they provide evidence for a fluid 
process of news media agenda setting which was still predominantly characterised by hierarchical 
power structures.  
These items were salient on the news media agendas because the information was circulated 
amongst political and media elites in established channels, whilst concurrently gaining traction in 
online networks. Although traditional news media agenda setting and established power 
relationships remained dominant, social media undoubtedly had a role to play. In answer to RQ4, 
political parties and media organisations used a combination of social media strategies and 
established agenda-setting practices to exert their influence over the news media agenda.  Sections 
4.3.2 to 4.3.5 analyse how information was sourced, used, and shared in relation to the two agenda 
items described above. Section 4.3.1 briefly looks at an unsuccessful case drawn from the Liberal 
Democrats’ campaign, which sets the scene for the analysis which follows. This analysis details 
the division of power between hierarchical and networked relationships, the hybridisation of 
logics in the use of social, online, and broadcast media, and the successful employment of 
message control as part of strategies of controlled interactivity. 
 
4.3.1 Failing to use a salient item to strengthen an agenda: The case of the Liberal 
Democrats 
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In the journalistic texts analysed there were 44 mentions of “coalition” occurring 
consistently over the 48-hour period (see Table 4.1). Talk of coalition was a main feature of the 
pre-debate build-up. Mark Austin at ITV News spoke about how “Natalie Bennett … will be 
hoping to present her party as one that could play an important role in any coalition” (ITV News, 
2015b), BBC News reporter Ben Wright explained that “Nick Clegg said he would prefer to see 
a coalition between the Liberal Democrats and one of the main parties” (BBC News, 2015a), and 
on Channel 4 News Michael Gove, speaking for his party, highlighted how “The clear dividing 
line is between a Prime Minister whose plan is working, and other parties scrabbling to form who 
knows what kind of coalition!” (Channel 4 News, 2015a). 
The existence of closely related media agenda items primed citizens prior to the debate. 
Scheufele and Tewkesbury’s (2007: 11) observation that priming leads news audiences “to use 
specific issues as benchmarks for evaluating the performance of leaders and governments” is 
borne out by my findings. I noted that the discussion of coalition amongst news media and 
political elites prior to the debate prepared citizens to view leader interactions through this lens. 
3,050 (10%) of the tweets collected using the search term “#leadersdebate” mentioned 
“coalition,” where many users expressed their coalition preferences or potential outcomes they 
disliked (see Figure 4.3). Therefore, the driving force behind the agenda was elite engagement 
with a coalition narrative and this was reflected in citizen discussion online. At the back-end of 
the process, power relationships remained hierarchical and online audiences indexed their 
discussion to the media agenda. The role played by social media users in this instance was in 
perpetuating the media agenda, and elite actors benefitted from this by sharing digital content. 
 
  
Figure 4.3. Examples of citizen tweets discussing “coalition” 
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Source: Gugle, S. (2015) and Thompson, S. (2015) 
 
The fact that “coalition” was firmly on the news media agenda in the build-up to the 
debate benefitted certain political parties. The Conservative Party used the prospect of a Labour-
SNP coalition as a key message with the goal of persuading potential voters that they were the 
safer option (see section 4.3.5). The Liberal Democrats positioned themselves as the middle 
ground between the two main parties, placing the assumption of a hung parliament at the heart of 
their message. In pre-debate interviews Nick Clegg and Liberal Democrat spokespeople were 
quoted saying “Most people now know that nobody on the stage is going to win this election 
outright" (ITV News, 2015b), presenting a coalition government as a given election outcome. The 
Liberal Democrats supplemented their engagement with broadcast media with digital content. On 
the morning of the debate the official Liberal Democrat account tweeted “Pollsters predicting a 
hung Parliament: Ben Page, Ipsos Mori: ‘Most likely a hung parliament or coalition.’ #GE2015” 
 
 
132 
 
 
(Liberal Democrats, 2015a), and a different tweet containing the same information was published 
from the same account at 12:30 – “Pollsters predicting hung Parliament – Ben Page, Ipsos Mori 
on #GE2015: ‘Most likely a hung parliament or coalition’” (Liberal Democrats, 2015b) (see 
Figure 4.4). Citizen interactions with these two tweets were sparse, totalling 20 retweets, 1 reply, 
and 7 likes for the former, and 6 retweets, 6 replies, and 5 comments for the latter.  
The Liberal Democrats’ tweets met Twitter standards for authentic communication on the 
platform, in line with the adjusted requirements for elite organizations based on Enli’s criteria 
(2015: 136-137): the tweets were predictable, spontaneous, and immediate. This theoretically 
endowed them with the ability to use network power. However, this did not work in practice. The 
party’s core campaign message was generally not well-received as it was reasonably uninspiring, 
perhaps even insulting (Perraudin, 2015), and the outcomes for the party were not made clear. 
Without this feature the tweets lacked the motivating impetus needed for their supporters to share 
the message. According to Stromer-Galley (2014: 14), motivating supporters to share information 
is an important factor for success in strategies of message control involving controlling the 
interactivity of supporters. Therefore although the technological affordances of social media were 
incorporated into the Liberal Democrats campaign, they failed to motivate supporters to share 
messages widely. The result was reduced power to set the media agenda, or indeed to direct their 
messages to travel online. The lesson for the party appears to be that no level of authenticity and 
engagement in controlled activity strategies can overcome an uninspiring message and low levels 
of support. 
There is further evidence that, among a section of the voting population at the time of the 
debate, the Liberal Democrats’ reliance on a coalition narrative was backfiring, although the 
notion of a hung parliament election result was generally not in question by the media, other 
political elites, or the public. In the Today programme’s regular campaign feature 100 Seats in 
100 Days broadcast on 2 April 2015, a member of the public expressed concerns about the Liberal 
Democrats in coalition: “what’s the point in voting for them because if they go into a coalition 
with the Tories again it’s just going to be more Tory policies. Voting for someone else presents a 
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different opportunity for a different government” (BBC Radio 4, 2015a). In this citizen’s opinion 
the option of voting for the Liberal Democrats was overshadowed by the expectation that they 
would form a coalition government with the Conservatives. Not only was this voter reflecting the 
media consensus that coalition was inevitable, but they were also influenced by the Liberal 
Democrats own agenda which situated them firmly in the centre ground on the presumption of an 
agreement with either main party.  
This example provides evidence for the loss of message control by the Liberal Democrats; 
although they took part in the hybrid news media agenda setting process, their adherence to the 
coalition agenda backfired. It also demonstrates how the process can become individualised. For 
the Liberal Democrats, in this instance, engagement on social media was not an effective part of 
their agenda-setting repertoire. Answering the research questions with this example – how are the 
technological affordances of social media incorporated into the news media agenda setting 
process? Do social media users play a role in setting the news agenda? – I have shown that the 
party harnessed Twitter as a platform to share positive information in line with their campaign 
messages, but social media users did not engage with the content. Had social media users played 
a more active role in the Liberal Democrats’ campaign on social media, granting them power 
drawn from the network, they may have had greater success in placing their items on the news 
media agenda. 
 
 
 
134 
 
 
 
 
Source: Liberal Democrats (2015a; 2015b) 
Figure 4.4. Two similar tweets from @LibDems released at 06:00 and 12:30 on 2 April 2015 
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4.3.2 Assessing the dialectical approach to power through The Telegraph’s framing of 
Nicola Sturgeon 
 
Making an issue prominent in the news media in order to make it prominent on the public 
agenda is a function of the traditional agenda-setting process (McCombs, 2014: 4). I argue that a 
tool used to achieve prominence for stories on the media agenda during the 2015 election 
campaign was the harnessing of network power from supportive networks that existed in online 
spaces. In the most effective cases, network power was used alongside hierarchical power 
relationships.  The use of digital tools in the form of The Telegraph’s website and Facebook page 
are examined here and show how the technological affordances of social media are incorporated 
into the news media agenda setting process. The findings answer part two of RQ4: how are the 
technological affordances of social media incorporated into the process of setting the news media 
agenda?  
The Telegraph’s outputs exemplified the attempts to harness network power by producing 
content that met the standards for communication on those platforms (Chadwick, 2013: 207). 
Equally, these actions demonstrated how established media organizations used Facebook as a 
push medium and therefore maintained a hierarchical power relationship. The media organisation 
was able to share an article originally published at an earlier date with a wider audience who 
potentially had not already been exposed to that text. The audience in turn could share this 
information through their social networks on Facebook, granting The Telegraph access to the 
structures of network power. I describe below how The Telegraph combined its access to 
hierarchical and networked power through the analysis of a Facebook post about Nicola Sturgeon 
(see Figure 4.5). 
The post was published within the following context. A coalition narrative had become 
increasingly central in debate coverage as a result of the inclusion of minor parties. From morning 
until mid-evening on 2 April 2015, print, online, and broadcast news reports about the leaders’ 
debate focussed predominantly on explaining its logistics and format and on introducing each of 
the leaders. It is for this reason that discussions of Sturgeon within the content were neutral in 
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tone and she was featured alongside all or most of the other leaders. In 12 out of 16 mentions in 
online news sources released before the debate, Sturgeon was written about in conjunction with 
all or most of the other party leaders. This is contrasted to the post-debate reports and analysis 
where she was widely lauded as a – if not the – winner, and certainly as the leader who performed 
best. For example “Miliband flops as SNP and Ukip secure shock victory” (Dominiczak, 
Swinford, and Hope, 2015) and “Nicola Sturgeon was judged best-performing leader in 
tonight’s debate in a poll of 1,117 viewers by YouGov, with 28 per cent backing.” 
(Channel 4 News, 2015b).50  That she was seen to have done especially well in England was a 
surprise given her Scottish Nationalist politics. She was also noted to have been popular amongst 
left-wing voters who might traditionally support Labour (Mason, 2015). 
This consistency was punctured by a post at 11:20 on 2 April 2015 on The Telegraph’s 
Facebook page. This post demonstrated the complicated hybrid media logics that characterise the 
news media agenda setting process. Captioned “Tonight the danger is that Nicola Sturgeon 
repeats the 2010 Nick-trick, presents her very old-fashioned politics as new, reasonable and 
sensible, and persuades enough voters in Scotland to vote for her party,” (The Telegraph, 2015a) 
the post linked to an article originally published on 31 March 2015 headlined “Nicola Sturgeon – 
the most dangerous woman in politics” (Archer, 2015).  Although other pre-debate content 
disseminated on The Telegraph’s website did not overtly promote an agenda, this action indicates 
that the organization was engaging in the news media agenda-setting process by sharing an older 
story on Facebook with a clear agenda, thereby actively trying to influence public opinion.  
 
                                                          
50 Opinion poll results were mixed but generally found that Sturgeon was well received. These included 
YouGov who named Sturgeon the winner with 28% of their sample backing her (YouGov, 02 April 2015) 
and ComRes/ITV who placed Sturgeon second with 20% behind Miliband, Cameron and Farage who 
were in joint first place on 21% (ComRes, 02 April 2015). 
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Source: The Telegraph (2015a) 
 
The Telegraph’s act of sharing this post on Facebook appeared to invite interaction, and 
an equitable power relationship with its audience. However, the organization used the platform 
as a push medium rather than a tool for conversation. This is a common use of social media by 
elite actors, yet undoubtedly this particular action was problematic for the organization as The 
Telegraph was not responsive to its audience. Stromer-Galley differentiated between computer-
mediated human interaction and media interaction, defined respectively as “prolonged interaction 
between two or more people through the channel of a computer network” (Stromer-Galley, 2000: 
117) and “interaction with the medium itself” (Ibid.: 118). She drew on Rafaeli’s (1988) work to 
argue that responsiveness is a requirement for computer-mediated human interaction. When two 
Facebook users interact on the social networking site, sending and receiving messages, this 
constitutes computer-mediated human interaction. When a Facebook user interacts with a post 
and receives no response then this is not computer-mediated human interaction despite the 
 
Figure 4.5. The Telegraph’s Facebook Post sharing their article warning against Nicola Sturgeon 
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affordances of the technology. Responsiveness is critical, and forms part of authentic 
communication on Facebook. The Telegraph’s use of Facebook posts in a non-responsive manner 
falls under the category of media interaction and provides evidence for hierarchical power 
relationships between news organizations and citizens. Maintaining hierarchy has both positive 
and negative outcomes. The organization can maintain control of its information but effective 
performance in network power relationships is challenged as the act of not engaging in reciprocal 
communication breaks expected standards.  
Yet, this story is not straightforward. Using Facebook as a push medium is not a 
completely redundant strategy in setting the news media agenda. These types of interactions may 
encourage two-step flow - at least 86 users did directly share The Telegraph’s post within their 
own networks, and others may have shared the information in their offline personal networks 
(Dennis, 2016). I also found that the post met other Facebook communication standards. Visually 
and discursively it presented as a typical post that a user may find in their timeline; it contained 
an opinion, a link, and was relevant to the day’s events.  
Meeting these standards for predictability on Facebook network endowed The Telegraph 
with a perceived authenticity amongst citizen-users. By achieving this, the message had a greater 
chance of being shared and of setting the media agenda. Sharing content creates a virtuous circle 
building a post’s perceived authenticity. Enli (2016: 128) demonstrates how “through their 
engagement with the post, social media users [do] the job of spreading the message and add[ing] 
a portion of authenticity by sharing directly through their networks rather than via the mass 
media.” However, responsiveness is also a communication standard of Facebook. Increasing 
interaction with this standard is where media organizations could increase their agenda-setting 
power further. Creating a semblance of a less hierarchical power structure through responsiveness 
would allow them to engage with their followers more effectively and could provide new 
information to strengthen their agendas. The following section provides an assessment of the way 
in which information originating on social media was used in the creation of media agendas. 
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4.3.3. “What are they tweeting about?”: How information from social media was used to 
strengthen media agendas 
 
The Telegraph’s attacks on Sturgeon continued into the evening of 2 April 2015. The first 
pre-debate website content produced on 2 April 2015 that expressed a wholly negative opinion 
about Sturgeon was published at 18:17. The Telegraph reported that the female leaders – 
Sturgeon, Leanne Wood, and Natalie Bennett – were “plotting” to “gang up” on Cameron “in a 
bid to dominate” the debate (Dominiczak, 2015). Natalie Bennett was a source for the story. She 
was quoted confirming that the female leaders held a number of opinions in common. This was 
juxtaposed with information supportive of a different news agenda item – that the Conservatives 
were “warn[ing]” of a Labour-SNP coalition and that the Tories offer “clear leadership” compared 
to this potential “chaos”. The text immediately promoted coalition as a reality, fitting the pattern 
that I have established happened frequently in news reports. A coalition involving Sturgeon was 
presented as a strong possibility. The article reported that evidence existed for the early stages of 
agreement between the parties. This narrative was validated, legitimizing and strengthening this 
agenda in the minds of their readers by following these statements with the Conservatives’ 
warning.  
This finding reveals the continuation of traditional functions in the news media agenda 
setting process and provides an answer to parts one and two of RQ4: journalists sourced 
information from political elites through social media, and the connectivity inherent in social 
media was incorporated into newsgathering practices. The way in which this information was 
sourced, compiled, and disseminated provides evidence of the continued dependence of news 
producers on elite sources, specifically political parties in this instance. This finding reveals 
something new for agenda-setting research: although the power relationship was hierarchical in 
this case study, hybrid media logics were in place for newsgathering with journalists turning to 
social media to provide supporting evidence. We should consider the interplay of these two 
journalistic practices when considering who sets the news media agenda and how they do so. 
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The connectivity of social media partly creates the power within its networks. This is 
demonstrated by the sourcing of the story through Twitter. The article used a photograph of 
Sturgeon and Wood backstage at the ITV studio as evidence that the female leaders were working 
closely together. The image was tweeted by SNP staffer Ria Robertson at 15:59. At 17:20 the 
Online Picture Editor at The Telegraph replied to the tweet asking if the photo could be used on 
The Telegraph’s website. Social media therefore played a role in facilitating speedy 
communication between elite actors. The content of this text furthered three agenda items, all of 
which benefited or advanced the Conservative Party’s messages. Firstly, it constructed David 
Cameron as an underdog in the debate who was facing a coordinated attack from smaller parties 
on the left, a point discussed in further detail below. Secondly, it depicted Sturgeon as a threat, 
forming part of an emerging frame that marked her as “dangerous”. Finally, and relatedly, it 
strengthened the arguments for coalition by depicting party leaders “plotting” together, priming 
audiences for potential multiple partners in government. 
In the post-debate period Sturgeon’s performance was widely praised by citizens on 
social media and by news media organizations. For example, Vicki Young on BBC News at Ten 
reported that “… the people with the biggest smile on their face tonight are the SNP. They think 
it has been a great night for Nicola Sturgeon” (BBC News, 2015b). Sky News at 11 reported 
similarly positive lines where Political Editor Faisal Islam’s opening speech was solely about 
Sturgeon’s performance: “Considering that this is a UK wide audience, UK wide polling that we 
have been hearing, the performance of Nicola Sturgeon is the standout … She is near the top of 
one of the polls and in the rest as well” (Sky News, 2015a). The result of this consensus was that 
political parties and media organisations used Sturgeon’s strong performance to suit their own 
agendas, and very few texts or broadcasts were disseminated with a neutral tone about Sturgeon. 
The provenance of the sources which underpin this story, including those from social 
media, demonstrate that although newsgathering processes happened through digital and legacy 
practices, legacy (hierarchical) power structures continued to dominate agenda-setting. Elite 
sources were still the primary mechanism for sourcing stories and supporting information. This 
is a consistent finding; 20 tweets used in online news reports, blogs, or broadcasts (n=20) were 
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sourced from journalists51, politicians52, or political party or staff accounts53 compared to 7 
sourced from citizens54. In news media content about the leaders’ debate, citizen contributions 
made on social media were used mainly to provide colour to the news report. There were no 
examples of original information being brought to light by citizens and challenging the framing 
of discussion, as previous research has shown is possible (see Chadwick, 2010; Freelon and Karpf, 
2015).  
The lack of information from social media used in the broadcast reporting may be due to 
the difficulties of making such content fit legacy broadcast news production practices; it is easier 
to embed a tweet in a piece of written text. Social media often feels separate to the main story 
within a broadcast, as will be explored further in Chapters 6 and 7. In the one programme that 
incorporated tweets, Sky News at 11 broadcast on 2 April 2015, the tweets were used as 
supportive evidence for the story they were telling and were sourced from elite actors: two 
journalists and the director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies.  
In their immediate analysis of the debate, Sky News at 11’s report contained a segment 
specifically to discuss comments made on social media as well as high-level data55 from Twitter. 
Anchor Adam Boulton’s lead-in comment was “First of all, as we have seen, this election is 
nothing if not an election taking place on social media as well” (Sky News, 2015a). This statement 
othered social media; the election is taking place there “as well”, that is to say in addition to, but 
separately from, the offline world. The programme’s analysis strengthened this understanding of 
the election on social media, with the reporter's speedily delivered description highlighting the 
total number of tweets about the debate, the total number of tweets discussing each leader, 
sentiment analysis on those tweets, and finally reading out three tweets all from the establishment 
                                                          
51 Sources for this finding are Guido Fawkes (2015), Lockhart (2015), Nardelli and Arnett (2015), Phipps 
(2015), Sanghani (2015), Sky News at 11, The Telegraph (2015d), Waterson (2015a), Waterson (2015b), 
and Zurcher (2015). 
52 Sources for this finding are Glaze (2015), ITV News (2015c), ITV News (2015d), McTague (2015), 
Phipps (2015), and Sparrow and Phipps (2015). 
53 Sources for this finding are BBC News (2015c), Dominiczak (2015), ITV News (2015c), and McTague 
and Chorley (2015). 
54 Sources for this finding are ITV News (2015c), ITV News (2015e), MailOnline (2015), Newton Dunn 
(2015), Sanghani (2015), Stubbs (2015), and Waterson (2015a). 
55 High-level data is defined as data about large numbers of users that has been aggregated, for example 
about location, general subject of tweets, total number of tweets about a topic etc. 
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actors highlighted above. Figure 4.6 illustrates this difference in use between citizen and elite 
content on Twitter.  
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Source: Sky News (2015a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4.6. Screenshots from Sky News at 11, comparing use of information from citizens’ tweets (left) to use of information from elites’ tweets (right) 
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This was a pattern repeated in other broadcast and online news reports. Information from 
citizens was only used as an original source in two ways; either as examples for a story about the 
reaction on social media – in which case social media was the story - or as supporting information 
in the form of vox populi. For example, on ITV News’ liveblog an update was published at 21:30 
headlined “Viewers: Debate shows we need more women in politics” (ITV News, 2015g) (see 
Figure 4.7).  Alongside a comment from Political Editor Tom Bradby, five tweets from non-elite 
citizens were included each making the point that the female leaders’ performances showed the 
need for more women in politics. In this case, the story originated on social media only in the 
sense that social media is the story – viewers’ opinions were reported as though they were the 
homogeneous thoughts of Twitter users.  
 
Source: ITV News (2015g) 
 
Figure 4.7. Extract from ITV News liveblog covering a story sourced from Twitter 
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An example of the second type of usage comes from The Telegraph, who used Twitter as 
a source for vox populi in an article entitled “Leaders' debate 2015: Do you really know who these 
women are?”, published at 11:34 (Sanghani, 2015). The journalist engaged in a legacy media 
practice via digital methods by asking her question to the public on Twitter (see Figure 4.8). The 
responses were included in article alongside supporting information from a YouGov focus group. 
This indicates a journalist using the network power inherent in her social network on Twitter to 
source information for a story. In the cases presented in this section I have shown that information 
from citizen-users of Twitter was used at a high-level as supporting evidence for stories. Main 
sources continued to be political or media elite actors. For the news media agenda setting process, 
this demonstrates that news-making legacy practices continued, built on established relationship 
structures between journalists and politicians. 
 
Source: Telegraph Women (2015) 
 
Figure 4.8. Sanghani's tweet requesting opinions from her followers 
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4.3.4. Constructing the “coalition of chaos”: meshing hierarchical and networked power 
and structures to set the news media agenda 
 
Reports of Sturgeon’s successful debate performance gained traction across media 
organisations, alongside evidence of citizen-users’ positive sentiment towards the SNP leader. 
Opinion polling, Twitter mentions56, and the 1,200 new members claimed by the SNP during the 
debate, all demonstrated that Sturgeon had performed well. The Conservative Party used this 
emerging story and narrative as part of a strategy to strengthen their own agenda regarding a 
potential Labour-SNP coalition.  The party successfully set the media agenda and the analysis of 
how they achieved this is outlined in this section. They melded older and newer media logics, 
sharing information across media platforms and drawing on their supporters networks to set the 
news media agenda. It was an effective exercise in using both forms of power which clearly 
reveals the functions of the process. 
On Sky News at 11 Kay Burley interviewed Stewart Hosie of the SNP regarding the 
impact of Sturgeon’s good performance in the debate: 
 
Burley: So do you think that Mr Miliband was thinking that that is someone he can do 
business with?  
Hosie: I hope he was. Given that Nicola won the poll of polls which was UK-wide and 
not just in Scotland, I think that Labour must be looking carefully. He would be wrong 
now to rule out an arrangement with the SNP if that is where the polls took us.  
Burley: I noticed you said arrangement not coalition?  
Hosie: We have never said not coalition? We thought that that was the least likely 
outcome.  
Burley: Never say never?  
Hosie: We have effectively said no and they have said no. But if there is a supply and 
confidence arrangement, a vote by vote arrangement, he would be foolish to rule it out. 
He may be then saying, he is going to reject things which people in England want and 
open the door to another Tory government. (Sky News, 2015a) 
 
This exchange was the first post-debate broadcast to specifically discuss a Labour-SNP 
arrangement. Sturgeon’s assured performance, alongside the snap opinion polls that ranked her 
                                                          
56 ITV.com/news reported that Sturgeon came third in total Twitter mentions. Data from Twitter showed 
that she garnered 113,000 tweets, behind Farage (262,000) and Cameron (162,000) (ITV News, 2015f). 
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highly, led Burley to be persistent in this line of questioning. Sturgeon’s strong performance put 
coalition even more firmly on the agenda as it cemented her capabilities as a formidable leader in 
the public’s minds (Green, 2015). Although during the debate she spoke about areas that the SNP 
and the Labour Party had in common and of them working together to “lock the Tories out of 
government”, Sturgeon never explicitly mentioned a coalition. Despite both parties saying no to 
a formal arrangement, Sturgeon’s olive branch to Labour was a gift for the Conservatives as the 
possibility of Labour-SNP coalition was a lynchpin of their campaign (Atkins, 2015). 
The Conservative Party promoted two agenda items after the leaders’ debate: 
1. “Cameron in charge” – the framing of Cameron as the only candidate fit for 
leadership (see section 4.4); and 
2. “Coalition of chaos” – warning about the threat of a Labour-SNP coalition 
government, described and analysed here. 
As discussed above, potential coalition was a salient news media agenda item throughout the 
campaign. The attribute57 of chaos became attached to the coalition narrative and the association 
was strengthened after the leaders’ debate when the multi-party nature of the event highlighted 
the seeming decline of two-party politics in the United Kingdom (Robinson, 2015a). It was argued 
that SNP success in the election might benefit the Conservative Party as it would result in Labour 
losing seats in Scotland and consequently being unable to deliver a majority government (Brown, 
2015). Coalition was a subject that was frequently raised in the online media, print media, and 
broadcasts analysed. The Conservative Party’s “coalition of chaos” agenda therefore fit into 
existing narratives and their post-debate message gained traction by resonating with this.  
Below I evaluate post-debate communications which demonstrate how power was 
exercised in this case. I find that the acceptance and promotion of attributing success to Sturgeon’s 
debate performance amongst media and citizens allowed the “coalition of chaos” agenda to 
resonate. The Conservative Party used a combination of positive information about Sturgeon’s 
performance, presenting her as a credible force in politics, and negative information about the 
                                                          
57 Attributes, as defined in Chapter 1, are qualities that “can be employed to evaluate or think about the 
issue” (Kim, Scheufele, and Shanahan, 2002: 11). 
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potential outcomes of the SNP in a coalition government to build their agenda. Their approach to 
the dissemination of information took into account hybrid media logics, in which they combined 
older and newer media practices to create and share information to construct their agenda. This 
included using both hierarchical and network power to exert control over the news media agenda. 
The established practices used by the Conservative Party included engagement with 
traditional media through interviews. The outcome of this was that their message travelled widely 
amongst mass media. The party’s spokespeople praised Sturgeon in broadcast interviews and in 
the print and online news media, in addition to praising Cameron’s performance. One example is 
John Humphreys’ interview with the Conservative Party’s Michael Gove on the Today 
programme the morning after the debate:  
 
Michael Gove: It’s probably fair to say that the three female leaders all did very well in 
different ways. It’s also legitimate to say that Nicola Sturgeon emerged as perhaps the 
most impressive debutante on the stage. She did very well and –  
John Humphrys: More impressive than David Cameron? Not that he’s a debutante. 
Michael Gove: That is the important distinction to draw. I think that in terms of being an 
insurgent or an outsider or a critic of government, I think that Nicola Sturgeon was the 
most impressive. I think in terms of being prime ministerial, being commanding, being 
someone who people who trust with the fate of this country for the next 5 years, David 
Cameron unambiguously won according to all the opinion polls that were taken 
afterwards… (BBC Radio 4, 2015b) 
 
The Conservatives’ strategy for pushing their agenda to traditional media was to maintain 
message consistency on both of these fronts. Gove, in the example above, highlighted Sturgeon’s 
strengths as “the most impressive debutante” but placed Cameron above her in leadership terms. 
Gove used the descriptor “commanding”, which was used frequently by party spokespeople to 
describe Cameron’s debate performance. For example, William Hague described Cameron’s 
performance as “commanding” on ITV News at Ten following the debate and a soundbite – 
“David Cameron gave a very strong and commanding performance this evening in the debate” – 
was used throughout the Today programme on 3 April 2015. Such descriptions of Cameron’s 
performance were further replicated in Conservative-supporting newspapers (see Figure 4.9) 
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Source: Letts (2015: 8) and Newton Dunn (2015: 5) 
 
In addition to traditional media interviews, the party synchronously shared information 
on their social media accounts which promoted Miliband being in thrall to Sturgeon in a potential 
coalition. An image was produced and shared on the @CCHQ Twitter account at 22:26, fewer 
than 30 minutes after the end of the debate. It was then retweeted by the @Conservatives Twitter 
account. The image repeated the theme of a poster shared earlier in the campaign. It depicted a 
small Miliband in Sturgeon’s pocket; the earlier image had depicted him in Alex Salmond’s 
pocket (see Figure 4.10).  The same image was turned into a video, zooming out from Miliband 
to the looming spectre of Sturgeon, while an audio clip of the SNP leader saying “SNP MPs in 
the House of Commons keeping him honest” played on loop. The effect was somewhat 
disconcerting. This was shared on the Conservative Party’s Facebook page at 23:08. The 
Conservative Party’s two-pronged approach, incorporating both hierarchical and networked 
power, demonstrates clearly the most effective approach to the news media agenda-setting 
process. They were able to harness their social media networks and the affordances of social 
  
Figure 4.9. Descriptions of Cameron’s performance in The Sun (left) and The Daily Mail (right) 
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networking sites, whilst use their position as a powerful elite actor to share their messages through 
traditional media. 
 
 
Source: CCHQ Press Office (2015) 
 
The image was later featured in the MailOnline’s analysis of the debate, under the sub-
heading “Now look where the Tories have put Miliband!” (McTague and Chorley, 2015). The 
article containing this image was published at 12:43 on 3 April 2015. The content of the text was 
a round-up of the debate and incorporated myriad audio-visual materials. It set out its stall in the 
headline: "Cameron wins by a whisker: PM attacked from all sides but 40% say he's best choice 
to lead the country AND back him to fix the economy as Miliband is overshadowed by Sturgeon 
and Farage”. It is therefore clear from the beginning of this text that the MailOnline was 
Figure 4.10. CCHQ tweet featuring a photoshopped image which propagates a 
Labour/SNP coalition 
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promoting the “Cameron-in-charge” agenda, but also that it was employing the coalition narrative 
by describing Miliband as “overshadowed” by the leaders of smaller parties.  
The text further constructed Miliband as weak, describing him as “hapless” and 
“indecisive”, compared to Cameron who “kept a firm hand on the leadership rudder”. Information 
from citizen-users of Twitter was also incorporated into this article as supporting evidence rather 
than as an original source. This further substantiates the way in which citizen information was 
used as a supporting act in the news media agenda-setting process. The text of tweets were 
integrated into the main news report instead of a screenshot of the tweet being embedded. 
Visually, this treats tweets as quotes from a source in a legacy sense and may lead the reader may 
give more weight to the source.   
A further Facebook post was created at 13:51 on 3 April 2015 containing different content 
but with the same goal. It successfully travelled through the Conservatives network on Facebook, 
receiving 3,800 likes and 1,100 shares (see Figure 4.11). 
Source: Conservatives (2015a) 
 
Figure 4.11. A still from a video ‘mash-up’ of Miliband and Sturgeon during the leaders’ debate 
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The post consists of a video comprising clips of Miliband and Sturgeon edited together, appearing 
as though they are finishing each other sentences. The video is unrefined; the audio and video are 
not seamless. This could be a design decision following a specific media logic of digital content. 
The video replicates the look of videos by semi-comedic online media producers which regularly 
go viral such as Casetteboy, a British duo who are noted for creating mash-up videos of 
politicians. The caption repeats the party’s core messages, reading “Labour propped up by the 
SNP means chaos for Britain – and hardworking taxpayers will pay for it” (Conservatives, 2015a).  
Repetition is a significant part of agenda-setting effects (McCombs, 2014; Stone and McCombs, 
1981), as is the related characteristic of message discipline for controlled interactivity in an 
election campaign (Freelon, 2017). The Conservative Party were successful in enacting both of 
these strategies to promote the “coalition of chaos”. 
Further to repeating their core messages and phrases in the caption, the party employed 
strategies of message control through calls to action by directing followers to “LIKE and SHARE” 
the video. This post met requirements for authenticity on Facebook; it was spontaneous in its 
message, the content was not obviously rehearsed. Furthermore, it was immediate, posted soon 
after the leaders’ debate, and was predictable. That is to say the post contained discursive and 
technological markers that the audience would expect to find in a Facebook post such as the call 
to action (“Hit SHARE”), and the inclusion of video content.  As a result, it was widely shared. 
This demonstrates that the party were able to successfully engage in the contemporary news media 
agenda-setting process through their creation of relevant content and by exerting power within 
online networks on Facebook to activate two-step flow.  
  Analysis of the comments on the post show that this agenda item achieved salience 
amongst this audience. Of the total number of comments analysed (564), the highest proportion 
expressed fear or concern regarding a Labour-SNP coalition, compared to only 3% which 
expressed disdain about this narrative and 4.6% of comments which criticised the electioneering 
behind the video. This small but important perception shows that citizen-users were able to 
perceive commodification and demonstrates the awareness that some users have about 
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campaigning strategies, notably they reacted to the lack of spontaneity perceived in the 
communication. Such awareness is one way in which the illusion of authenticity can be broken. 
Once a communication is revealed as inauthentic, for example by appearing as rehearsed, behind-
the-scenes electioneering can be perceived and attempted commodification of citizen content and 
action is revealed. The actor loses the ability to direct citizen activity in a meaningful manner. 
This might make citizens less likely to share information.  
Generally Facebook users were divided about this agenda item. Specifically their division 
centred on whether a Labour-SNP coalition would be a good or bad outcome, and not on whether 
or not it was a realistic prospect. The general consensus across both digital and traditional media 
was that a coalition government would be the election outcome, and that Labour were likely to 
enter into an arrangement with the SNP. Citizens who commented on a Facebook post on The 
Telegraph’s page published at 13:15, which shared their earlier article entitled “Leaders’ Debates: 
The SNP won, the rest of the country lost” (Stanley, 2015), discussed the prospect of a Labour-
SNP arrangement. For example the first comment on this topic stated that "What is clear is a vote 
for Labour in England is a vote for Scottish Separatists to rule England. Anyone really fancy 
that...?" A reading of the article shows that Sturgeon is constructed as a threat and likely to be a 
“kingmaker”. 
The Conservative Party in this instance successfully engaged in the hybridised practices 
which constituted the news media agenda-setting process in the 2015 general election campaign. 
They produced shareable content for social media, encouraged their followers to share it amongst 
their networks – and successfully persuaded them to do so by meeting the communication 
standards for the social media platforms. Simultaneously, they engaged with the traditional media, 
sharing their message and promoting another news story (Sturgeon’s successful performance) to 
further their own. They used the technological affordances of social media successfully and 
meshed this approach with legacy practices in their engagement with traditional media to set the 
news media agenda. However, not all of their strategies were as successful. The following section 
analyses the second of their approaches, and highlights the importance of authenticity of 
communications within social media networks. 
154 
 
 
 
 
4.4. #cameronincharge?: The role of authenticity in setting the news media 
agenda  
 
The Conservative Party’s post-debate agenda-setting approach had two lines of attack. Discussed 
above was their “coalition of chaos”. This section analyses their second, less successful, item, 
which I refer to as “Cameron in charge”. This strategy involved framing Cameron’s performance 
during the debate as masterful and above the fray, and by extension Cameron as the only party 
leader with leadership qualities. “Cameron in charge” was the top line promoted by Conservative 
Party spokespeople across media platforms and in their own content. Whilst this agenda did 
transfer to Conservative supporters on social media and amongst the right-wing press and online 
news producers, it did not achieve success as a main news line across traditional media. This was 
the result of two important criteria. Firstly, the “Cameron in charge” agenda did not have a pre-
existing narrative to draw on, as did the “coalition of chaos” communications. Secondly, despite 
using many of the same tactics to promote this agenda item, the Conservatives’ communications 
were inauthentic on social media. Specifically, they lacked both spontaneity and predictability 
despite meeting the standard for immediacy. 
Beginning with the Conservative Party’s first post-debate Facebook post made at 23:55 
on 2 April 2015, it is notable that they strongly and consistently pushed their core message. This 
post-debate agenda comprised a dichotomy of Conservative competence versus Labour chaos. 
The text of the Facebook post presented this idea as a fait accompli: "Tonight's debate confirmed 
what we already knew" (italics added for emphasis) and utilised the language of choice; (1) a 
choice between Cameron and Miliband; and (2) a choice between a competent government and a 
chaotic one. The headline of the link stressed that there was an obvious answer: "Tonight the 
choice was clear". This wording is similar to an earlier Telegraph article online (The Telegraph, 
2015b), which shows consistency and reflexivity between the Conservative Party and supportive 
press in constructing this agenda. 
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The Facebook post was carefully designed to enhance message control and to motivate 
sharing amongst their supporters. The image in the post was a screenshot of the leaders at their 
podiums, on which the hashtag “#cameronincharge” was superimposed (see Figure 4.12). This 
hashtag was used by Conservative Party members and supporters on Twitter, but by sharing it on 
an image posted to Facebook it broke the standard of communication for predictability. Although 
there is overlap between the two social networking sites in terms of functionality, networking, 
and user base – and Facebook functionality indeed supports the use of hashtags – they are not 
widely used in practice on Facebook and do not operate in the same way as on Twitter. Research 
shows that including hashtags on a Facebook post can ultimately lead to lower user engagement 
(Hutchinson, 2016).  
Source: Conservatives (2015b) 
 
 
Figure 4.12. Conservative Facebook post promoting #cameronincharge 
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By sharing an image with a hashtag the post failed to meet the standard of predictability 
for authentic communication, as it introduced a device which citizen-users would not expect to 
see. Enli and Simonsen (2017: 5) show how politicians and political parties attempt to influence 
agendas by redefining or reframing an existing hashtag already at use in the network. This is part 
of a social media logic. In this case, however, the Conservative Party attempted to direct 
conversation by introducing a new hashtag and promoting it on Facebook as well as Twitter. This 
action is a failure to apply social media logic accurately. The use of hashtags is not a standard on 
Facebook and therefore not a feature a user would expect to find. In breaking this standard the 
Conservatives uncovered their message control strategies - more so than using explicit calls to 
action, which are standard practice by organizations on Facebook (Vitak et al., 2008: 112).  
By shattering the authenticity illusion, attempts to direct the message by controlling and 
motivating interactivity became inauthentic as a consequence; attempted commodification of 
citizen-users was made clear. This reduced the party’s chances of harnessing network power and 
was reflected in the comments, which were disparate and not united in support for Cameron’s 
leadership skills. Of a total 547 comments, 18.8% were negative about Cameron’s performance, 
Cameron in general, or the Conservative Party, and 9.0% were negative about Miliband’s 
performance, Miliband in general, or the Labour Party (see Table 4.3). A small number of citizen-
users’ comments included language which either reflected (2.4%) or subverted (2.2%) the 
Conservatives’ agenda. These included references to Cameron’s leadership and competence 
capabilities, and five comments which specifically challenged #cameronincharge for example 
“Cameron will only be in charge of his (second) kitchen after May 7th.” 
 
Table 4.3. Frequencies of user posts on Conservative Party Facebook post promoting 
#cameronincharge by topic 
  Frequency 
% 
(n=547) 
01 Issue - education 7 1.28 
02 Issue - employment 4 0.73 
03 Issue - economy 8 1.46 
04 Issue – health 3 0.55 
05 Issue – EU 6 1.10 
157 
 
06 Issue - defence 1 0.18 
07 Issue - austerity 2 0.37 
08 Cameron - good performance 12 2.19 
09 Cameron - bad performance 21 3.84 
10 Cameron - positive 32 5.85 
11 Cameron - negative 36 6.58 
12 Conservative Party - positive 34 6.22 
13 Conservative Party - negative 46 8.41 
14 Miliband - good performance 1 0.18 
15 Miliband - bad performance 5 0.91 
16 Miliband - positive 7 1.28 
17 Miliband - negative 19 3.47 
18 Labour Party - positive 7 1.28 
19 Labour Party - negative 25 4.57 
20 Farage - positive 17 3.11 
21 Farage - negative 5 0.91 
22 UKIP - positive 45 8.23 
23 UKIP - negative 3 0.55 
24 Sturgeon - positive 20 3.66 
25 Sturgeon - negative 7 1.28 
26 SNP - positive 5 0.91 
27 SNP - negative 1 0.18 
28 Clegg - positive 2 0.37 
29 Bennet - negative 1 0.18 
30 Labour-SNP - positive 2 0.37 
31 Labour-SNP - negative 20 3.66 
32 Anti-politics 29 5.30 
33 Media bias 3 0.55 
34 Polls 4 0.73 
35 Unclassified 107 19.56 
 
Turning to Twitter, #Cameronincharge did not gain traction on this site for three reasons. Firstly 
the Conservative Party’s attempts to promote their hashtag was ineffective. Although I did not 
collect tweets using #cameronincharge, I collected a sample of 323,694 using #leadersdebate. In 
this sample only 726 tweets (0.2%) used #cameronincharge. A tweet by @Conservatives which 
contained a clear call to action to share the message, “RETWEET to let friends know that at 
#leadersdebate, it was #cameronincharge” (Conservatives, 2015c), was retweeted 211 times in 
total. This represents 0.13% of the 151200 followers the account had during the election campaign 
(Hayes, 2015). Secondly, “Cameron in charge” did not benefit from prior existence on the news 
media agenda in the same way that agendas involving the coalition narrative did. Thirdly, 
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although expectations for Cameron had been down-played by some news media, with seven 
participants the candidate most ‘in charge’ was an ongoing debate in which the case could be 
made for many different leaders.  
Yet this agenda was partially constructed by news actors in addition to Conservative Party 
staff. On the morning of 2 April 2015, ITV’s breakfast show Good Morning Britain was the first 
television broadcast to use a line featuring “Cameron in charge”. Anchor Kate Garraway 
interviewed a body language specialist as part of the programme’s promotion of – and build-up 
to – the debate (Good Morning Britain, 2015). The expert praised Cameron’s “commanding 
presence” and compared Miliband to him unfavourably on the basis of this trait. Therefore 12 
hours prior to the debate Cameron was being framed as the more prime ministerial candidate by 
the media organisation hosting the event. This action should have been helpful for the 
Conservative Party in their promotion of “Cameron in Charge” as it supported their message and 
anticipated their later attempts to set the post-debate agenda. However, such priming was a one-
off occurrence. Without strong repetition of the message across news media, as the “coalition of 
chaos” narrative received, “Cameron in charge” could not gain salience.  
Following the debate, Conservative Party spokespeople did repeat the line to journalists. 
As with the “coalition of chaos” soundbite, Conservative Party spokespeople strongly promoted 
“Cameron in charge” on traditional media alongside their social media output. Clips and footage 
of various candidates and MPs appeared across the broadcast news media as the party strove to 
portray Cameron as the sensible choice compared to the chaos that they associated with Miliband. 
For example, on the post-debate bulletins on ITV News at Ten, Conservative spokesperson 
William Hague and reporter Romilly Weeks held the following exchange where Hague claimed 
victory for Cameron by invoking the themes of command and choice:  
 
Romilly Weeks: Now William Hague, David Cameron had most to lose, but he didn’t 
emerge as a clear winner.  
William Hague: Well I think he was a very clear winner. He gave a very commanding 
performance … He showed how all the other parties there would create more debt and 
more taxes. And that is the choice facing the country. (ITV News, 2015c) 
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These themes were also included in a report by the BBC News at 10 journalist Vicki Young, who 
emphasised that this was the message that the party wanted the viewer to take away:  
 
George Osborne has just been saying to me that David Cameron was totally in charge 
from beginning to end. He said he was not getting pulled into the scrapping. That was the 
message they wanted to get across, that he was prime ministerial, rising above the others, 
showing that chaos would institute if there is another coalition. (BBC News, 2015b) 
 
The promotion of these lines continued into the following morning where Radio 4’s Today 
programme used clips from spokespeople stating that “David Cameron gave a very strong and 
commanding performance”, and “Who’s got the leadership qualities? I think we saw tonight it 
was David Cameron, and these are the choices that people are going to make as we approach the 
election” (BBC Radio 4, 2015b). The language used by spokespeople to construct this particular 
agenda was coherent and memorable. Employing alliteration – command, chaos, control, and 
coalition – was an effective strategy to ensure the message was consistent and the objects could 
easily be linked. The network agenda of these objects and attributes58, created by the party, was 
strong but it did not transfer in its entirety to the media agenda despite receiving airtime and being 
quoted in print and online news reports. I argue that this was a consequence of the inauthenticity 
of the message. As a result it was less able to tap into network power. As discussed above, 
repetition is one way to aid message consistency, but it runs the risk of exposing electioneering 
strategies and baring the authenticity illusion. The impact of Theresa May’s election slogans and 
seeming inability to provide spontaneous responses in 2017 is also revealing here (Wahl-
Jorgensen, 2017) and demonstrates the applicability of these findings beyond 2015. 
The inauthenticity of #Cameronincharge was noted by some media outlets, particularly 
its lack of spontaneity which made clear the rehearsed nature of the tweets and discourse. 
BuzzFeed journalists noticed the persistence with which Conservative Party candidates pushed 
this item on social media during the immediate post-debate period of analysis. BuzzFeed’s then 
                                                          
58 As defined in Chapter 1, objects are “the things on which the attention of the media and public are 
focused” and attributes are “the characteristics and traits that describe the object” ” (McCombs, 2011: 5). 
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Political Editor, Jim Waterson, tweeted about, and wrote an article on, the topic (see Figure 4.13). 
Conservative candidates had demonstrably been instructed to tweet, simultaneously, using an 
approved set of words, and as Waterson pointed out "The idea is that this discipline means the 
core message reaches everyone in the country. The risk is that it looks inauthentic" (Waterson, 
2015). I argue that this inauthenticity, the lack of spontaneity in these communications, is the 
reason that these tweets did not gain traction on Twitter; beyond existing Conservative supporters 
and members it was not a line that was widely repeated. With the exception of retweets from 
@Conservatives and @CCHQ, original tweets using this hashtag tended to be mocking, and 
social media users subverted or challenged the agenda.  
On Twitter an important facet of communication standards which give the user 
authenticity is spontaneity, as outlined in Chapter 2. Although the #Cameronincharge tweets 
posted by Conservative Party candidates met the standards for immediacy and predictability, the 
forced spontaneity revealed an underlying premeditation. This resulted in inauthentic 
communication. Although on one hand this strategy ensured consistency of message and enabled 
it to reach a greater number of people, on the other hand – once exposed – it had a damaging 
effect on the party’s ability to set the news media agenda because the inauthenticity of the message 
led journalists and citizens to challenge or mock the message rather than repeat it. 
The authenticity contract can be broken if attempts at control become clear. Enli (2015: 
132) states that “mediated authenticity is constructed by authenticity illusions, such as the 
enhancement of raw material through adjustments that make it seem more realistic, genuine, and 
trustworthy”. Rather than motivating controlled interactivity on the part of citizens, such actions 
appear as attempts to commodify their interaction and content.  In this instance the construction 
of the message was laid bare as it appeared rehearsed. In this case, achieving immediacy also 
worked against the party, as large numbers of MPs and candidates almost simultaneously tweeted 
the same information rendering the lack of spontaneity – and therefore the attempted agenda 
setting and electioneering – obvious. When its inauthenticity became apparent and the party was 
faced with a plethora of opposing or alternative interpretations of the debate, it became unable to 
harness network power.  
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“Cameron in charge” never became a serious contender on the news media agenda despite 
the party’s message consistency on social, broadcast, print, and online news media for two 
reasons. Firstly because it did not easily fit with other agendas like the potential coalition and 
Sturgeon’s success and so was less likely to be reported, and secondly because the party were 
unsuccessful in their efforts to promote the message on Twitter and Facebook. Arguably, the news 
media agenda setting process involved harnessing the technological affordances of social media 
and using strategies involving controlled interactivity to direct their message, but authenticity of 
communication is required to realise the potential of these actions. 
 
Figure 4.13. BuzzFeed’s tweet thread showcasing a selection of “Cameron in charge” 
tweets 
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Source: Waterson (2015b) 
 
4.5. Some media are more equal than others: Domination of Facebook does not 
equal domination of the news media agenda 
 
I have argued that for an elite to retain control of the news media agenda-setting process in the 
2015 election campaign it was necessary for them to control and direct their message on social 
media and to use the network power inherent in these platforms. This became increasingly 
important the greater the number of competing agendas. I also found that it remained important 
to take part in the established hierarchical practices of news-making. Simply repeating a message 
consistently on social media does not equal domination of the news media agenda. To evidence 
and illustrate this point I discuss below the autonomy with which Facebook users acted on the 
posts examined, and notably the comments made by users on a variety of elites’ Facebook posts 
which often digressed from the original premise.  
One of the most common themes within the Facebook comments on the analysed texts 
was discussion of Nigel Farage and/or UKIP. This was reflected in the online news media texts, 
elite Facebook posts, and broadcasts in which Farage was the third most mentioned leader (see 
Table 4.4). On Facebook, however, debate about Farage occurred far more regularly, even 
appearing in the comments for posts ostensibly unrelated to UKIP or their leader. Therefore, 
information about UKIP was recurrent in a number of citizens’ Facebook feeds before and after 
the leaders’ debate. Arguably this gave them access to a wealth of network power and I expected 
to see this access translate to agenda impact. However, this access to social media networks did 
not convert into mirrored analysis and discussion in the traditional media, with the notable 
exception of Farage’s comments on health tourism and HIV patients. 
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Table 4.4. Number of mentions per party leader 
 
Facebook and Online 
News Websites 
Broadcast Segments Cross-Platform Total 
Frequency 
% 
(n=471) 
Frequency 
% 
(n=255) 
Frequency 
% 
(n=726) 
Ed Miliband 74 15.71 45 17.65 119 16.40 
David 
Cameron 
69 14.65 42 16.47 111 15.29 
Nigel Farage 77 16.35 31 12.16 108 14.88 
Nicola 
Sturgeon 
68 14.44 37 14.51 105 14.46 
Nick Clegg 70 14.86 27 10.59 97 13.36 
Leaders 
collectively59 
32 6.79 35 13.73 67 9.23 
Leanne Wood 45 9.55 20 7.84 65 8.95 
Natalie Bennett 36 7.64 18 7.01 54 7.44 
Note: Online news articles (n=129) Facebook posts (n=40) Broadcast segments (n=80) 
 
UKIP effectively enacted controlled interactivity over their message dissemination before 
and after the debate. During the afternoon prior to the debate, at 13:07, they posted an eye-
catching image to Facebook designed for sharing. It comprised: 
 the ‘UKIP purple’ background; 
 a headshot of Farage; 
 a headline stating "The ITV Leaders’ Debate";  
 a direction to supporters to "Watch Nigel tonight at 8pm on ITV"; and  
 the calls to action "Like & share" and "#TeamNigel" (see Figure 4.14).  
This image was well-designed. It had a strong appeal to their audience through use of UKIP’s 
core branding colours and an image of Farage. It was demonstrably highly shareable collecting a 
total of 8,200 likes and 2,200 shares. 543 user comments were collected from this post. Of these, 
                                                          
59 The ‘leaders collectively’ code was used when political party leaders were referred to as a group, 
without differentiating between individuals. 
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230 (42.36%) interacted with the party or addressed a comment directly to Farage. for example 
"Good luck Nige!", or "Go get them!". 49 (9.02%) offered direct advice to Farage within these 
interactions, such as "watch for the ambush from Cameron", "ignore all the bait that the others 
throw at you", and "have a pint of beer before you go on”. Table 4.5 contains frequencies of all 
codes applied to each user comment.  
 
 
Table 4.5. Frequency of user comments on UKIP’s Facebook post by topic 
 Frequency 
%  
(n=543) 
01 Farage - positive 89 16.39 
02 Farage - negative 15 2.76 
03 Polls 3 0.55 
04 Interaction 181 33.33 
05 Interaction with advice 49 9.02 
Figure 4.14 An image promoting the Leaders’ Debate shared by 
UKIP on Facebook. 
 
Source: UK Independence Party (2015) 
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06 Unclassified60 53 9.76 
07 Issue - EU 6 1.10 
08 Issue - immigration 33 6.08 
09 Issue - employment 1 0.18 
10 Metacommunication 23 4.24 
11 UKIP - positive 39 7.18 
12 UKIP - negative 7 1.29 
13 Issue - Islam 4 0.74 
14 Miliband - negative 1 0.18 
15 Issue - disability 2 0.37 
16 Debate general 13 2.39 
17 Issue - health 1 0.18 
18 Cameron - negative 3 0.55 
19 Issue - housing 1 0.18 
20 Tagging a friend 19 3.50 
 
These findings show that the UKIP Facebook community felt a direct connection to the 
party’s leader; their comments seemingly had a clear expectation he would receive them, and they 
addressed him informally. Unlike in the case discussed in the following chapter, it appears that 
because of the strength of their supporters’ loyalty it was unimportant that the party did not 
respond to these comments. The discussion amongst citizens built momentum and the feeling of 
a grassroots movement, and many confirmed they had shared the message with their networks. 
These themes were noted in the comments on other Facebook posts made by both political 
parties and by news media organisations. The consistency of Farage appearing on the agenda of 
Facebook comments of citizen-users was observed in two places: (1) in comments on posts 
covering Farage’s statement on health tourism and HIV patients; and (2) in comments on posts 
unrelated to the health tourism furore, but where users discussed Farage regardless. The first 
example comes from a Sky News post created at 22:49, under 50 minutes after the end of the 
debate. This post comprised a clip of Nigel Farage’s speech on HIV and health tourism, alongside 
the information that it was the most tweeted about moment of the debate (Sky News, 2015b). Of 
the 826 recorded comments, 457 (55.3%) expressed support or a positive sentiment towards 
                                                          
60 An unclassified code was applied to comments where no clear topic could be discerned or the content 
was irrelevant, for example an offensive remark made to another user. 
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Farage’s statements on HIV patients, compared to just 109 (13.2%) which were negative or 
unsupportive (see Table 4.6).  
 
Table 4.6. Frequency of user comments on Sky News’ Facebook post by topic 
 
 
Frequency 
% 
(n=826) 
01 HIV comments - positive 457 55.3 
02 HIV comments - negative 109 13.2 
03 Farage - positive 14 1.6 
04 Farage - negative 17 2.0 
05 UKIP - positive 14 1.7 
06 UKIP - negative 3 0.4 
07 Sturgeon - positive 1 0.1 
08 Sturgeon - negative 1 0.1 
09 Green Party - negative 1 0.1 
10 Miliband - negative 1 0.1 
11 Media Bias 12 1.5 
12 International comparison 5 0.6 
13 NHS - positive 7 0.9 
14 NHS - negative 2 0.2 
15 Issue - benefits 4 0.5 
16 Issue - EU 9 1.1 
17 Issue - immigration 19 2.3 
18 Issue - health 5 0.6 
19 Issue - economy 4 0.5 
20 Issue - international aid 2 0.2 
21 Issue - defence 1 0.1 
22 Issue - Racism 21 2.5 
23 Issue - terrorism 1 0.1 
24 Tag only 31 3.8 
25 Anti-politics 4 0.5 
26 Poll 1 0.1 
27 Unclassified
61 80 9.7 
 
Amongst the comments made by citizen-users there were persistent themes that Sky 
News was anti-UKIP and that the media organization typically removed comments that were 
positive about the party. Many users drew on their personal experiences to support Farage’s 
statements on health tourism, with claims made that he was “speaking for the people”. Despite an 
                                                          
61 Unclassfied comments were coded where the content was unrelated to the topic, for example on user 
insulting another, or posting an unrelated link. 
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overall negative stance being taken towards Farage’s HIV comments amongst media 
organisations, other political parties, and other elite actors (see BBC, 2015e; Glaze, 2015; 
Linekar, 2015; and Miliband, 2015), Facebook comments made by citizen-users showed evidence 
of support for Farage’s remarks. I argue that this is a result of UKIP’s social media approach 
which maintained the authenticity illusion, meeting standards for spontaneity, immediacy, and 
predictability. This in turn strengthened message control and dissemination of information 
amongst their members and supporters, and motivated those supporters to share their core 
messages. 
Illustrative of the second finding is a Facebook post by The Telegraph published at 19:35 
on 3 April 2015 (The Telegraph, 2015c). The Telegraph shared a link to their daily election 
campaign winners and losers report. Despite being a general discussion piece it did include the 
debate as its main point for the 3 April round-up, using a screenshot of the debate as the 
accompanying image captioned “A good day for the Scottish National Party (SNP) but not so 
great for the side-lined Nigel Farage and Nick Clegg." This is a theme for The Telegraph, who, 
as shown above, had produced content praising Nicola Sturgeon but also playing down Farage’s 
performance. This binary approach suited the Conservative Party’s agenda; simultaneously 
talking up Sturgeon’s performance in order to scare potential Tory voters in England who would 
want to avoid a Labour-SNP coalition, and diminishing the chance of UKIP in the eyes of those 
same voters.  
Despite the article covering the whole day of campaigning, all user comments focused on 
the debate outcomes. Of the 91 user comments, 27.5% (25) expressed support or liking for Farage 
and related to this were the 8.8% (8) comments which suggested that The Telegraph was biased 
against Farage. It may be the disconnection between what UKIP’s supporters saw in their 
Facebook feeds and what they saw reported in the press, online, and in broadcasts which led them 
to the belief that the news media were biased against UKIP and Farage. Current research supports 
the notion of social media users’ news exposure being limited to their own preference ‘bubbles’ 
(see Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic, 2015; Nikolov et al, 2015). However, what is clear is that 
simply marshalling a numerous ‘People’s Army’ on social media does not translate into control 
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of the media agenda. Trevison and Reilly (2015) state that “while UKIP received much less 
coverage in traditional broadcast and print media than the other parties, Farage’s party dominated 
Google searches”. However, effectively exercising network power, through authentic action and 
successful control of the message on social media, did not impact the news media agenda in this 
instance. Although my findings provide support for the existence of hybrid media logics, and the 
promotion of news media agendas on social media platforms is an important part of the process, 
the case of UKIP demonstrates how hierarchical power structures must also be drawn upon in 
order to successfully set the agenda. 
The disjuncture between media organisations and the public, as represented on the 
Facebook posts of media organisations, reveals that media agendas do not always make the 
transfer across to public agendas. Although news media organisations and politicians were 
successful in setting the news media agenda to be, on the whole, against Farage’s comments on 
health tourism, this dominance did not translate to the public agenda as expressed through 
Facebook. Facebook has the largest cross-demographic segment of the UK population of any 
social media site validating this finding.62 In contrast to the Twitter users in my sample, who 
mostly condemned Farage’s comments in line with other political parties and media 
organisations, users on Facebook appeared to be less receptive to this particular agenda. Social 
media therefore cannot be treated as a homogenous entity in the news media agenda setting 
process. Each platform requires a different approach in order to reach its network power, and – in 
the event that an actor is successful in doing so – there must still be established agenda-setting 
relationships in place for the message to impact the news agenda. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
The analysis of news stories and information released following the first leaders’ debate has 
demonstrated that the contemporary news media agenda setting process is multi-faceted. It moves 
                                                          
62 In 2015, there were 35.13 million Facebook users in the United Kingdom (Statista, 2017) – over half of 
the UK population. 
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our understanding of the process forwards by highlighting the asymmetrical relationship between 
hierarchical and network power required when setting the media agenda The technological 
affordances of social media and information from citizen-users on social media formed a part of 
the process in the cases analyses, but their use was not uniform. I have drawn the following 
conclusions from these findings. Whilst the process remained dominated by hierarchical power 
relationships and established news-making practices, political and media elites did utilise hybrid 
media logics. Elite actors used both online and offline platforms, and responded to them as part 
of a cross-platform approach to content production and dissemination. Varying degrees of success 
were found, the most successful of which was the “coalition of chaos” narrative. Evaluation of 
this case strongly suggests that whilst a hybridisation of logics is crucial within the process, 
hierarchical power and the ability to draw on established narratives remain most important. 
This chapter has shown that the process of setting the news media agenda was fluid and 
fluctuating. It comprised a combination of legacy and digital practices, message control strategies 
online as part of controlled interactivity, harnessing of network power through social media sites, 
and the use of other news stories to build the media agenda. Ultimately, though, the main force 
behind the news media agenda setting process was the engagement through established 
relationships that political and media elites have with each other. 
Citizen-users of social media did not make any decisive interventions in the news agenda 
following the leaders’ debate. The content created and shared by citizens tended to reflect the 
existing news agenda. This provides support for existing knowledge around agenda-setting, that 
the public agenda will mirror the media agenda. However, a conceptual development comes from 
the instances of users subverting or challenging elite information, as happened with 
#cameronincharge, and the number of divergent agendas discussed on Facebook, such as those 
related to UKIP. Agenda-setting research has predominantly focused on the salience from the 
media agenda to the public agenda. The findings presented here show that even if items are in 
alignment, publics discuss agendas differently or may be challenging them within their social 
networks. 
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Hierarchical and established practices undoubtedly remained central to the news media 
agenda setting process. Yet both political and media elites tried to utilise network power in order 
to control their message on social media. Content produced by Twitter users was used by 
traditional media organizations to provide evidentiary support for a news story. Occasionally, 
social media became the story itself when media organizations reported on emerging themes of 
discussion on social networking sites, for example the positivity felt by citizens towards the 
female leaders. Both information from citizen-users and access to network power through them 
became more important when agendas were competing or contested. As message control through 
the professional media becomes more difficult for elites, message control on social media to 
activate a two-step flow system can increase the ability of an actor to retain control over the 
agenda setting space. The case study of UKIP showed how effective this can be when the actor 
manages their social media engagement effectively.  
On the other hand, this case also demonstrated how seeking to dominate social media 
without engaging in established processes with traditional media does not give a party influence 
over the news media agenda. Network power and relationships with social media users does not 
have the same importance in the process as the ability to tap in to hierarchical power structures 
between elites. Controlling your message and only being able to use network power online, no 
matter how effective, does not allow political actors to set the agenda for the wider news media. 
It is imperative that the established processes and relationships are evoked. Therefore although 
there is a dialectical nature to power in the news media agenda setting process, power exercised 
through hierarchical relationships remains the most important.  
The findings of this chapter also provide conceptual development in our understanding 
of acts that constitute controlled interactivity and those that comprise commodification of 
citizens’ content and action.  I outlined this through analysis of network power, which is not 
negligible in this process. Its role can perhaps best be seen in its impact on failed attempts to 
activate networks. When elites produce online content which breaks the authenticity contract with 
citizens, such as occurred with ‘Cameron in charge’, their attempts at controlled interactivity 
instead reveal electioneering and the underlying motive of commodification of citizens’ content 
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and action. This reduces citizens’ motivations to share messages amongst networks and hence 
reduces the ability of elites to access network power. It can also lead to an increase in subversion 
of the message and challenges to attempts to set the agenda. The following chapter analyses these 
trends in further detail, closely evaluating the anatomy of one news story and the battle for 
dominance over the agenda following the leak of a civil service memo with damaging 
implications for Nicola Sturgeon. 
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Chapter 5 Contestation and control in 
building a media agenda: An anatomy of 
reports on Nicola Sturgeon and the 
leaked memo 
 
Researcher:  In your opinion then what do you think was the biggest story across the 
campaign period? 
Jim Waterson:  The SNP and what the SNP would do, and who they would go with, and 
the effects of it. It’s probably what won the Tories the election. In retrospect it’s turned 
out the SNP have no say, because the SNP are irrelevant now because there is no coalition. 
So the weird thing is the story of the campaign was wrong, but only due to the result 
which in no small part came about because of the story of the campaign. I can’t work out 
really which of the chicken or the eggs in that situation came first. Covering a story like 
that there is nothing to add, how do you move it on? (Jim Waterson, interview 3, July 
2015) 
 
Jim Waterson, Political Editor of BuzzFeed, speaking in our final interview about the 
impact of the SNP’s success on the news media agenda. 
 
The success of the Scottish National Party (SNP) was one of the stories of the 2015 UK general 
election. Both during the campaign, when “Surging Sturgeon” led her party to high polling results 
and was lauded for her debate performances (McTague, 2015b), and after the SNP’s historic 
landslide victory in Scotland. The SNP and its leader were a constant feature of election reporting. 
Following from the previous chapter’s analysis of the agendas emerging from the leaders’ debate, 
this chapter examines a news story that arose partially from Sturgeon’s success and the threat the 
SNP posed. Assessing the process of setting the media agenda around the SNP was particularly 
interesting as I was able to focus on an area of high contestation, and place power relationships 
and the flow of information under closer scrutiny.  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter describes in detail how the hybridisation of news-making practices has 
impacted the process of setting the news media agenda. To do so it reports on findings from 
qualitative analyses conducted on one news story that emerged during the election campaign. The 
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report was based on a leaked memorandum from the UK Government civil service which claimed 
that Nicola Sturgeon, the First Minister of Scotland and leader of the Scottish National Party, 
would prefer to see David Cameron as Prime Minister over Ed Miliband. The story was broken 
by The Telegraph on its website. This chapter takes this news report, and the information released 
in relation to it, as a case study. Building on the findings of Chapter 4, I ask how news media and 
political elites used social media to strengthen their power in the news media agenda-setting 
process. The findings of this chapter provide answers to three of this dissertation’s research 
questions: (RQ4) How are (i) information sourced from social media, and (ii) the technological 
affordances of social media incorporated into the process of setting the news media agenda?; 
(RQ5) Do citizen-users of social media play any role, such as intervention in the information 
cycle, in the process of setting the news media agenda?; and (RQ6) Do citizen-users of social 
media replicate or challenge agendas? 
Whilst The Telegraph instigated the news story, over the time period of analysis a 
multitude of actors released relevant political information into the news cycle. The result was that 
The Telegraph’s framing was challenged and replaced. There were three main findings which 
explain for The Telegraph’s loss of control and the relative success of the SNP in gaining control 
of the news agenda. Firstly, The Telegraph, and political elites supportive of this agenda, had no 
substantial new information to share and they did not draw on any information arising from 
citizen-users on social media. In answer to RQ4, although The Telegraph and the Labour Party 
used social media to promote their agendas, they did not source any new information from these 
spaces. This resulted in a reliance on the original source information and the repetition of their 
established frame in myriad outputs. The impact of this in terms of the news media agenda-setting 
process is similar to the “Cameron-in-charge” effect discussed in the previous chapter. Simply 
stating the same information repetitively through social media channels does not allow the actor 
to harness network power. Whilst the concept of commodification of citizen-users does not apply 
in this scenario, there was a failure of controlled interactivity strategies on the part of elites which 
cleared the way for the success of competing agendas.  
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Secondly, the story and underpinning assumptions were effectively challenged through 
denials from actors involved. This information was shared to great effect through a combination 
of elite actions within traditional media and by citizens on social media. In response to research 
questions 5 and 6, outlined above, citizens were active on social media debating this story. 
Critically, their conversations were indexed to discussions in the news media. Just as the news 
media contained an increasing amount of political information which challenged The Telegraph, 
so this was reflected by citizens on social media in their discussions and content. Furthermore, 
citizens not only reflected the discourses being presented by mainstream media outlets but also 
propagated their own interpretation. For example the more measured “denials” in news reports 
led to a stronger discourse around “lies” aimed at The Telegraph. Broadly, citizen-users of social 
media were found to reproduce the competing agendas and discourses of the traditional media, 
but differed in their interpretation of them.  
Thirdly, the SNP successfully used a mixture of older and newer media logics to 
disseminate information, which enabled them to be part of both the hierarchical power structure 
and the networked power structure. This dialectical power structure was central to the news media 
agenda setting process in the 2015 UK general election. Actions taken by the SNP to counter The 
Telegraph’s agenda and exert control provide clear evidence of the hybrid approach now needed 
to be successful in the news media agenda setting process. Their actions also demonstrate the 
efficacy of combining the hierarchical power structure of traditional media with network power 
on social media platforms. Their approach to social media in this case can be contrasted with that 
of the Labour Party. The SNP were able to motivate and activate their supporters online to share 
Sturgeon’s denial and related information. In comparison, the Labour Party’s own supporters 
expressed disagreement with their message. The party tried to overcome this by repeating the 
same information and interpretation across media platforms. These repetitive interventions by the 
Labour Party revealed their electioneering because, although predictable and immediate online, 
the content lacked spontaneity and was rehearsed. This rendered their communications 
inauthentic. Party supporters subverted rather than promoted their agenda and this contributed to 
the party’s failure to exert control over the news media agenda. 
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Ultimately, information released on Twitter played an important role in the news media 
agenda in that the most important intervention was made on Twitter by Nicola Sturgeon.  Sturgeon 
was able to challenge The Telegraph’s framing quickly and decisively in a tweet. Her 
communication met the standards of Twitter and the requirements for authenticity: (1) it appeared 
as unrehearsed, and therefore spontaneous, (2) it was immediate, the tweet was released under 20 
minutes after the article was published; and 3) it was predictable, using the @ mention and 
including a period before the journalists handle to ensure all followers could view it.  She was 
able to tap in to the network power of her followers, who widely shared information regarding 
her denial. Despite Sturgeon’s example, journalists and political parties in general did not fully 
realise the network power available in social media, utilising it predominantly as a push medium. 
This is evidence of a significant tension that exists between elites and citizens in their use of social 
media, there is a disconnection in the ways that each group uses social media. I argue that had 
The Telegraph or the Labour Party fully met the communication standards on Facebook and 
Twitter, or been able to release new political information supportive of their agenda, they would 
have been more successful in maintaining and exerting their influence. 
The case of the news story regarding Sturgeon and the leaked memo therefore 
demonstrates both the most and least effective ways to engage with other actors in the news media 
agenda-setting process. By combining older and newer media logics, calling on hierarchical and 
networked power relationships, and maintaining authentic communication outputs on social 
media, the SNP were able to influence an initially damaging agenda item. This is compared to the 
approach taken by The Telegraph and the Labour Party who made little attempt to interact within 
network power relationships, beyond using social media as push media, failed to effectively 
control the interactivity of their audience and supporters due to the repetitive and inauthentic 
nature of the messaging, and were unable to introduce new information into the political 
information cycle to maintain their framing. 
 
5.2. Case Selection 
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The story was first reported by The Telegraph on 3 April 2015 at 21:30 in an article published on 
their website and printed on their front page the following day (see Figure 5.1). Journalists Simon 
Johnson and Peter Dominczak reported on a leaked memorandum which claimed that Nicola 
Sturgeon had held a discussion with the French Ambassador, Sylvie Bermann, wherein she 
expressed a preference for David Cameron to become Prime Minister. It further alleged that she 
did not see Ed Miliband as “PM material”, and that she would not want a formal coalition with 
Labour (Johnson and Dominczak, 2015a). Sturgeon’s denial of all the allegations was rapid. At 
21:47, just 17 minutes after the report was published, the SNP leader issued a tweet claiming that 
the story was “categorically, 100%, untrue” and further that the journalists had not consulted her 
before publishing (see Figure 5.2). 
 
Figure 5.1. Front Page of The Daily Telegraph on 4 April 2015 
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This particular news report was chosen for analysis as it offered a different perspective 
on Sturgeon’s preferences to the other Conservative-supporting press. As described in Chapter 4, 
the notion of a Labour-SNP agreement or coalition was a constant on the news media agenda. 
This report bucked the trend by suggesting that Sturgeon may have preferred Cameron to be Prime 
Minister instead of Miliband. Therefore this agenda item was likely to be challenged; studying 
this case provided insights into the news media agenda-setting process. Additionally, the choice 
of this story for analysis reflects of the weight given to the impact of the SNP during the campaign 
by the politicians, staffers, and journalists I interviewed for this project, as the opening quote to 
this chapter makes clear. In ten out of eleven post-election interviews the participant named the 
impact of the SNP as the biggest news story and one which dominated the campaign. Taking my 
lead from my interviewees, this story was chosen for analysis. 
 
  
Source: Sturgeon (2015a) and Johnson (2015) 
 
Figure 5.2. Twitter thread showing the conversation between Nicola 
Sturgeon and Simon Johnson 
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5.3. Method and Data 
 
The data from which these findings were established is specified in Table 5.1. The dataset 
contained all related online news articles, Facebook posts, and user comments published over a 
24-hour period following the release of the story (from 21:30 on 3 April 2015 to 21:30 on 4 April 
2015). The dataset also included television news bulletins broadcast between these times from 
BBC News, ITV News, Channel 4 News, 5 News Tonight, and Sky News, and the Today 
programme broadcast on BBC Radio 4. Finally, newspapers published on 4 April 2015 were 
included for analysis. Details of the full dataset are given in Appendix B.  
Tweets were treated differently. In order to avoid the pitfall of missing important 
evidence by sampling from a large volume of tweets, I noted tweets which had an impact on the 
news agenda. Examples include those that were used in news reports or which introduced new 
information into the information cycle. I then evaluated their impact, looking at the actors 
involved in their creation and dissemination, and response to them by others. Please see Chapter 
3 for greater detail on this method. 
 
Table 5.1. Number of sources per media type 
  Frequency 
% 
(n=35) 
Online News websites 14 40.00 
 Political blogs 2 
5.71 
 Facebook posts 8 
22.86 
Broadcast Radio 1 2.88 
 Television 6 
17.14 
Print Newspapers 4 11.43 
 
In order to assess the patterns within comments made by citizen-users on Facebook posts, 
each comment was coded individually using a specific coding framework. Coding frames were 
individualized to take into account the fact that the user was commenting on a specific 
organization’s page. When assessing the results from coding, I translated each number into a 
percentage so that this descriptive information could be used to draw comparisons between the 
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different texts. This study is qualitative, as such it uses an inductive approach to the development 
of the coding framework for content analysis. I took this decision in order to avoid prescribing 
my results. Also included in this analysis is information from the interviews I undertook with 
politicians, political staffers, journalists and political bloggers. This functions as triangulation, 
providing supporting evidence and rationale behind the behaviours and actions described from 
the content and discourse analyses.  
 
5.4. The Telegraph and the Labour Party: Relative success, eventual failure 
5.4.1 Betrayal and Devastating Revelations: The Labour Party’s Response  
 
The Labour Party was the only political party to vocally support The Telegraph’s claims. It 
released information across media platforms to this effect, and party leaders were quoted in the 
traditional media condemning Sturgeon’s comments. My findings show that their supporters did 
not agree with their interpretation of events. Labour’s agenda was not promoted through 
supporters’ social networks and did not gain salience on the public agenda. Conversely, it was 
challenged by citizen-users who denounced the story as a lie by the Tory-supporting Telegraph. 
This section will show that although the Labour Party attempted to use network and hierarchical 
power, they were unsuccessful in gaining access to social media networks. Due to both the lack 
of supportive information and the plethora of information challenging The Telegraph’s story, 
Labour’s interaction in the news media agenda-setting process was ineffective.  
The Telegraph’s initial news story broke allegations that Sturgeon wished to see 
Cameron, and not Miliband, as Prime Minister. This claim ran contrary to usual campaign 
reporting, which focussed on the potential for a Labour-SNP agreement and contained the 
assumption that Sturgeon would prefer to see Miliband in power. As a result, the central notion 
of the “leaked memo” story that readers were required to accept as true in order to make the report 
both credible and threatening was that Sturgeon was two-faced and devious. This frame was 
inherent in The Telegraph’s campaign coverage generally and was also a feature of other 
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organizations’ approach to Sturgeon, notably The Daily Mail. This notion was furthered by similar 
framing within the Labour Party’s responses.  
The attribute of “Sturgeon-as-devious” was present from the beginning of the report; the 
headline referred to Sturgeon “secretly” backing Cameron. It was further made explicit 
throughout the article. For example, Johnson and Dominiczak wrote “Yesterday, unaware that the 
memo had been leaked to The Telegraph, she continued to openly back Mr Miliband” (Johnson 
and Dominiczak, 2015a). Such allegations built on the theme of deception by suggesting that 
Sturgeon was hiding her true allegiance, and furthermore that if she had she been aware of The 
Telegraph’s access to the memo then she might have admitted her actual preference. Information 
within the original report therefore contributed to a frame that was an attack on Nicola Sturgeon 
personally, building an image of her as a deceiving person.  
The report used information from elite Scottish political leaders to support its case. 
Quotes from the leaders of Scottish Labour, Jim Murphy, and the Scottish Liberal Democrats, 
Willie Rennie were incorporated. Both of these party leaders foregrounded a dichotomy between 
public and private space in which Sturgeon and the SNP were alleged to be deceptive, for example 
Murphy stated that “the SNP say one thing in public but another in private” (Johnson and 
Dominiczak, 2015a). This dichotomy formed the basis of the Labour Party’s response to, and 
interpretation of this story, and was one of the few political party agendas which worked with The 
Telegraph. 
Within the two hours following the publication of the allegations online, the Labour 
Party’s response was disseminated throughout the media, using a hybrid system of newer and 
older media to release their statements. Murphy’s statement was widely repeated across the news 
media; his quote was used in online news reports and in the outputs shared by the party on social 
media. The Labour Party pushed their lines determinedly: from 21:49 to 23:20 there were eight 
outputs shared on social media and an article on LabourList which clearly set out the party’s 
stance. Tweets from @scottishlabour, the official Twitter account of Scottish Labour, all followed 
a definitive pattern in which they claimed that the allegations were shocking and true by labelling 
them “devastating” and a “betrayal”, and the majority of their tweets shared the link to The 
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Telegraph’s report (see Figure 5.3). They resolutely promoted their agenda regarding the 
contrasting public and private faces of the SNP and references to The Telegraph’s report as “the 
truth” provided proof that the SNP were lying. However, @scottishlabour’s tweets on the subject 
stopped abruptly once statements denying the allegations began to be issued by the actors 
involved. Individual MPs and candidates even retracted the similar tweets they had posted or 
issued an apology. 
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Figure 5.3. Examples of tweets from @scottishlabour 
 
 
Source: Scottish Labour, 2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d 
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The article released by LabourList was shared in a Facebook post and on Twitter 
simultaneously, an action taken to increase its reach by enabling their audience to share the article 
amongst their online networks. Evidence for this strategy used by online journalists comes from 
my interview with an editor of a political blog. When asked about the role played by their 
readership on social media, the editor informed me that: 
 
The number of tweets and Facebook messages that we would do about our content was 
completely dwarfed by [audience shares]... the readership was absolutely crucial. And it 
becomes a sort of self-sustaining loop so the more readers you get, the more people are 
sharing which grows the readership. (Anon01, Interview 3, November 2015) 
 
LabourList also used hyperbolic language to stress the importance of this story (LabourList, 
2015a). The author deemed the allegations “explosive”, an adjective which suggests that The 
Telegraph’s report was both impactful and controversial. Conversely, the article also implied that 
the Labour Party was not surprised by the allegations made and that the basic facts of the news 
report were commonly known: “In Scottish Labour circles there is a widely held belief that both 
the SNP and Tory leaderships would like to see the other perform well in May” (LabourList, 
2015a). The party’s framing of the story as a “betrayal”, “devastating,” and “explosive” was 
therefore aimed at party supporters and others actor groups who were not familiar with this 
narrative. The article also made a link with the ‘Sturgeon-is-devious’ attribute through its 
inclusion of the information from Murphy’s statement that Sturgeon “says one thing in public and 
another in private”.  
Whilst LabourList is not a mouthpiece for the Labour Party, it is unsurprising that they 
would follow the party’s line on this subject as the Labour Party was particularly threatened in 
Scotland. This stance was further elaborated by the blog on 4 April 2015. Following Miliband’s 
condemnation of Sturgeon’s alleged remarks, LabourList published two additional articles. The 
first, at 10:55, simply contained the background to the story and Miliband’s full statement 
(LabourList, 2015b). This was shared on Facebook with the caption “Miliband has his say…” 
alongside an imposing headshot of Miliband perhaps intended to demonstrate the seriousness with 
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which Labour were treating these allegations (see Figure 5.4). Unlike the Labour Party, however, 
Facebook users were not so convinced. Despite being the Facebook page of a Labour-supporting 
blog, the comments were mostly negative about the party's response. Of 38 comments 15.8% (6) 
were negative about Miliband and 36.8% (14) were negative about Labour's response and 
approach to the allegations (see Table 5.2). Some citizen-users’ referred to the story as a lie and 
argued that Labour needed to stop treating the story with credibility. 
 
Table 5.2. Frequency of comments coded by topic on LabourList’s (2015b) Facebook post. 
  
Frequency 
% 
(n=38) 
01 
Labour response - 
negative 
14 36.8 
02 Miliband - negative 6 15.8 
03 Sturgeon - negative 2 5.3 
04 Lie 6 15.8 
05 Supportive of story 3 7.9 
06 Unclassified 7 18.4 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Facebook post from LabourList reporting on Miliband’s response 
 
Source: LabourList (2015b) 
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The second article shared by LabourList on 4 April 2015 was a comment piece by then 
Editor Mark Ferguson. He wrote in support of Labour’s interpretation, looking to provide 
evidence for this agenda item and persuade Labour supporters of its validity. A notable section of 
this text was his statement "I don't rule this out simply because she denied it. (And if a simple 
denial is enough to make you believe something isn't true, I envy you the lack of cynicism that 
politics has drilled into me)" (Ferguson, 2015). As mentioned above, a number of Labour 
candidates and MPs had retracted their condemnations once denials began to appear as part of the 
story. With this statement, Ferguson was responding directly to both the Labour Party's doubters 
and to the backtracking MPs and candidates, as well as the many members of the public basing 
their arguments against Labour’s response on the denials. 
The Labour Party also tried to further their agenda around Sturgeon’s deception by 
posting the link to The Telegraph’s article on Facebook at 22:49 alongside their line “Saying one 
thing in public and another in private?” (The Labour Party, 2015). By posing this as a question 
they invited interaction with their followers on Facebook, encouraging them to consider the 
question for themselves. Interaction is a culmination of communication standard for Facebook 
posts. It aids spontaneity, actual or illusory, as it creates a conversation between users. Interaction 
is expected by citizen-users, and therefore the communication would meet criteria for 
predictability. Finally, interaction – although potentially not taking place in real-time – can create 
the illusion of liveness, up to a point. Interaction therefore helps to create authenticity around an 
elite post; based on my theoretical framework I would expect this to be a positive move in the 
promotion of this agenda. Inviting interaction suggests a reciprocal or networked relationship, 
particularly on a social networking site where computer-media human interaction is expected by 
users. Nevertheless, the Labour Party did not uphold their side of this rule and failed to meet 
users’ expectations. Again the elite actor used a social media platform as a push medium. 
Inviting responses backfired for the party. They were attacked in the comments by their 
followers for furthering “The Torygraph’s” biased agenda. Many of the comments referred to the 
story as a lie in light of the various statements of denial which had been released. Commenters 
called for the Labour Party to stop pushing this particular agenda item but interaction with their 
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Facebook followers stopped at the caption. The comments of their supporters on Facebook had 
no impact on the party; they continued to promote this line into the following day. I argue that 
interacting with their supporters on Facebook would have met communication standards for 
spontaneity, immediacy, and prdictability, increasing the authenticity of their content, and 
therefore enabled them to increase their control of the message through access to network power. 
Interacting through a networked power structure via authentic communication may have resulted 
in a greater number of ‘convinced’ supporters who would promote their message. 
  
5.4.2 Outcomes of The Labour Party’s response 
 
One of the key findings that emerges from this research is that within the media system 
there is tension and a point of difference between the expectations of citizen-users and elite-users 
on social media. As established, social media can create a challenging environment for political 
or media elites trying to influence the news agenda. Using the power that exists in social media 
networks can offer journalists and politicians a way to retain control of the news media agenda 
setting process. If the tension in difference of use is unresolved, or at least does not appear 
resolved, this opens up the door for inauthenticity. It is imperative that journalists and elites take 
action online to achieve this.  
I observed this tension particularly in the ways in which the Scottish Labour Party, the 
UK Labour Party, and The Telegraph used Twitter and Facebook as tools to share their 
information. The associated accounts shared the links to the same information, and, in the case of 
Scottish Labour, did so repeatedly in a short space of time. Social media logics contain routines 
for information sharing (van Dijck and Poell, 2013), which have come to be adopted into mass 
media logics. This can be seen in the importance placed on social media in campaign strategies. 
Chris Luffingham, national campaigns director for the Green Party, provided evidence for this in 
his interview. When asked about the integration of media strategies in the campaign he stated 
that:  
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They were very much one and the same. We tried, where possible, to link all of these 
things up. So for the policy announcement[s] … we had the traditional forms of 
communications, letters, leaflets, policy briefings, etc. but then also you would make sure 
that the social media effort reflected that as well… [We would produce] memes around 
it, we would produce tweets around it, and make sure there were common pieces. (Chris 
Luffingham, interview 1, July 2015) 
 
Ultimately, elites see the threat to their traditional reserved areas of power and attempt to 
retain influence by engaging with social media as part of their repertoire. However, their 
engagement on social media constitutes treating the platforms as push media, with little broader 
engagement or conversation with their followers. As discussed above,  this approach lacking in 
interactivity does not help an actor to be influential in the news media agenda setting process as 
it does not meet standards of communication for media which are based on networks and not, 
primarily, on broadcasting. Examples of this can be seen in Chapters 6 and 7. This tactic was not 
successful for either The Telegraph or the Labour Party. Whilst the news report undoubtedly had 
a wide reach, citizens’ tweets instead perpetuated information that challenged The Telegraph’s 
and Labour’s framing of the leaked memo, particularly related to actor denials. For these elite 
users of Twitter, simply sharing the same piece of information repeatedly did not enable them to 
be effective in controlling the news agenda as it contravened the standards for spontaneity and 
immediacy; appearing rehearsed and re-hashed. This is similar to the outcome for the ‘Cameron-
in-charge’ rhetoric discussed in the previous chapter. I argue that increasing their engagement by 
being more responsive to citizens’ comments might help them authentically become a part of 
network power relationships and increase their chances to exert power and control the news media 
agenda. 
Analysis of the comments made on Facebook posts shows that citizens were not 
supportive of The Telegraph’s agenda. Even on pages of organisations which supported the story, 
notably posts made by The Telegraph, MailOnline, and the Labour Party, debate about the story’s 
validity was prevalent in the comments. Shown in analysis of posts throughout this chapter, the 
majority of comments challenged the framing of the report and the media and political 
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organizations’ interpretation of Sturgeon as devious or two-faced. There was no response from 
any of these elite actors to comments made by Facebook users, despite the fact that some users 
addressed their comments directly to the originator of the post. This provides evidence of the 
tension between the ways that citizens and elites perceived their relationship on social media. 
Citizen-users treated Facebook pages as a space for discussion and conversation, and their actions 
indicated that they expected the organization to be included in that. Conversely, the political and 
media elite-users analysed in this case study treated their Facebook pages only as a place to share 
information. As mentioned in Chapter 5, there is evidence of the hybridity of media logics in the 
practice of information-sharing and of extending the two-step flow model to incorporate social 
media (see also Choi, 2015). It further reveals the inauthentic ways in which elites try to use 
network power without truly engaging with the network of citizen-users. 
In an interview I conducted with a digital advisor to a major political party he made clear 
the differences between the social networking sites, Facebook and Twitter, and their roles in the 
setting the news media agenda:  
 
Twitter was tremendously important for the media cycle, the back and forth with 
journalists, how people viewed the success or otherwise of the different leaders on debate 
nights … Facebook was just not very impactful for that media debate, but half a million 
people would see a piece of our content on Facebook. (Anon02, Interview 1, September 
2015) 
 
It is clear from this quote that the importance of Facebook for this political party lay not in 
exercising power over journalists through traditional structures, but in convincing their supporters 
to share key messages. In order to do this parties needed to ensure that they were meeting the 
required communication standards for the platform. In the case of the leaked memo, the Labour 
Party consistently shared the same message across traditional and newer media. They failed to 
take into account, and respond to, the fact that many supporters felt this was a discredited story. 
Nor did they provide specialised content for different platforms. Repetition of a key message 
without taking these factors into account renders the communication inauthentic, lacking 
spontaneity and immediacy, not only resulting in an inability to use power drawn from the 
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network but also as a failure to enact strategies of control and direct or motivate supporters to 
share the message. 
Labour’s responses were widely reported across all news outlets. This information was 
promoted into the next day. Over the 24-hour time period of analysis, the story was reported 
numerous times by broadcast and online news media, and in six print articles in newspapers on 4 
April 2015. The Labour Party’s main lines were featured in news reports online and in broadcasts. 
For example at 10:10 on 4 April 2015, ITV News’ online liveblog was updated with a video of 
Ed Miliband, and a full text quote lacking context, claiming that the report in The Telegraph  
constituted “damning revelations” (ITV News, 2015k).  
The Telegraph’s story was covered by other news outlets throughout the night. In the 
early hours of the morning, at 01:41 on 4 April 2015, The Times published an online article 
headlined “Sturgeon ‘says she prefers Cameron’” (McIntosh, 2015). The article presented the 
allegations as fact. The caption under the picture – situated immediately underneath the by-line – 
did contain Sturgeon's denial (see Figure 5.5), which was initially made in her tweet (Sturgeon, 
2015a) and then repeated by the SNP’s spokesperson in an official statement. The text took a 
speculative approach, making the argument that, if true, the story "would be hugely 
embarrassing,” and that "Scottish Government sources were last night at a loss to explain where 
the report had come from". This approach supported The Telegraph's agenda as it never 
questioned the basis of the allegations: the leaked memo. The article also provided reasons from 
the Labour Party to claim truth for the assertions. 
190 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5. Challenging The Telegraph’s version of events: Meshing media logics to build 
a stronger media agenda 
 
Beyond Sturgeon and the SNP’s denials made on Twitter and through traditional channels 
in a press release and statements to reporters, further information was released into the 
information cycle which increased challenges to this agenda item. With a stream of challenging 
information being revealed, The Telegraph made a concerted effort to add more supportive 
information into the cycle and maintain their influence in the news media agenda setting process. 
For example, following Sturgeon’s call for an inquiry into the leak The Telegraph produced two 
successive articles which addressed this development in different ways (see Figure 5.6).  
The first article was a very short text which contained a written account of Sturgeon’s 
denial alongside the facts of the case, and an embedded video of Sturgeon calling for an inquiry. 
This was published at 14:00 (Krol, 2015). The second article was written by the authors of the 
original piece and was 4.5 times the length of Krol’s piece, at 877 words compared to 189. The 
Figure 5.5. The Times reporting the leaked memo allegations: headline and image 
 
Source: McIntosh (2015) 
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second article, published at 14:13, was more inflammatory. From the verbs used in the headline 
– “Sturgeon demands inquiry” (Johnson and Dominiczak, 2015b) compared to “Sturgeon calls 
for inquiry” (Krol, 2015), the text then continued with a highly detailed recap of the story and 
some of the denials which had been issued (Johnson and Dominiczak, 2015b). More descriptive 
detail was given about the actors and events. For example the senior civil servant became "an 
experienced UK civil servant" who compiled the memo "immediately" after talking to the French 
Ambassador. The authors highlighted how their source has "faith" in the civil servant and that 
they were "experienced and reliable", thereby providing evidence that this is the more dependable 
version of the story. The text also included phrases which seem objective but actually 
strengthened The Telegraph’s agenda, for example "The First Minister has denied she made the 
comments but, when challenged, refused to say that she thought Ed Miliband was prime 
ministerial material." Further similar actions occurred through the juxtaposition of Sturgeon's 
"claims" with what the newspaper "understands" to have happened. Claims being unverified 
assertions compared to understanding based in knowledge. The text ends with the now oft-
repeated quotes from Miliband and Rennie. 
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Sources: Johnson and Dominiczak (2015b) and Krol (2015) 
 Figure 5.6. Contrasting articles from The Telegraph reporting Sturgeon’s call for an inquiry 
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Johnson and Dominiczak’s report is a reproduction of their original story, only with more 
adverbs and positive adjectives. Its creation demonstrates The Telegraph’s attempt to release new 
information into the political information cycle (Chadwick, 2011a). By the time of publication of 
these articles, the new information being released predominantly consisted of denials of the 
allegations and information about the inquiry. I argue that due to the speed of the political 
information cycle, the actor most likely to influence the news media agenda is that which can 
release new information to be dissected by journalists and citizens alike. The Telegraph had no 
new information to add and so reproduced their story with embellishments. 
The Telegraph continued to take steps to exert control over the process of setting the news 
media agenda. Later in the day the organization took recourse in targeting Sturgeon. On the 
evening of 4 April 2015 The Telegraph posted new information in the form of a news story that 
read like an opinion piece. Headlined “Never before has Scotland been quite this deluded” this 
text was not a story about the leaked memo, it was a character assassination of Sturgeon. Anderson 
described Sturgeon in scathing terms that fitted the “devious” framing of her used in the original 
memo report: "It is less a question of a splinter of ice in her heart, as a few scraps of heart tissue 
clinging to an icicle" (Anderson, 2015). This text provided information in support of the 
newspaper’s interpretation of Sturgeon, specifically that she was two-faced and capable of lying. 
This text was published in the news section of the website, which suggested that it was targeted 
at audiences who would be expecting to read a factual report.  
Another example of further information released in efforts by The Telegraph to keep 
control of this agenda item was their lambasting of SNP supporters who had placed stickers 
denying the story on print copies of the newspaper. The stickers read “This story is a fabrication 
and has been denied by both Nicola Sturgeon and the French Ambassador” (Sawyer, 2015). 
Despite the stickers only being placed on copies of the newspaper in one supermarket shop, 
Sawyer’s article derided SNP supporters as a whole and criticised their offline protest. This story 
was shared on The Telegraph’s Facebook page at 21:13. The post had the positive impact of 
keeping the story on their readers’ radar in the final hours of its first day, although they challenged 
The Telegraph’s agenda and framing. Of 311 citizen-user comments collected from this post only 
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20 mentioned the stickers, many instead debated the veracity of the leaked memo story (see Table 
5.3). 18.3% (57) argued that the story was a fabrication and 15.1% (47) condemned The Telegraph 
and their journalism. Only 5.8% (18) directly argued that the story was true. 
 
Table 5.3. Frequency of user comments by topic on The Telegraph’s Facebook post about 
stickers 
  
Frequency 
% 
(n=311) 
01 Agrees the story is a lie 57 18.3 
02 
Agrees the story is not a 
lie 
18 5.8 
03 SNP - negative 15 4.8 
04 SNP - positive 6 1.9 
05 Telegraph - negative 47 15.1 
06 Telegraph - positive 6 1.9 
07 Sturgeon - negative 23 7.4 
08 Sturgeon - positive 3 1.0 
09 Stickers 20 6.4 
10 
Labour response - 
negative 
4 1.3 
11 Tag 3 1.0 
12 Unclassifed 109 35.0 
 
The story remained on the news agenda throughout 4 April 2015, with broadcasters 
following the lead of print and online media organisations. This fact points to broadcasters 
potentially playing a more central role in the news media agenda setting process. Whilst only 
briefly covered in newspaper reviews on BBC Breakfast and the Today programme, it was a lead 
story on ITV News, BBC News, 5 News Tonight, Channel 4 News and Sky News from their 
midday bulletins (where applicable) through to their evening and night-time bulletins. However 
there was a notable shift in the focus on which information was prioritised and reported. This shift 
provides evidence for the impact of various actors. 
The midday bulletins from ITV (ITV News, 2015q) and BBC News (BBC News, 2015f) 
both opened with the main claims from The Telegraph as the first pieces of information in their 
reports, and the content of the memorandum itself was the focus of the report. Both reports also 
included footage of Miliband and his quote: "These are damning revelations. What it shows is 
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that while in public the SNP are saying they do not want to see a Conservative Government, in 
private they are actually saying they do want a Conservative Government." At 18:00 the leaked 
memo remained the top story on the ITV News bulletin (ITV News, 2015m). Although the item 
had remained prominently on the news media agenda, new information had been introduced by 
elite actors and its framing was markedly different. The headline announced on ITV News was 
“allegations of dirty tricks”, demonstrating the influence of the SNP who had introduced a new 
interpretation; the SNP’s strategic response to the report included framing the scenario as “dirty 
tricks” from Westminster in response to the establishment’s fear of SNP success. The BBC News 
website led with this in a headline on the morning of 4 April 2015. A section of the text with the 
sub-heading "Completely false" focused entirely on the denials and Sturgeon's full quote 
criticising Whitehall, part of which was: "It suggests a Whitehall system out of control - a place 
where political dirty tricks are manufactured and leaked” (BBC News, 2015k). However, as the 
BBC have a requirement to remain impartial, a second section was included headed "Damning 
revelations" and reverted to the coalition frame. This method was repeated in their broadcasts 
later that day.  
James Cook’s report on BBC’s evening news bulletin also led with a different angle, 
which focused on the launch of the inquiry (BBC News, 2015g). On Channel 4 News, Labour’s 
“unholy alliance” description was used in the top line alongside the summary of the memo and a 
full statement of denial from Sturgeon (Channel 4 News, 2015d). Reporter James Blake also 
offered some analysis of the Labour Party response, noting that they were "quick to pounce on 
the story" due to the threat of the SNP and that "The Scottish Labour leader ... would not admit 
that Labour jumped the gun in using The Telegraph story to attack the SNP". Whilst ITV’s report 
later in the evening remained the same (ITV News, 2015n), the BBC circled back to the pervasive 
coalition frame. Reporter Eleanor Garnier ended the segment with "... what this episode reinforces 
is that the days of a two-party system here in Westminster are well and truly over and we are now 
fully entrenched in a multiparty system" (BBC News, 2015h). 
Nicola Sturgeon made a second decisive intervention to shift the news agenda (see Figure 
5.7). She wrote a piece for The Observer which was published online on 4 April 2015 at 19:33 
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and in the print edition the following morning (Sturgeon, 2015b). The majority of the piece was 
dedicated to describing and endorsing SNP policy and the SNP's rationale for The Telegraph’s 
article, namely the framing of the "Westminster establishment" as afraid. The final three 
paragraphs address the leaked memo, repeating the claims that it is "100% untrue" and 
"comprehensively rejected by both the French ambassador and consul general". Sturgeon wrote 
about her request for an inquiry and reiterated her challenge to Ed Miliband: "will he and Labour 
join with us in locking David Cameron out of Downing Street?" This is an attempt at invoking 
the coalition frame with a positive emphasis on a Labour-SNP agreement in order to bring to an 
end the suggestion that she would prefer Cameron to be Prime Minister.  
 
Source: Sturgeon, 2015b 
 
The Observer additionally published an online piece reporting on Sturgeon’s article 
(Helm, 2015). The top lines of this story were that Sturgeon was seeking an "anti-austerity pact" 
with Miliband as she denied the allegations made in the leaked memo. This text focussed on her 
"anger" about, and denials of, the claims. The article took a negative stance towards Miliband and 
denounced him for the Labour Party’s electioneering: "Miliband jumped into the controversy over 
the alleged Foreign Office memo as he tried to turn the row to his party's advantage". The impact 
Figure 5.7. The headline and sub-heading of Sturgeon’s comment piece for The Observer 
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of Sturgeon’s piece went further as allegations of “dirty tricks” were included in the BBC’s night-
time news bulletin on 4 April 2015 (BBC News, 2015h) and on Channel 4 News on 5 April 2015 
(Channel 4 News, 2015e). Sturgeon’s appeal to the Labour Party was repeated in online articles 
(for example Sky News, 2015c), and on BBC Breakfast the following day (BBC News, 2015i). 
The salience gained by the SNP’s “dirty tricks” narrative is indicative of their power to set the 
news media agenda. They did so by engaging in networked and hierarchical power structures with 
citizen-users on social media and traditional media organizations alike. 
Another key frame that began life as part of the anti-Sturgeon agenda and ended as an 
integral part of the anti-Telegraph/pro-Sturgeon agenda was the use of information regarding 
Sturgeon’s popularity. Specifically, her perceived win in the 2 April 2015 leaders’ debate was 
given as an underpinning rationale for the leak of the memorandum. The Telegraph’s reporters 
wrote pejoratively about Sturgeon’s success in the leaders’ debate, stating that she “appeared to 
have ‘won’ Thursday night’s general election debate” and “the disclosure of her private comments 
may undermine Miss Sturgeon’s new found popularity” (Johnson and Dominiczak, 2015a). This 
was further promoted by an article published by MailOnline at 22:00 who used “undermine” in 
reference to how the allegations would affect Sturgeon’s claims that she wants a progressive 
alliance (Chapman, 2015). However, in contrast to The Telegraph, the MailOnline reported 
Sturgeon’s debate win as a fact, this helped them to strengthen their own agenda that Sturgeon 
was “the most dangerous women in Britain”. In the context of an article that claimed she was 
dangerous, reporting Sturgeon as the winner of the debate presented her as powerful and well-
supported and therefore gave credibility to that claim.  This was further promoted in a comment 
piece in the print edition of The Daily Mail on 4 April 2015 which was published simultaneously 
with their lead article.  
A further finding establishing how the release of new information challenged The 
Telegraph’s report and supplanted it in the news media agenda comes from the discussion of 
Sturgeon’s popularity and debate success by the Huffington Post. At 23:44 on 4 April 2015 the 
online news aggregator and blog put forward an interpretation of this agenda item in which it 
described The Telegraph as “attacking” Sturgeon because of how well she had done in the leaders’ 
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debate polls. The text brought to the fore the Conservative bias of The Telegraph and explicitly 
linked Sturgeon’s success to the allegations, writing that “Fleet Street’s main Tory newspaper has 
moved quickly to attack Nicola Sturgeon following her impressive performance during the live 
TV debate on Thursday” (Vale, 2015). The author of this text linked to an important news story 
from the previous day, Sturgeon’s success in the leaders’ debate. It was used to construct a 
narrative in which Sturgeon was being targeted as a result of her success. It found salience 
amongst citizen-users of social media. 
This interpretation began to be reflected consistently across social media. Comments on 
Facebook posts by media organisations challenged the allegations on this basis. For example, on 
The Telegraph’s 06:55 Facebook post (The Telegraph, 2015d), which shared a link to the report. 
As part of the qualitative content analysis of this post, I coded citizen-user comments for 
negativity or positivity toward The Telegraph’s story. Additionally I noted any language which 
supported or challenged The Telegraph’s agenda (see Table 5.4). Out of 57 citizen-user 
comments, I found that 68.4% (39) challenged the basis or facts of the story, compared to just 
19.3% (11) which were supportive. Of those comments 5.7% based their opposition on the idea 
that the article was a result of Sturgeon’s debate success. Other notable uses of language included 
21 instances of The Telegraph being accused of lying, 10 accusations of bias by the newspaper, 
four claims of bad journalistic practice, and just one comment which referred to Sturgeon as two-
faced and therefore concurred with The Telegraph’s framing. This pattern is repeated across 
Facebook comments on other posts. For example, on the Huffington Post’s Facebook page 
(HuffPost UK, 2015), where they shared their article discussed above, 41.8% of citizen-users 
comments were negative about the story compared to 12.4% which were supportive (see Table 
5.5). 48 comments used language which pertained to lying, 26 discussed bias, five accused the 
newspaper of bad journalistic practice, one linked Sturgeon to the “danger” frame, and seven 
spoke of logical reasons for Sturgeon to prefer Cameron.   
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Table 5.4. Frequency of codes in support or challenging The Telegraph’s agenda on The 
Telegraph’s Facebook post 
    Frequency 
% 
(n=57) 
01 Negative 39 68.4 
02 Positive 11 19.3 
03 Unclassifed 7 12.3 
Source: The Telegraph (2015d) 
 
Table 5.5. Frequency of codes in support or challenging The Telegraph’s agenda on Huffington 
Post Facebook post 
    
Frequency 
% 
(n=201) 
01 Negative 84 41.8 
02 Positive 25 12.4 
03 Unclassifed 92 45.8 
Source: HuffPo Uk (2015) 
 
I found that a key reason that The Telegraph lost control of this item on the news agenda 
was because of the lack of supportive political information released from other news sources. 
With the exception of the MailOnline most reports focussed on the various denials from the key 
actors involved from early on in the political information cycle. This is a fault inherent in the story 
itself, it simply could not stand up under scrutiny when the central actors were issuing denials of 
all allegations. However, had other sources been used in support of the original information The 
Telegraph’s agenda item would have had more of a chance to retain its dominance, as happened 
to challenger frames. Having a series of varied sources that media actors could draw on enabled 
news outlets to present different framings of this story. This was then reflected on Twitter and 
Facebook; users opposing The Telegraph’s agenda were more likely to cite a wider variety of 
sources than those who promoted The Telegraph’s interpretation and were therefore limited to 
information within the original report. 
It is clear that The Telegraph was successful in placing the item firmly on the news 
agenda, but also that it lost control of the narrative. The report was covered on the Today 
programme and BBC Breakfast, albeit briefly and in the newspaper reviews, and it led to 
numerous news online articles and debates on Twitter and Facebook. However, The Telegraph 
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had lost control of the way in which the story was framed due to the lack of new supportive 
information released. The political information that was being released into the news cycle 
constituted denials by the actors implicated. The SNP were particularly successful at re-framing 
the story as an attack by a frightened Westminster elite. They were able to enact power through 
their online networks of citizen-users who shared this interpretation.  As the news agenda shifted 
to focus on the denials, and on the SNP’s rationale for the story, citizens on social media reflected 
this. 
 
5.5.1 The Conservative Party’s Response 
 
The Conservative Party bided their time in responding to the leaked memo claims, and 
when they did respond the story’s importance was diminished. Cameron first referred to the 
claims mid-morning on 4 April 2015 at a campaign event, in which he said “Nicola Sturgeon's 
alleged comments that Mr Miliband was not "Prime Minister material" was nothing new” (ITV 
News, 2015p). On 4 April 2015 ConservativeHome, a Conservative-supporting blog, produced a 
comment piece which furthered the party’s framing of this agenda item (Phibbs, 2015). This text 
expounded on reasons why the contents of the leaked memo as reported by The Telegraph were 
accurate. However, it concluded by saying that accuracy was irrelevant because if the SNP were 
to win the majority of seats in Scotland they would put Labour in power and "that threat remains".  
The text was also pejorative about the tweet through which Sturgeon first denied the story, the 
subtext being that her medium of choice – Twitter – makes her denial less believable: "Sturgeon 
has denied it in the most emphatic terms. On Twitter." The division of this sentence places the 
emphasis on the medium and not on the denial. 
 
5.6. The Role of Social Media  
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Framing of the news report in established media and by politicians was clearly reflected on social 
media. For example, the notion of the story as an attack on Sturgeon as a result of her popularity 
was frequently reflected in tweets and Facebook comments. In answer to research question 6, 
citizen-users both replicated and challenged elite agendas. Citizens also used the discourse of 
elites as a starting point for interpretation of the news report, for example reports about the denials 
of actors involved were invoked on social media as evidence that The Telegraph was lying. The 
word ‘lie’ or any of its derivations were not used in news reports or by the SNP in its statements, 
but it was frequently used by citizens who then cited traditional media content in support.  
In considering the positions of actors in this process, it is noteworthy that none deviated 
from their prescribed role and I find evidence that traditional media producers and politicians 
acted according to an expected media logic in the reporting of political information. The public 
were also well-versed in how this should work; citizen-users did not make critical interventions 
in the telling of this story but they did criticise its construction insofar as they recognised The 
Telegraph’s failure to use any of the main actors involved in the memo as a source, or to get a 
response from Sturgeon before publication. Citizens on Twitter and Facebook referred to this poor 
journalistic practice as part of their repertoire of challenges to the media agenda, with one 
commenter writing on The Telegraph’s Facebook page “Please make sure your hacks have some 
sort of evidence before printing such nonsense in the future. The British public are watching this 
election closely.”  
Interventions on Twitter can be important, and in this case the most central actor offered 
an alternative framing of the story and had the ability to reach a large group of supporters willing 
to share the information. The first challenge to The Telegraph’s position in the process of setting 
the news media agenda came directly from Sturgeon on Twitter, and was posted at 21:47, just 17 
minutes after The Telegraph’s article was published online.  In the words of one Twitter user, the 
story began “imploding before the print edition had even hit the shelves.” (Trainer, 2015 – see 
Figure 5.8.) 
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Source: Trainer (2015) 
 
Nicola Sturgeon’s tweet was a particularly quick response to the story as she had not been 
approached for comment during the newsgathering stages. It was seen by a wide audience 
compared to a traditional press release, which would have had a slower and potentially less far-
reaching impact. Arguably a press release would not have been such a decisive intervention as it 
would have relied on the news media for further dissemination. Sturgeon’s tweet resulted in a 
shift in the focus of the news media agenda and provided a direct challenge to The Telegraph, in 
part leading to the online debate about the truth of the allegations. The tweet also marked the 
beginning of the individual actors involved in the story gradually coming forwards to deny the 
allegations. This happened through traditional media processes in interviews with mainstream 
media organisations and through the release of official statements disseminated on both online 
and offline platforms.  
Sturgeon’s tweet also formed an important part of wider debate on Twitter. The debate 
consisted of many conversations which were amalgamated into ‘one debate’ by the mainstream 
media and characterised as “a savaging” of The Telegraph by the Huffington Post (Vale, 2015) 
and as “vicious” by The Times (Elliott, McIntosh, and Fisher, 2015). Interestingly in discursive 
terms, The Times attributed a level of importance to Sturgeon within the agenda-setting process 
for instigating the debate as a result of her tweet, stating “Ms Sturgeon’s statement sparked a 
vicious row on Twitter, with accusations of bias on the part of the media and the civil service.” 
Figure 5.8. Twitter user @PaulTrainerPT’s response to the story 
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Not only does this ignore the role of other actors, it implicitly acknowledges the network power 
held by Sturgeon by endowing her personally with the ability to spark a row on the social network. 
Social media allowed non-influencer users the chance to play the role of watchdog.63 This 
finding demonstrates that citizens engaged with and responded critically to the agendas put 
forwards despite the fact that their engagement was one-way and ultimately had little impact on 
elite actions. Nevertheless, the impactful interventions from Twitter users came from elite-users 
only, most prominently from Nicola Sturgeon.  Therefore whilst there is no evidence that the 
public performed a critical intervention in the telling of this story, the way they responded to it 
demonstrates a development in media logics pertaining to the role of the audience. This is a factor 
that The Telegraph may have wished to engage with more effectively in order to retain power 
over the direction of information. 
I therefore argue that some interventions on Twitter can change the course of the news 
agenda, but these were interventions from elite-users. Sturgeon’s very early intervention in this 
political information cycle was a tweet denying the allegations made against her. It was retweeted 
4,662 times and was featured in 37.5% of online news articles analysed for this dissertation. The 
wording of the tweet was reproduced in the SNP spokesperson’s official statement and was 
paraphrased on the broadcast news bulletins. As a party leader Sturgeon had the ability to activate 
her online social networks and use power through networks. Her tweet had a large reach and was 
seen by, and shared by, a large group of people who were supportive of her and the Scottish 
National Party. In this tweet we see evidence of the co-existence of continuing hierarchical power 
that exists between political elites and journalists in the newsgathering process and the network 
power in existence on Twitter. 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
                                                          
63 Influencers is here defined as those users “who exhibit … network attributes such as connectivity or 
centrality—that allows them to influence a disproportionately large number of others, possibly indirectly 
via a cascade of influence” (Bakshy et al, 2011: 1). 
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By joining [networks], one gains access to the resource, or the “network power” that 
resides in the cooperative relationships facilitated by those norms and practices. This is 
why individuals constantly adapt their norms and practices to join networks that will 
provide them with advantages of varying kinds. (Chadwick, 2013: 17) 
 
 Journalists and politicians want to join and direct actions within networks that exist on social 
media, they recognise the inherent network power and want to use it to control the flow of political 
information. However, they tend not to be an organic member of those networks. This results in 
elites actually achieving an artificial re-enactment; it is not true “network power” but an attempt 
to continue the existence of their hierarchical power by utilising these networks. By sharing 
information on social networking sites there is the expectation that the network will share it in a 
two-step flow pattern, and the news agenda can be directed. But social media are many-to-many 
platforms and a failure to engage with users, and to appropriate or re-package information from 
users in order to strengthen frames, results in a weaker hold on power. This, combined with the 
glut of political information challenging the Telegraph’s agenda and with Sturgeon’s decisive 
early intervention on Twitter led this particular news agenda to flounder in its early stages.  
Three important factors played a role in undermining The Telegraph’s hold on the news 
media agenda. Firstly, The Telegraph did not have any new information to release into the 
political information cycle. The political information cycle of a given story is a fast paced process 
involving different actors across multiple platforms, with different combinations coming together 
and moving apart. This makes it easy to both release new information which challenges the 
agenda, and to perpetuate challenges to the agenda. As noted previously, simply repeating 
information on social media is an inauthentic way to interact with citizen-users who expect a level 
of spontaneity, immediacy, and – indeed – change. The Telegraph failed to do this, but the SNP 
and their supporters on social media were successful in doing so and so were able to shift the 
frame of the story. 
Secondly, although the report received airtime across multiple channels, discussions by 
citizen-users on social media were inclined to be negative about the story. There was not a transfer 
of issue salience to the public who tended to dismiss it as a result of Sturgeon’s success in the 
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leaders’ debate or a response to the SNP’s success in Scotland. As a result, outputs by the Labour 
Party using the story to further their own agenda were not well received on social media. Their 
own supporters did not share the party’s content, which was inauthentic as it did not meet required 
communication standards for Facebook. Furthermore, the links between Labour and the story, 
and the repetitive nature of their outputs, revealed their electioneering which rendered their inputs 
inauthentic and “embarrassing” to some supporters. Therefore Labour’s interactions can be 
categorised as commodification of citizen-users. Overall, social media played an important role 
in subverting this agenda item, broadly reproducing discussion in the traditional media but 
offering greater diversity in their interpretations. 
Finally, a combination of older and newer media logics was used successfully by the SNP 
to share their information. Beginning with Sturgeon’s quick denial of the allegations on Twitter 
and followed by an official statement from an SNP spokesperson that repeated almost verbatim 
the original tweet, the SNP moved on to engage with traditional media including Sturgeon’s 
opinion piece in The Observer newspaper and on The Guardian’s website. This piece was crucial 
in pushing the party’s rationale for the report, namely that the Westminster establishment were 
afraid of the SNP’s success in Scotland and were working to damage the party and its leader as a 
result. Meeting communication standards on all platforms played a role in enabled the SNP to 
control the interactivity of their supporters to promote their message, activating a network to share 
their denials. The party also engaged with hierarchical structures to frame news reports. This 
combination was successful in shifting the agenda onto a favourable slant. 
Overall, this case demonstrates a news media agenda setting process that requires the 
ability to tap into network power and to maintain a position within hierarchical power structures, 
to produce content that suits older and newer media platforms, and to be able to introduce or 
interact with a stream of supportive new information within the political information cycle. The 
Telegraph may have been able to set the news agenda initially, but they were unable to maintain 
control and influence over the story over the course of the period of analysis as a result of the 
SNP’s efficacy at achieving these criteria. The following two chapters look in detail at the actions 
taken by two different news producers to meet these standards.  
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Chapter 6 The Today Programme’s 
Election: campaign coverage marked by 
continuity in hierarchical power 
relationships 
 
Researcher: Do you [the programme] use Facebook? 
Jamie Angus: Yeah a lot. But we never look at it 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Leading on from the findings of Chapters 4 and 5, I now turn to a discussion of participant-
observations and interviews with UK news producers. The core tension between attempting to set 
the news media agenda and achieving this is summed up in the quote above, that is to say an 
underlying belief amongst elite actors that they are acting one way on social media, and evidence 
from analysis that they are not meeting the required communication standards. In order to fully 
understand the actions and decisions of actors involved in news production - and specifically the 
integral power relationships – this chapter and Chapter 7 evaluate how media elites reconfigured 
their roles and content output as part of the agenda-setting process in the hybrid media system. 
This chapter focuses upon the observations and interviews that I carried out at BBC Radio 4’s 
Today programme.  
The daily news programme is widely recognised as being one of the UK’s leading news 
media agenda-setters (Berry, 2012: 256). The aims of the observations of the programme team 
and interviews with then Editor, Jamie Angus, were to understand the decisions behind the news 
production process at the programme in the context of a hybrid media system, how their 
relationship with political elites was constituted, and the role these factors played in Today’s 
position in the news media agenda-setting process. The main finding of this chapter is that Today 
was unsuccessful in challenging the political parties’ news agendas in the election campaign 
207 
 
because the programme team did not utilise boundary-drawing power (Chadwick and Collister, 
2014), signalling a continuation in traditional power relationships. The team also did not fully 
realise their cross-platform content production, the result of which was an inability to both use 
network power within their newsgathering or message promotion strategies. They did not fully 
use the affordances of controlled interactivity (Stromer-Galley, 2014). Therefore, regardless of 
the presence of elements of a two-step flow effect through Today’s influential Twitter followers, 
the programme was unable to have the impact on the news media agenda that it was hoping for. 
Ultimately, Today’s election campaign was characterised by continuity in power relationships 
and content production, their adaptations to the hybrid media system were incomplete and left 
them in a weaker position in the news media agenda-setting process than more adaptive news 
producers. 
The irony of this finding is that the Editor, and the team in general, expressed a great deal 
of recognition around the positive impacts of engaging with their audience on social media for 
promoting their lines and as a newsgathering source which would enable them to challenge the 
political parties in a greater variety of ways, and the need to reconfigure Today’s content 
production and dissemination, at least to some extent, in order to allow their news stories to travel 
further and increase in salience. Yet, despite expressing the positives of hybridity within a media 
system, Today failed to follow through with related action during the election campaign. 
The questions that guide this section of my research are drawn from the overarching 
research question ‘what does the agenda-setting process look like during the 2015 general 
election?’ I aimed to find out specifically how power relationships are constructed between the 
journalists and Editor at Today and political parties’ central teams and high-profile candidates, 
and how those relationships are perceived at Today. I also looked to establish how and why news 
production practices have changed in the context of the news media agenda-setting. Ultimately, 
though, given the misalignment between stated beliefs about these two factors and actual observed 
activity and outcomes, I asked how these misalignments affected Today’s role in the news media 
agenda-setting process. The research questions answered in this chapter are (RQ1) How do power 
relationships between traditional news media producers and political elites function in the 2015 
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UK general election campaign, and how do they impact the agenda-setting process?; (RQ2) How 
do traditional news media producers and political parties attempt to successfully harness network 
power?; and (RQ3) How are social and digital media integrated into traditional news media’s 
output, and how does this impact their power relationships with political elites? 
This chapter focuses on three inherent and inter-related tensions. The first of these is the 
conflict which exists between political elites and journalists. The second is the tension which 
exists between older and newer forms of media, specifically for this older – legacy – form of 
broadcast media. The third is the tension between hierarchical (elite-led) and networked (shared 
by audience members) information dissemination. From the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, 
and from the findings outline in Chapters 4 and 5, I argue that the news media agenda-setting 
process requires media producers to find a balance between the second two tensions. They need 
to produce content which can cross the boundaries of newer and older forms of media, and there 
should be some element of encouragement of bottom-up or horizontal information dissemination 
amongst their audience members. 
This chapter will look at what claims were made about media production by the 
journalists in the Today team and analyse this against actual output. I show that whilst there was 
a recognition of the need to create content for social media, and online media in general, this was 
not as successful as the journalists and editorial team hoped for, and was not ultimately enacted. 
I further demonstrate how the power relationship which existed between the programme team and 
political parties was indicative of a continuity in hierarchical power, with the parties’ tightly-
controlled campaigns providing a stumbling block to Today’s reporting of the election.  
The methods employed in this chapter are analysis and description of interview and 
observational data, and a textual and discursive analysis of their content. These methods resulted 
in a thick description of the underlying beliefs of the journalists, an account of their actions and 
decisions, and how these two factors correspond. I began by coding the interview transcripts and 
field notes to identify themes and beliefs held by journalists about the media system, power, and 
their role in setting the news media agenda. I also coded for actions they had taken, or expressed 
a desire to take, in response to these beliefs. I finally compared their stated beliefs and 
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expectations with their cross-platform election coverage information outputs to establish the 
realities of position in power structures and the media agenda. This integrated analysis approach 
raised analytic themes which I explored in further detail through considerations of discourse. 
The chapter is structured according to these two main findings, incorporating an analysis 
of observations and interview responses which answers the questions regarding changes in news 
practices and power relationships. It demonstrates that the journalists who produced the Today 
programme were aware of the need to produce hybridised content – there was a lot of discussion 
around this from Angus – and that they made some steps towards this goal in their diversification 
of content, but content produced did not accurately reflect the lip-service paid to these values. 
Furthermore, power relationships between the media producers and politicians remained 
hierarchical. I argue that in terms of the news media agenda-setting process while challenges to 
Today’s position, and the steps needed to hold onto their place in the media ecology, are 
recognised, in reality continuity was central during the election campaign.  
 
6.2. Choice of Case Study: Why Today? 
 
The Today programme has a long and venerable history of interrogating politicians and setting 
the nation’s news agenda; in 2017 Today celebrated its 60th year. A case study of BBC Radio 4’s 
Today programme was chosen because within in the UK’s news media agenda-setting process 
there is a level of respect and importance attributed to it by other journalists and politicians. If it 
can be said that a particular programme is seen to be a power player in agenda-setting for a day’s 
reporting, Today holds that accolade. Furthermore, the programme team themselves accept this 
as one of their main attributes and even their raison d’être. I had a unique opportunity; to 
understand what the contemporary news media agenda-setting process looked like by studying 
the mechanisms of power and decision-making from the perspective of a news team who appear 
to, and are widely believed to, hold a large amount of influence over other news producers and 
political elites alike. 
210 
 
Berry (2012: 256) argues that Today is important due to three main reasons: firstly, its 
audience share makes it “the most popular news programme in broadcasting… Secondly, its 
audience has a heavy concentration of professionals and opinion formers, and, thirdly, it is widely 
seen as significant in setting news and political agendas in other parts of the media.” In one of the 
three interviews conducted for this study, then Editor Jamie Angus highlighted that: “There are 
days when [the news cycle] works really well because Today can literally set the agenda; that’s 
what the programme is supposed to do, [it’s] one of the programme’s core functions” (Jamie 
Angus, interview 3, July 2015). The acknowledgement of this position by other journalists across 
the field is a main contributing factor in creating this interpretation of the programme’s role as 
important for political communication.  
When Nick Robinson, then BBC Political Editor, announced his new role as Presenter on 
the Today programme in July 2015, he did so on Twitter stating “So farewell Westminster. I’ll 
miss you. I’m joining @BBCr4today – the programme which set’s the nation’s agenda – to fill 
Jim’s immense shoes” (Robinson, 2015). It is not just BBC journalists who ascribe this role to the 
programme. Reporting the same story, The Mirror stated that “The presenter and journalist 
replaces Jim Naughtie as part of the core presenting team on BBC Radio 4’s agenda-setting 
flagship news and current affairs programme” (Walker, 2015), and in 2009 – reporting on an 
award bestowed upon Today by a listeners’ group – The Telegraph began its story thus: “The 
agenda-setting news programme topped a list of the 25 most respected shows of the past quarter 
century to mark the 25th anniversary of the Voice of the Listener and Viewer” (Telegraph, 2009). 
 
6.3. “A lot of aggro is expended on both sides”: The Today-Politician Power 
Relationship 
 
Clearly a big media organisation like the BBC has a huge amount of influence on [the 
news media agenda] and it would be pointless to suggest otherwise. Which is why in 
election time quite a lot of political effort goes into trying to steer programmes like Today 
onto particular areas of coverage. A lot of aggro is expended on both sides. (Jamie Angus, 
interview 1, October 2014). 
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Previous research on power in a contemporary media system has focussed on the relationship 
between professional journalists/media organizations and their audiences (Boyle, 2001; 
Schoenbach, de Waal, and Lauf, 2005). Clearly there is an impetus among scholars to understand 
the reconfiguration of power in this relationship which has occurred due to the capabilities 
afforded to citizen-users by digital technology (Giglietto and Selva, 2014; Gillmor, 2004; Stanyer, 
2009). However, this is not the only relationship of importance in political reporting. The media’s 
relationship with politicians, parties, and their staff, as sources, subjects of reporting, and 
commentators, are significant. The relationship is reciprocal. Carl Dinnen, political reporter at 
ITV News explicated this view of the power relationship in our first interview:  
 
If you take it that knowledge is power for a start then journalists have a certain amount 
of power. And when you consider how important the image and message are politicians, 
and journalists are in such a strong position to mediate that, then of course they have 
power. (Carl Dinnen, Interview 1, October 2014). 
 
At Today I sought to understand the way in which this relationship was both perceived to 
function, and actually functioned, during the election campaign, ultimately finding a gap between 
stated expectations in my early interactions with the programme team and actual occurrences 
during the election campaign. I also sought to understand and interpret the effect that this had 
upon Today’s news production and dissemination strategies, and ultimately on their ability to 
control their own place and role in the agenda-setting process. Within a hybrid media system, 
journalists also have the ability to direct the interactivity of their audiences. By mobilizing citizen-
users, or drawing on information from citizens, journalists can increase their ability to hold 
politicians to account and set the media agenda. However, I found that, despite the potential for 
journalists to increase their own agenda-setting power through integrating digital media, for 
example by drawing on the resources and network power integral in their audiences, in the 2015 
general election campaign Today did not successfully enact power within the redrawn platform 
boundaries and, more often, political elites were positioned to dictate the news media agenda.  
The microcosm of relations between Today and political actors in the opening quote of 
this section speaks to the debate around the power relationships which exist between political 
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parties and journalists. Angus’s summary statement that “A lot of aggro is expended on both 
sides” encapsulates the power struggle for the news agenda at any time, especially during a 
general election.  His use of the word “aggro” provides a starting point to understanding this 
relationship by suggesting a process that is conflict-driven, and in which Today and the BBC 
became a battleground with political parties involved in a struggle to dictate the news agenda to 
the media organization.  
Further to this, the opening quote makes two key points for which I did not observe 
evidence in the 2015 election campaign. Firstly, the language used makes it appear as though the 
effort expended in the power relationship is mostly on the side of the parties. This is a point that 
Dinnen’s quote, above, also supports. Secondly, and as a result of this, there is the rightful 
assumption that ultimately the BBC has a huge influence and the wrongful assumption that 
therefore it is the parties’ job to persuade the media, who may pick and choose the agenda. As 
will be demonstrated below, events and observations ultimately demonstrate that this was not the 
case. 
The assessment given by Today’s editor of his programme’s place in the media ecology 
was that of importance. “I think the programme’s influence over the daily news is still pretty 
marked … because of the amazing position it occupies at the start of the day. That will always 
give Today quite a lot of prominence and people write a lot about what we cover” (Jamie Angus, 
interview 1, September 2015).  Angus bestows upon Today a central place in the UK’s news 
media agenda. He asserts that its position in terms of timing and its influence over other journalists 
give it a measure of agenda-setting power. This logistical factor, timing, is crucial in Today’s 
agenda-setting ability, and this was the case during the election campaign. For example Today 
regularly trended on Twitter, yet the programme was speaking predominantly to those already 
pre-disposed to listen; journalists and the programme’s regular audience 
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, being an influencer on Twitter gives access to network 
power which can then be used to promote your messages or agenda items. The Today programme 
is an influencer because of its large network which incorporates citizens, journalists and 
politicians. As well as having a network of listeners, Today is part of the elite networks that exist 
213 
 
on Twitter. In an interview with Jim Waterson, then Deputy Editor of BuzzFeed UK, he informed 
me that “Twitter is read by journalists and what that means is that something gets big on Twitter 
and then it might make the 6 o’clock news” (Jim Waterson, interview 1, October 2014). Today 
theoretically has the ability to combine both its powerful position in the mainstream news media 
hierarchy with interactions with listeners to harness network power. 
When Angus and I first spoke, in September 2014, he was optimistic about the ways in 
which the new media environment could help strengthen power for journalists over political 
parties in the agenda-setting process. When discussing the control of messages by politicians and 
journalists, he spoke about an erosion of control of single-message dissemination for parties as a 
result of two phenomena: (1) the rise of anti-politics sentiment resulting in the public becoming 
less receptive to party lines; and (2) the greater challenge that parties can face from journalists 
because of the ability to reach out into social media and find people or opinions to counter party 
lines. Finding evidence of the second phenomena this during Today’s campaign would signal a 
shift in the power relationship between politicians and journalists. However, although Angus 
recognises this capability to draw on network power relationships, I did not observe any evidence 
of such action taking place at Today. 
Angus’ statement is a recognition of the challenges that politicians face as a direct result 
of hybridity in the media system. In this instance, the strategic use of the affordance that enables 
journalists to crowdsource opinions which provide contradictions to the party information. 
Ensuring a flow of alternate political information into the news cycle via both legacy and digital 
media is an important part of retaining control of the news media agenda in the fast-paced political 
information cycle. The idea underpinning Angus’ statement is that the relational nature of power 
within the media system, as described in Chapter 2 concerning the work of Foucault (1982) and 
Castells (2010), means that the power to communicate news stories has become dispersed 
amongst the online social networks of the broadcaster. There has been a diffusion of power 
amongst actors, creating networks which can then be harnessed by journalists to challenge the 
political agenda. The potential for this in terms of the process of setting the news media agenda 
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is that the journalists at Today could pose a greater challenge to political party information by 
drawing upon their social networks. 
However, in my second interview with Angus in February 2015 he was less idealistic, 
describing the extent to which Today’s programming follows party agendas in political reporting: 
“it does come and go, so some day’s there’s tons of politics and some days it just seems to suit 
everyone for there not to be any. So really it depends on what the political parties are doing.” 
(Interview 2, February 2015). It is evident that without party and candidate activity in the build 
up to and during an election campaign there would be a dearth of political campaign news to 
report. This is not to say that the journalists at Today followed the party lines verbatim, but that 
their agenda remained very much tied to party agendas, and – whilst they regularly challenged 
their interviewees about party messages and policy – I did not observe the use of social media as 
a source to challenge politicians in the manner described by Angus in our first interview.  
During my fourth observation period of the team I attended a morning editorial meeting. 
This occurred on 4 May 2015, the day before Nick Clegg was due to give his final Today interview 
of the campaign. Most of the discussion focussed upon what angle the team could “push” Clegg 
on, but the attendees acknowledged that they faced the problem of Liberal Democrat leader 
sticking rigidly to party lines and not answering their questions. They needed to find a way to 
approach Liberal Democrat key messages that would lead Clegg to give a meaningful answer. 
The team considered different discussion points, for example that the party could lose all their 
seats in Scotland, suggestions that Clegg had lost control of the party, and a challenge on why 
policy on Europe was not one of their “red lines”. Another option put forwards was that Today 
could get a “strong line” on resignations within the party to put to Clegg. The editorial meeting 
ended without reaching a consensus on this issue. It appeared to me that the stage-managed 
campaign, so tightly-controlled by the party, was posing a significant challenge to journalists 
looking for different angles – or indeed a story that would set the news media agenda. In follow-
up interviews with journalists more broadly this was confirmed. Andrew Sparrow, political 
correspondent at The Guardian and author of the politics live blog, reflected on this: “I think it 
was worse … certainly all journalists that were going out were saying that it was basically worse 
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than it’s ever been in terms of limited access for the press and probably access with politicians 
too.” (Andrew Sparrow, interview 3, July 2015) 
From this example I deduce two key points. Firstly, and in answer to RQ264, despite 
Angus’ optimism in our first interview regarding the potential for networks to journalists to reach 
out and find information to challenge party lines through social media networks, this was never 
an option used in practice. In the editorial meeting described above no member of the team 
suggested this as a way to source information or stories to put to Clegg, either to find a new angle 
or push him further on Liberal Democrat messages. Secondly, and in answer to RQ165, the fact 
that Angus spoke of the programme remaining tied to party agenda’s in this way suggests a 
continuation of a hierarchical power relationship in the agenda-setting process. This is supported 
by the lack of evidence of any divergence from legacy practices during the observation periods. 
Following the election, in July 2015, Angus’ viewpoint on the power relationship 
between journalists was at its most pragmatic.  
 
I think probably in general terms the campaign was notable for a lack of really big 
breaking news stories, because mostly the news agenda was so tightly controlled by the 
parties and access to the candidates was really tightly controlled by the parties… I don’t 
think Today really stood out in terms of breaking new lines. But I don’t really feel that’s 
our fault, it’s just kind of a feature of the campaign. (Interview 3, July 2015) 
 
It could be the case that Angus’ post-election statement was symptomatic of the malaise felt 
within the wider journalistic profession, also outlined in the Sparrow quote, following an election 
where parties had so tightly controlled access, key messages, and ultimately the news agenda. 
Additionally, opinion polls – a key source for journalists– had been incorrect. However, there are 
two central points to draw out from this quote before drawing conclusions. Firstly, the power 
relationship acknowledged by Angus is that the vast majority of power sat with the political elites 
and there was nothing that Today could do about that. In the quote the journalists are described 
                                                          
64 How do news media producers and political parties attempt to successfully harness network power? 
65 How do power relationships between traditional news producers and political elites function in the 
2015 UK general election campaign, and how do they impact the agenda-setting process? 
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as disenfranchised and subject to the whims of the parties. Secondly, Angus removes agency from 
Today with the statement “I don’t really feel that’s our fault”. This suggests that no actions could 
have been taken to bring control of the news agenda into journalists’ hands, use of social media 
was not a consideration at this point. This statement in our final interview is in marked contrast 
to the optimism demonstrated in interview one, eight months prior to the election campaign. I 
found no evidence, therefore, that the audience was networked with the programme on social 
media. Whilst prior to the campaign using network power by encouraging citizen-users to share 
their lines or sourcing alternate viewpoints from social media sites was practically seen as a way 
to drive or challenge a news agenda. However, during the campaign this did not occur and legacy 
news production practices continued. 
A fact that illustrates the power relationship that I describe is that Today, and indeed the 
news media in general, missed what turned out to be a very important story in the campaign: the 
successful Conservative campaign which wiped out the Liberal Democrats and delivered a Tory 
majority government. Angus raised this in our post-election interview, telling me that the BBC 
was doing a lot of “soul-searching” to understand why the story was missed. The explanation 
given by Angus as to why this story was not reported was that it did not fit with the prevalent 
narratives: the opinion polls, the Conservative Party’s framing of SNP, and speculating about 
coalition. Due to the focus the news media gave to these items, and the fact that no party made it 
a set piece of their campaign, it was missed by mainstream journalists.  
This is a key finding that provides evidence of a hierarchical power relationship with 
stories led by elite actors; news media story-telling followed the agendas of political parties’, 
augmented by evidence from the polling companies and election forecasters. During my 
observations with the team, the “real” story was not mentioned once. Considering the Editor’s 
statements I contend that this is because the programme was dismissive of evidence that did not 
fit with the picture being painted by national polls. Therefore, far from widening out their sourcing 
of stories utilising social networks, Today relied heavily on traditional sources and information 
networks. Angus’ complaints about how tightly controlled the party’s campaigns were, and the 
little room for manoeuvre that this left for journalists, demonstrates clearly that rather than 
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challenging party agendas or pushing to set their own the Today programme relied upon parties 
and other organisations for their leads. In this way, traditional news media agenda-setting 
processes persisted, despite Angus’ initial optimism regarding Today’s news media agenda-
setting potential. 
In conclusion, it is worth noting and understanding again the conflicting perceptions put 
forward by Angus in relation to journalist-politician power relations. When asked how politicians 
and their staff engaged with the Today programme Angus replied that: 
 
People like the BBC, they’re respectful of us … there was a bit of argy bargy at times 
during the campaign but it tended to be less between politicians and us, more between 
press handlers and the journalists. (Jamie Angus, interview 3, July 2015) 
 
Angus creates dichotomies between ‘politicians’ and their ‘press handlers’ and between ‘us’ – i.e. 
senior programme-makers at Today – and ‘journalists’, reporters following the campaign. This 
ignores the fact that party press handlers are directed by the political party infrastructure 
comprising staffers and politicians. Additionally, the journalists on the ground who dealt with 
those press handlers were the frontline for the programme. Despite the “respect” between those 
at more senior levels, the junior members of staff enacted the power plays evident in the analysis 
above; parties withheld or fed information to the journalists as best suited them, and journalists 
followed their lead.  
Returning to the questions asked the beginning of this chapter, the power relationship 
structures between Today and political which influenced the process of setting the news media 
agenda remained hierarchical. Political parties were at the top of the pyramid withholding and 
releasing political information, and Today used them as their main source. The journalistic 
consensus surrounding the coalition frame may have resulted in fewer challenges to parties who, 
as has been discussed previously, used this to frame their own agendas and interests. Network 
power was available to Today, and they occupied a central influencer position within their 
networks. However given their adherence to party agendas and their reticence in engaging with 
their audience to find alternate information, they did not use this to its full advantage. 
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6.4. The Missing Link: Today’s failure to engage in a renewal of boundary-drawing 
 
The disconnection between the statements made by Angus in interview one, and those made in 
our second interview three months prior to the start of the official campaign period, speaks to a 
tension inherent throughout this research project. Firstly there was widely held recognition of the 
changing nature of news production, agenda-setting, and the role of citizens, and a belief that it 
posed a challenge to the existing process of news media agenda-setting. Secondly, this led news 
producers to the belief that they needed to take certain actions, and that the news-making process 
should be adapted. But thirdly, and crucially, the mere fact of holding such beliefs rarely 
translated into meaningful actions.  
I argue that strategies of message control, as described by Stromer-Galley (2014) in her 
conceptualisation of controlled interactivity, are required in the news media agenda setting 
process that exists in a hybrid media system. Although Stromer-Galley’s theory was developed 
in relation to party campaigning, the tenets of message control are applicable to any actors within 
the media agenda-setting process, including journalists. Today’s approach fell short of 
requirements for controlled interactivity, but also cannot be classed as commodification of 
citizens as their interactions with their audience were minimal. I term their method insufficient 
interactivity, their digital outputs did not help them to set the news media agenda. Today’s 
communications online met requirements for authenticity and communication standards, they 
generally appeared as spontaneous despite the constructive thought that went into their creation, 
they were immediate, being shared during and after the programme, and they were predictable, 
crafted specifically for each platform. However, the team were unable to motivate their audience 
to share content widely on social media. 
The challenging conditions for legacy news-making practices, including hybridity across 
the media system and the ability of audiences to challenge the status quo, were recognised. The 
solution - diversify content across platforms and bring audiences in to content production and 
dissemination - was known. However, follow-through in terms of action was weak. This can best 
be summed up in the following interaction from interview two in February 2015: 
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Researcher: Do you [the programme] use Facebook? 
Jamie Angus: Yeah a lot. But we never look at it. 
 
The duality around the programme’s use of this specific social medium, Facebook, is illustrative 
of this insufficient level of interactivity. The Today programme posted to Facebook regularly, and 
indeed had a strategy for the type of content and its creation that I observed in action during my 
time with the programme team. The communications were authentic but responsiveness was 
missing: the programme did not enter into conversations with the audience. In my observations 
of the social media sub-team’s work, and subsequent data collection during the election campaign 
period, it became apparent that Today used Facebook as a push medium, instead of the two-way 
push-pull that could be used to create a relationship with their network and motivate citizens to 
share their digital content. This finding is in line with the behaviour of other organizations as 
described in Chapters 4 and 5, for example the discussion in Chapter 5 regarding Labour’s use of 
Facebook which demonstrated that responsiveness can encapsulate the standards of authentic 
communication by facilitating spontaneity and immediacy. 
Strategizing to gain network power and use social media and your audience is integral to 
message control and to upholding a position as a central node in the media system. Support for 
this comes from Alex Wickham, news Editor at Guido Fawkes, who held the opinion that “social 
media is good in lots of ways. It’s great for news and it can help drive news agendas” (Alex 
Wickham, interview 3, June 2015). The idea of extending control over networks in this way is 
complementary to Chadwick and Collister’s (2014) discussion of boundary-drawing power, 
which the authors define as:  
 
The capacity of an organizational actor to reconfigure the context of its own actions by 
using resources and strategies that are intrinsic to itself but which also involve interfacing 
with other actors in a hypernetworked environment. (Chadwick and Collister, 2014: 
2427). 
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Although there was an acknowledgement at Today of the potential for social media to 
play a role in content creation, I observed that news media production remained a hierarchical 
process. The inherent tension that exists between top-down content from established media 
producers and bottom-up content from citizens is not a challenge for Today or the BBC in general. 
As an organization, they are in a position to commodify their audience, incorporating them, their 
views, and their outputs when those features add something to news reports. Yet there is no 
necessity in this beyond giving the audience some sense of belonging or loyalty to the show, and 
rounding out the news content. The incorporation of citizen journalism or produser content is 
generally superfluous to the BBC’s own output in general, and not linked to the way in which 
their programming sets the news media agenda.  
For example, during observations I noted that Today’s feature ‘100 seats in 100 days’, 
comprising reports from 100 different constituencies in the months leading up to the election, was 
driven by national issues. Constituencies were chosen, on the whole, due to their relevance to 
policy proposals or issues of national importance. Citizens were included in a traditional vox 
populi practice or were interviewed on how these issues would affect them, but a local story was 
rarely a driving force in the choice of constituency. Local citizens additionally did not play a role 
in the choice of constituency, and audience interactions with this feature on digital media were 
not used in the segments. The one exception to this came from a candidate from Grimsby who 
asked to be interviewed after reading about the recording of the ‘100 seats in 100 days’ campaign 
feature in their local newspaper.  
It remained imperative that Today established and maintained a successful digital 
presence for a number of reasons. It is a feature of a hybrid media system that news producers 
work across platforms and combine older and newer logics both in newsgathering, content 
production, and dissemination. In order to exercise greater control over the news media agenda 
in the election campaign, Today needed to engage in a reconfiguration of media boundaries. It is 
a broadcaster with a traditional platform and a steady listenership, but to reach a wider audience 
during the election campaign and beyond it needed to maximise its use of digital media. Chadwick 
and Collister’s conceptualisation of boundary-drawing power was derived from a study of a print 
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media company with a strong online presence. The lessons from their study of The Guardian do 
not transpose precisely onto another medium. Yet when combined with a consideration of other 
the theories which describe mechanisms of power and message control across platforms and 
networks (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Kreiss, 2012; Stromer-Galley, 2014) it is clear that in order 
to position itself in the news media agenda-setting process Today needed to strategically employ 
cross-media tactics and engage more fully with its audience.  
Prior to the election, in February 2015, Angus appeared to recognise this need:  
 
One of the things I’m sort of anxious about is how you take quite a traditional radio-only 
platform like Today and do something web-wise which doesn’t look forced or 
inappropriate but offers kind of additional extras for the audience who want that kind of 
thing. (Jamie Angus, interview 2, February 2015) 
 
The editor’s use of the phrase “doesn’t look forced or inappropriate” is telling, suggesting a belief 
in a basic incompatibility of traditional broadcast content and non-traditional digital content. 
Angus’ idea that internet content is either forced or inappropriate when tied to a radio news 
programme is noteworthy: radio broadcasting is ‘natural’ in this situation and digital content is 
not. Seemingly, digital content lacks the authenticity of the broadcast. Today initially struggled 
to create content that met the communication standards for social media, although they ultimately 
achieved this. The quote leads to two further points, firstly that the content itself might actually 
have been “forced” or “inappropriate”, but in order to sell it to the audience the programme team 
needed to make them think it was neither of these things. The implications of these actions would 
be inauthenticity of communication and commodification of citizen-users by hiding the insincere 
nature of the communication. Secondly, that the creation of digital content which offered 
something extra for the audience was superfluous for the majority of listeners who were assumed 
to be happy with the radio content only. Despite these deductions the fact that Angus was 
“anxious” about creating this content suggests that it was something he believed needed to happen 
and something that the programme needed to improve upon. 
222 
 
It is this basic failure to engage with the hybridity of the media system and practice 
boundary-drawing power that contributed largely to Today’s lack of intervention in the news 
media agenda during the campaign. By treating digital content as an added extra, rather than an 
integral part of the news-making assemblage, Today missed the opportunity to control and 
promote information flows to a greater extent. This happened despite Angus’ and the production 
team’s recognition of the need to create a stronger digital footprint. Angus told me that: 
 
We want the audiences to feel as though they have got a personal involvement in the 
programme and with its presenters and that they might find stuff in our timeline or on our 
Facebook page through the day that rewards them sharing it, using it, watching it, 
listening to it. (Jamie Angus, interview 1, October 2014) 
 
The use of the word “reward” suggests that Today’s audience were viewed as needing 
encouragement to engage with digital content and the quote also speaks to Angus’ desire to be 
able to use the power within Today’s networked audience more effectively. 
Despite these criticisms, from observation of the Today team it became clear that the 
number of staff responsible for social and digital content was not only increasing but that the 
digital team was becoming increasingly integrated with the wider programme team. Within the 
office space, the social media team sat amongst the reporters and editors and were represented at 
all editorial meetings and programme debriefs. Those members of staff were responsible for 
creating and disseminating digital output and they focussed their efforts on a range of actions, 
including producing and sharing a daily round-up email of effective and less effective digital 
strategies with the wider team, creating content for digital media with a particular focus on video, 
and encouraging reporters and presenters to capture content specifically for digital media. 
During the election campaign the team hoped to be able to make an impact in the social 
media space, focussing on Facebook and Twitter, in order to both push their main news lines and 
to reach a broader audience. However, it was recognised by Angus that beyond Today’s 180 
minutes running time it would be difficult for them to “dominate” social media websites. This 
gave rise to the need to push lines early in the day and to produce shareable content which could 
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be disseminated throughout the day. The direction given to the social media producers was that 
the core purpose for Twitter was to get lines out quickly in order to set the news agenda, an action 
commensurate with Today’s position as an influencer within their social media network. 
Following that, the aims were to get a high volume of click-throughs or retweets. The impact and 
worth of these actions came from publics seeing the content and engaging with it. These 
outcomes, had they occurred, would indicate the increase of interactivity required for the audience 
to become a tool within the process of setting the news media agenda. The underlying assumption 
was that actions taken by the audience to share Today’s content would promote Today’s brand 
and news lines amongst people who did not tune into the broadcast.  
In my observations of the digital producers it was clear that they implicitly understood 
the importance of resonating with Facebook’s communication standards when developing content 
for social media. Immediacy, spontaneity, and predictability were all considered when creating 
content for Facebook. The team aimed to produce content which would engage with the audience 
on lighter subjects working on the premise that, having caught the attention of an audience, 
citizen-users would then be more likely to view the serious current affairs content. Actions such 
as these provide evidence that the programme wanted to tap into its audience’s personal networks. 
For example, spontaneity and bloopers are known to “travel well”, that is to say that they are 
widely shared. The team targeted such clips at Facebook users and used them to direct audience 
members to longer clips and “harder” current affairs content. According to Angus, “What we do 
need to do is think about what material we’re putting out on social to reinforce the messages we 
want people to understand about the programme” (Jamie Angus, interview 2, February 2015). 
This has a clear implication for the process of setting the news media agenda; specific information 
was chosen and shared to direct the audience to think about the programme in a particular way. 
During my observation of the team, I noted that Twitter was seen by some producers as 
the most useful way to achieve this. The Social Media Content Producer highlighted the 
importance of Twitter for disseminating news lines, and communication standards for tweets were 
met. I observed the way in which the producer superimposed quotes from the programme over 
relevant images or Today backgrounds, using a headline from an election story or interview. 
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These specific items were created for social media using quotes and images from the day’s 
broadcast, and they were designed to travel. The team expressed the belief that this was one of 
the best ways to increase interaction on Twitter, and would also help to push Today’s top news 
lines. Through the lens of redrawing boundaries, this can be seen as a partial attempt to situate 
Today across platform boundaries and produce and promote content; these are actions which have 
been shown to increase salience in the news media agenda-setting process. However, audience 
interaction with the content is also a crucial factor in redrawing boundaries, they need to know 
that the social media platforms contain content worth visiting for. They also need to engage with 
that in order for it to travel. This did not happen to the necessary extent during the general election 
campaign. 
Focussing on the two most widely used social media sites in the UK, Facebook (c.31 
million users in the United Kingdom)  (Statista, 2015) and Twitter (c.15 million users) (Statista, 
2015c), I identified certain actions taken by Today’s editors and producers to increase their 
chances of setting the news agenda during the 2015 UK general election. The first thing to note 
from the interviews with the Editor is that he felt strongly that Today’s content on Facebook 
received more interest than that on Twitter. However, as Angus admitted in the statement given 
earlier, user responses to Facebook content were not interacted with by the programme. 
As mentioned above, Today often trended on Twitter during the election campaign 
through the hashtag #r4today. The production team termed those who use this hashtag “super-
users”. Super-users were defined as listeners who talk to each other on Twitter about the 
broadcast. Trending amongst a defined group of people partially meets the requirements for a 
two-step flow. It crucially falls short of actually promoting the content to people who had not 
already heard the broadcast, and hence promoting Today’s lines more widely.66 In line with the 
programme’s use of Facebook, the official Twitter profile - @BBCr4today - was used principally 
to promote news lines rather than interacting with listeners or creating dialogues. During 
                                                          
66 As a caveat, one limitation to this method is that I was unable to identify the number of retweets by 
super-users or learn about their offline sharing information. Therefore measurements of how far 
information travelled are limited. 
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observations of the show, I kept track of tweets from the official Today account and those using 
#r4today. Discussion online amongst listeners made connections between news stories and 
reports, and some users challenged the narratives being broadcast. However, there was minimal 
to no reaction during the show to listeners’ comments. Twitter users talked only to each other, 
signalling insufficient interaction of the part of the programme and a missed opportunity to 
activate their audience networks.  
Furthermore, from data I collected during the election campaign it is clear that the number 
of interactions by the audience with purposely-created campaign video content on Today’s 
Facebook page were low in comparison to interactions on Instagram, although the figures were 
small in general with an average of 17 likes on Facebook and 20 on Instagram on directly 
comparable days when the same content was shared (see Table 5.1). In addition, when comparing 
the numbers of likes for election-based content on Facebook in comparison to non-election 
content posted more recently we can see marked differences. ‘Today’s Today’ were 15-second 
videos which featured a presenter talking directly to camera in the newsroom, and were filmed in 
a homemade style that aimed to strengthen the connection between audience and presenter. They 
featured the presenter simply summarising the main campaign news and current affairs covered 
in the programme. These short videos received an average of 13 likes, 4 shares, and 15 comments 
on Facebook during the election campaign. In comparison, a video posted on 30 December 2015 
showing the impact of the Boxing Day floods in Northern England garnered 127 likes, 348 shares, 
and 27 comments. There could be many factors explaining this difference, not least of which may 
be to do with the nature of the news story. Election coverage might be regarded as less interesting 
and lacking the human interest of the story used for comparison. The inconsistency with which 
the Today programme posted to social media is also revealed in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1. Number of interactions with Today’s social media posts from 15 April 2015 to 6 May 2015 
 
Facebook Instagram Twitter 
 
Likes 
% 
n=(148) Shares 
%  
(n=45) Comments 
%  
(n=162) Likes 
% 
(n=242) Retweets 
% 
(n=7) Favourites 
% 
(n=6) Replies 
% 
(n=14) 
15 April 13 8.78 0 0 3 1.85 26 10.74 - - - - - - 
16 April 22 14.86 12 26.67 2 1.23 31 12.81 - - - - - - 
20 April 6 4.05 0 0 27 16.67 - N/A - - - - - - 
21 April 6 4.05 0 0 35 21.60 30 12.40 - - - - - - 
22 April 8 5.41 0 0 20 12.35 28 11.57 - - - - - - 
23 April 11 7.43 0 0 9 5.56 35 14.46 - - - - - - 
24 April - - - - - - 29 11.98 - - - - - - 
27 April 8 5.41 2 4.44 22 13.58 - - - - - - - - 
28 April - - - - - - 32 13.22 - - - - - - 
29 April 44 29.73 29 64.44 14 8.64 31 12.81 7 100.00 6 100.00 14 100.00 
02 May 10 6.76 0 0 6 3.70 - - - - - - - - 
05 May 7 4.73 0 0 4 2.47 - - - - - - - - 
06 May 13 8.78 2 4.44 20 12.35 - - - - - - - - 
Note: A dash (-) indicates that a post was not shared on this platform on that date 
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The decision to produce ‘Today’s Today’ is indicative of perhaps the most important way 
that the Today team attempted to blur boundaries in their content creation: the use of video. Video 
was recognised as one of the most important ways of engaging citizens to share messages, not 
just at Today but amongst my interviewees more generally. For example, a digital advisor to a 
main UK party stated that “In some ways we were copying the style and format of how American 
campaigns use email, how American campaigns use online video in particular.” (Anon02, 
interview 1, September 2015) Audio-visual material played an important role in the ‘100 seats in 
100 days’ feature and is a significant indicator of Today’s diversification of content. Nevertheless, 
although I found that development of social and digital media as a complementary piece to the 
legacy radio broadcasts were viewed as crucial by the programme team during the election 
campaign of 2015, the extent to which this was enacted was insufficient to harness network power.  
Overall, the actions taken by the Today programme in their production of election 
coverage demonstrates evidence of content diversification as a means of participating effectively 
in the contemporary agenda-setting process. Some limited steps were taken by the programme to 
improve their integration of digital and legacy content in order to increase their reach over 
audiences and to increase their cross-platform output, and hence retain their place in the agenda-
setting process. However, the extent and success of this was limited. Understanding how the 
programme interpreted its place and role within the contemporary media system, particularly in 
relation to other actors and pertaining to agenda-setting, is crucially important for assessing the 
validity of the controlled-network relationship model in this context. It is clear that some actions 
were taken to broaden Today’s digital space. Perhaps if these had been more successful, Today 
may have been able to harness their social media networks and exercise more control over the 
agenda. Ultimately, though, their biggest downfall was inaction in the face of the tightly-
controlled party campaigns in conjunction with their failure to successfully redraw boundaries 
and position themselves across platforms.  
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6.5. Conclusion 
 
Despite attempts at digital innovation by the team at the Today programme, hierarchical power 
structures and legacy news-production practices dominated their approach to campaign coverage. 
Today combined a small number of digital practices with legacy practices. In an election 
characterised by “stage-managed” political party campaigns within a hybrid media system, these 
limited actions were ineffective. Today’s approach resulted in a failure to realise the programme’s 
full potential within the news media agenda-setting process. Drawing on the findings presented 
in this chapter, I argue that Today was not able to access power inherent in social media networks 
due to its limited approach to creating original content for digital spaces. Additionally, where 
content was shared the journalists were unable to motivate their online networked audience to 
share it widely. Furthermore, Today did not source information from citizen-users from social 
media, which I argue would have enabled them to find more challenging perspectives to party 
lines. 
 Whilst the editor and programme team certainly recognised the potential for digital and 
social media to help them in the content creation and promotion, a tension existed between the 
theory and practice of two key factors. The first of these findings relates to power relations 
between the programme and the political parties. Initially, Angus spoke about interaction with 
politicians as though power was relational. He stated the belief that the hybridity of the media 
system, and the greater amount of information produced by citizens, was beneficial to journalists 
and detrimental to parties. However, these beliefs did not turn into action during the election 
campaign. Instead, Today continued to operate within a hierarchical power structure whereby 
their main sources were traditional organizations such as parties, who – in keeping a greater level 
of control over their messages – were able to lead the news agenda most days. For example, the 
discussions I observed during the editorial team’s preparations for the interview with Nick Clegg 
showed a continuation of legacy journalistic practices, with no suggestion of using digital or social 
media to mount a challenge to party lines. 
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 Further to this, news production practices neither diversified nor demonstrated a 
commitment to re-drawing of boundaries. The Today programme’s team were conscious of the 
potential for them to exert power in online spaces by taking these actions. This was demonstrated 
by growing their social media team and their production of content for social media. Nevertheless, 
the amount of interactivity enacted during the campaign was minimal. The interactivity with 
citizen-users was insufficient for the programme to use their social media networks to the fullest 
extent and hence exert or retain power over the news media agenda-setting process. The lessons 
from these main findings is that to engage effectively in the process of setting the news media 
agenda, a news organization must engage in a re—drawing of platform boundaries using hybrid 
media logics. This includes responsive interaction with their audience through controlled 
interactivity directing authentic communications across their networks, and engaging with 
citizens not only to promote content but also as a source for content which challenges others’ 
messages.  
 In previous chapters I outlined an updated process for news media agenda-setting, 
involving the engagement with, and use of, citizens to create salience around a news story. 
Required for this were elements of controlled-interactivity, alongside a two-step flow process in 
which audience members share content with their own networks, increasing the reach of a story 
or news line. Whilst Today occupied the same space within the UK’s media system that it has 
done since its inception, and undoubtedly played a role in the news media agenda-setting process, 
it had very little opportunity to lead the agenda due to the continuation of traditional practices. 
This adherence to tradition came at the expense of incorporating interactivity to challenge party 
messages and to promote its own lines and interpretations. 
There are, of course, some limitations to this case study. As with any case study based on 
observational insights the findings relate only to this specific scenario in which the observations 
were made: in this case one radio current affairs programme during the 2015 UK general election 
campaign period. The external validity of the findings is therefore low, but as an account of an 
important news programme interacting with political parties within the agenda-setting process 
certain statements can be made which can be applied more generally. Additionally, as a stand-
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alone account of Today’s news-making processes and procedures, it provides a reliable insight 
into a legacy organisations attempt to adapt to a hybrid media system. The following chapter 
analyses news output from ITV News. The coherence of findings from this rival news channel 
with findings from Today demonstrates the internal validity of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 7 ITV News Election 2015’s 
failure to engage: insufficient 
interactivity and continuity in 
hierarchical power relationships 
Alex Chandler: So just being in the right place at the right time with a camera phone 
doesn’t make you a journalist – it makes you a very useful feature of what our modern 
media world is, because the more opportunities to capture images makes it much easier 
to tell different stories. You don’t have to be a reporter and a crew in the right place at 
the right time to capture something. Anybody can do it. And that means that stories that 
wouldn’t necessarily come to light or come to air do come to air. And that’s great, that 
democratization of news-gathering has been fantastic. (Interview 1, November 2014) 
 
Alex Chandler, Editor of ITV’s election results night programme Election 2015, explained to me 
how important citizens were in the newsgathering process. His words endowed citizens with the 
quality of being a “useful feature” for professional journalists, which explicitly describes 
commodification of their content and action. He also highlighted how the information brought to 
light by citizen-users can tell, enhance, or challenge a news story. This is a process he described 
as democratizing, despite the clear continuation of a divide between professional journalists and 
non-professionals. This chapter analyses the beliefs and actions of journalists working on Election 
2015 and compares it to the output of the programme to describe the power relations and use of 
social media that impacted Election 2015’s ability to take part in the news media agenda-setting 
process.  
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Election 2015 was ITV News’ election results programme. As part of this study I undertook 
observations of the Election 2015 programme team, and interviews with the programme Editor, 
Alex Chandler, and the Digital Director, Jason Mills. The goals were to gain an understanding of 
the decisions made and the way in which the news-making practices were used to create an 
agenda-setting programme. As stated in the previous chapter, this case study – and that of Today 
– were carried out in order to fully understand the impact of decision-making as a function in the 
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contemporary news agenda-setting process. Within that I also sought to establish how journalists 
respond to the affordances and challenges of the media system, and how power relationships 
between audiences, journalists, and political parties function. 
ITV News is arguably better-versed in the integration of digital and legacy media logics 
and practices than the Today programme. This is because on a day-to-day basis the news teams 
behind ITV’s national and regional news broadcasts produce content designed to cross platforms, 
including television, the ITV News website, and their social media accounts. It is also easier for 
a television broadcast to be turned into visual clips which travel further online. The journalists 
producing Election 2015 were therefore familiar with enacting boundary-drawing power, defined 
by Chadwick and Collister (2016: 2423) as the “capacity of an organizational actor to reconfigure 
the context of its own actions by using resources and strategies that are both intrinsic to itself but 
which also involve interfacing with other actors in a hypernetworked environment.” I observed 
that this was incorporated into their decision-making and content production. 
The research questions are developed from the over-arching focus: ‘what does the 
agenda-setting process look like during the 2015 general election campaign?’ This chapter 
focuses specifically on research questions (RQ1) How do power relationships between traditional 
news media producers and political elites function in the 2015 UK general election campaign, and 
how do they impact the agenda-setting process?; (RQ2) How do traditional news media producers 
and political parties attempt to successfully harness network power?; (RQ3) How are social and 
digital media integrated into traditional news media’s output, and how does this impact their 
power relationships with political elites? I aimed to find out precisely how social and digital media 
were integrated into the programme’s design, and what impact this had on Election 2015’s ability 
to set the news agenda. I also asked how the power relationships between the editor and journalists 
producing Election 2015 and the political parties were constituted and how they were impacted 
by the hybridity of practices within the media system (Chadwick, 2013).   
The findings discussed in this chapter continue the theme of insufficient integration of 
interactivity which had a negative outcome on the programme’s ability to use network power 
within social media networks. Social media and the integration of digital and legacy media logics 
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and practices was spoken about regularly by the professionals I interviewed. In contrast I observed 
a continuation of older media practices augmented by a small amount of specific, high-level, 
data67 from social media. Attempts at using network power were the result of inauthenticity of 
communication and therefore not fully realised.  The main difference between the Today 
programme and Election 2015’s case was that the latter did have a great deal more integration of 
media platforms. The level of control exercised over integration suggested that they wanted to 
limit the interactivity offered to their audience members and use macro-level data gleaned from 
social media to strengthen their framing of news stories, rather than encourage controlled 
interactivity by including social media users and their content in the programme or online 
conversations.  
The first key finding of this chapter is that despite an acceptance amongst journalists of 
the need to include social media as part of the programme’s output, and a recognition of the way 
in which it would strengthen their position in the agenda-setting network, there were discrepancies 
between this understanding and the actions taken. In the context of news media agenda-setting, I 
noted that the journalists working on Election 2015 were aware of their social media networks 
and the potential for them to harness the more influential members of those networks in order to 
promote their content. This shows understanding regarding methods of message control online 
and reflects a re-consideration of Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) two-step flow which I argue can 
form a key part of the news media agenda-setting process in an online space. As shown 
previously, if this is done successfully it has the potential to increase the news media agenda 
setting power of the media producer. However, whilst I expected to see action being taken on 
election night in order to achieve this, the action noted had limitations. 
The tension between what was discussed in the interviews pertaining to the use of social 
media and what happened in practice is the second key finding presented in this chapter, and fits 
the pattern established in the previous chapters. I found two uses of social media highlighted in 
the interviews and noted in the observations. Firstly, that there was a desire to include content 
                                                          
67 High-level data is defined as data about large numbers of users that has been aggregated, for example 
about location, general subject of tweets, total number of tweets about a topic etc. 
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produced on social networks, whether by the audience, by politicians, or other journalists, in the 
programme as a way of including the audience and other elite actors in the conversation. 
Secondly, the information that could be gleaned from social media from a higher level, for 
example geographic data such as the most popular topic of conversation in a given area of the 
country, could be used to illustrate the story. I found that despite informants speaking of both 
ways of using information from their social networks, only the second method was substantially 
included in the broadcast. It is important to note that while the journalists interviewed emphasised 
that what they offered was a substantive way of involving their audience, and that there was room 
for improvement; what their actions actually achieved was to allow the team to incorporate 
selected information that would help them to tell their story. 
Therefore, a third key finding from this analysis regards the inclusion of Twitter and 
Facebook. The data presented by the two companies played a crucial role in allowing the editors 
and presenters to strengthen their narrative or to move the story on in line with their own agenda. 
In Election 2015 established cultural norms and practices were retained and traditional 
newsgathering logics remained in place, but these were augmented by selected digital practices. 
Prior to results night, the programme team seemed poised to use their network power in order to 
further the goals of the programme, but in observations and analysis of the programme support 
was not clear. Social media allowed the programme to tell parts of the story in new ways, but the 
2015 general election did not mark a change or an increase in the social media-related production 
practices used. Instead Election 2015 was characterised by continuity of previous news media 
agenda setting practices and functions, including continuity in hierarchical power relationships 
with other actor groups. 
 
7.2. Case Study: Why Election 2015? 
 
I chose to study Election 2015 as an example of an election night results programme, which is the 
climax of the televised election campaign. A programme of this type is qualitatively different to 
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a regular broadcast such as Today. Observing the preparations for, and decisions behind, the news-
making practices which enabled reporting on election night gave me further insights into the 
impact of media convergence and the hybridisation of platforms and media logics. ITV News also 
has a broader audience, both demographically and numerically, than the Today programme - 
although Election 2015 was targeting a niche audience. 
Election 2015 was ITV News’ election results night programme, and the editor Alex 
Chandler drew upon his experience as an editor of other news programmes to develop the 
broadcast. I was interested in the ways in which the broadcast and digital teams creating the 
programme drew on their experience under business-as-usual reporting and past election 
programmes and applied this to the creation of a one-off programme. Chandler stated a desire to 
take a more innovative approach to telling the story of the election compared to ITV News’ 
previous approaches. The team also set the goal of standing out from their competitors in 2015 
by breaking news first. Chandler headed up a large team comprising a variety of workstreams 
including newsgathering, social media and digital, graphics, and technology. The team expanded 
over the five month period in which I observed them. The team held three rehearsals which also 
expanded in scope over time. Some of the key changes that Chandler and his team made to the 
programme, as compared to 2010, included incorporating specific technological developments 
and having a second on-air space – the Opinion Room – in which analysts and guests gathered to 
give their views on the events of the night. Particularly notable is the inclusion of analysts from 
Facebook and Twitter who used aggregated data from their websites to simultaneously illustrate 
the story being told and bolster the on-air conversation. 
 One limitation that must be addressed is the fact that setting the agenda when the story 
boundaries are so narrow is a difficult thing to do, especially on an election results night when the 
majority of media outlets are reporting on the same event. There tends to be little in the way of 
differing interpretations and challenges to the news media agenda in election results reporting. I 
did expect, as did most journalists, politicians, and staffers I interviewed, that the election results 
might lead to coalition negotiations, in which case there may have been more contestation over 
the framing of the results. However, the key stories that emerged were indisputable on the night 
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of 7 May 2015. Most prominently was the shock of the exit poll, which showed a clear majority 
for the Conservative Party and not the hung parliament predicted throughout the campaign. The 
news team had to be reactive to this and recalibrate their approach. Entire set pieces developed 
especially for the programme, such as the coalition calculator, were not used as a result. Other 
key stories include the huge victory for the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) and a great loss for 
the Liberal Democrats. It was therefore important to observe and understand how Election 2015 
told these stories and the mechanisms through which they attempted to direct the news agenda. 
 
7.3. Integrating Digital and Legacy News Practices: Being the First to tell the Story 
 
The market is increasingly competitive when it comes to the providers of opinion and 
content … How you stand out and how you prioritise content over and above other people 
is a challenge for anybody who’s in the business of providing content and making content, 
and making it relevant to the right sorts of people who are out there is part of the challenge 
that we all face now. (Alex Chandler, interview 4, July 2015) 
 
This opening quotation is taken from my final interview with the programme’s Editor in 
July 2015. It summarises one of the main challenges for a programme such as Election 2015: how 
to make your content and story stand out amongst the content of so many different producers. 
Furthermore, the suggestion that it needs to be tailored to the “right sorts of people”, implies that 
creating content for a specific target audience – whether that includes influencers or ordinary 
audience members – is an important part of enabling their story to travel. It is also an implicit 
recognition of the need to meet communication standards in order for the content to be shared 
widely. This is relevant in the context of a re-conceptualisation of two-step flow (Katz and 
Lazarsfeld, 1955) in a media system incorporating social media networks. Capturing an audience 
of influential users with networks has the potential to increase the reach of content and, by 
association, its salience within the news media agenda. Chandler recognised that the interaction 
undertaken by audiences online is mostly done in their own social networks and is less likely to 
be achieved between broadcaster and audience member. However, he was also aware of the 
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potential for the broadcaster to tap into those networks and use the inherent power there to invoke 
a two-step flow of information dissemination between the audience and their personal networks.  
In our second interview in March 2015 Chandler stated that: 
 
Being first is one of the things that helps you to stand out from the crowd and if we are 
able to deliver key bits of content ahead of our competitors then I’m hoping that that will 
get pick up elsewhere on social media, and our output and our name and the 
characteristics of the programme will be clear, and will be shared, and will be making an 
impact, beyond simply viewers at home. (Alex Chandler, interview 2, March 2015) 
 
In this quote, Chandler sets out how he hoped Election 2015 would reach groups other than the 
viewing audience, potentially the social media influencers and political elites that the programme 
was hoping to engage with. The desire to include social media content in the programme was 
motivated not only by the interactivity it offered to the audience, but also by the benefits the 
programme would receive. Chandler spoke early on, in our first interview in November 2014, 
about the potential contributions of the audience and how they could impact the programme if 
utilised: 
  
They may be sharing some really interesting conclusions about what they are seeing, 
which I think can then stimulate the conversation elsewhere within the programme, and 
if that happens you start to get a virtuous circle of people who are posting stuff that we’re 
picking up and their picking up what we’re talking about and its genuinely having a bit 
more of a sophisticated conversation than the presenter and a party politician having a 
row about whether the exit poll was right. (Alex Chandler, interview 1, November 2014) 
 
In this way the programme’s output could become embedded in conversations on social media 
and hence their news lines could gain traction. As stated above, Chandler had hoped that the 
“right” people would become engaged in conversation on social media around Election 2015, this 
statement provides support for the idea that the programme wanted to create arenas of interactivity 
with the audience, but specifically wanted to engage with influencers online. One way of doing 
this, according to the Editor, was to work towards creating a “virtuous circle” of discussion with 
social media users. He described the basis of how Twitter works, the creation and sharing of 
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information leading to conversations. Had Election 2015 achieved this, they would have met an 
important standard in communication for Twitter interaction. They did not achieve this, as 
discussed below, and their interactions in fact demonstrate a continuation of hierarchical power 
relationships. This leads to the conclusion that within the news production process, and within 
contemporary news media agenda-setting, legacy practices continued to dominate, despite the 
hybridity inherent in the UK’s media system.  
 Setting the news agenda first is a key way to increase impact as a content producer. When 
devising Election 2015, telling the story first was a significant goal for the programme team. As 
a broadcaster vying for audience share with the BBC, Channel 4, and Sky News, ITV needed a 
selling point, and it was decided that speed would be the feature to set them apart. For Election 
2015, being first to tell the story amounted to declaring the constituency results first. Chandler 
believed that achieving this would allow the programme to make a potential news media agenda-
setting impact. It should be noted that whilst Election 2015 was successful in calling seat results 
first, their focus on speed did result in one seat - Warwickshire North - being called incorrectly 
by the anchor. Overall, however, according to Chandler, the stringer68 network “delivered results 
[first] in 75% of the constituencies so that was an achievement” (Alex Chandler, interview 4, July 
2015). 
Election 2015 wanted to set itself apart from its competitors by being first to deliver the 
constituency results, an act that could potentially ensure a top position in the news media agenda-
setting process as other news producers may look to them for information. In order to achieve 
this, the team took actions combining legacy and digital media logics, as well as incorporating 
new technology. This particular goal was consistent with ITV News’ goals under business-as-
usual production, as Mills confirmed in our first interview in October 2015: “We pride ourselves 
on putting a story up and getting it tweeted out before most other news organisations have even 
put out the tweet in the first place” (Jason Mills, interview 1, October 2015). During my time with 
                                                          
68 Stringers are typically freelance journalists who are hired by a company when their employees will be 
unable to cover a news story or reach the location in time. In the context of an election, a large number of 
stringers is necessary to be at local counts. 
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the team I was able to observe the practices they engaged in as they prepared for newsgathering 
and dissemination on 8 May 2015. In terms of technology incorporated, Chandler spoke about a 
new process which allowed reporters in regional or constituency hubs to text updates to a central 
area (Alex Chandler, interview 3, April 2015). This worked alongside the automatic simultaneous 
dissemination of results across many different platforms, which not only helped the programme 
in their pursuit of speed, but enabled their lines to reach as many people as possible. 
In addition to being first with the results the programme team also had to be reactive once 
the unexpected results of the exit poll had been released. This was an event which had an impact 
on the news media agenda-setting process across a UK news media who were mostly expecting 
to report a close race resulting in coalition formation. Election results programmes are in the 
irregular position of telling a news story that breaks slowly over a large time period but which is 
unlikely to be dynamic for large swathes of the night. In the event, the exit poll did provide an 
energetic start to the night as their results were entirely unexpected and – within the newsroom 
where I was present – seemingly disbelieved. The programme team of Election 2015 therefore 
constructed content more pragmatically than planned, with Chandler telling me that they 
“changed the direction of the narrative that we thought we were going to be dealing with” (Alex 
Chandler, interview 4, July 2015).  
In answer to research question 369, a connected observation I made in the build up to 7 
May 2015 was that, whilst pragmatism was called for on the night, this particular approach had 
been prepared for in terms of crossing the boundaries of media. It was clear during observations 
that the team aimed to be pragmatic with their use of a variety of media platforms to tell the story. 
For example, the online team’s integration into the news team was particularly beneficial as they 
could quickly create short videos from the broadcast to share on social media and itv.com/news. 
By recognising in the planning stages that the stories of the night may not be particularly dynamic, 
and deciding not to try and present them as such, Chandler and the programme team focussed on 
                                                          
69 How are social and digital media integrated into traditional media’s output, and how does this impact 
their power relationships with political elites? 
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creating space for analysis and explanation within the show. They incorporated practices which 
would allow them to tell the story first and offer a different approach to their competitors.  
When asked if they felt they had played a role in the agenda-setting process on results 
night, and indeed throughout the campaign, both Chandler and Mills were positive about ITV 
News’ place. Chandler believe that the joined up coverage they provided across media platforms, 
and across programmes as the story moved into 8 May 2015, gave the programme persistence and 
pervasiveness and  allowed the news producer to play an important agenda-setting role. Mills 
shared this opinion: “We spent a lot of time at least helping set the agenda. If you think about how 
the first leaders’ debate massively set the agenda, and that was an ITV event” (Jason Mills, 
interview 2, 25 June 2015). However I argue that this is not correct. Claiming influence for ITV 
media events like the leaders’ debate on the basis of hosting does not equate with setting the news 
agenda after that event. This may indicate a lack of clarity in their understanding of news agendas. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the leaders’ debate had many different competing agendas. The fact 
that ITV hosted the event was not, in itself, a reason that they did or did not set the news media 
agenda. Nevertheless, overall in terms of evidence gathered during my observations and analysis 
of the programme it can be argued that they were successful at achieving their goal to be first with 
the story on election night thanks to the integrated media logics and technologies that they utilised. 
For Election 2015 ITV News’ integrated approach to digital and legacy practices included 
newsgathering in targeted areas that would help to tell the stories that were expected, the use of a 
database to manage seat and constituency information, and the role of the stringer network, who 
were crucial in getting the story out first. These were complimented by digital practices, such as 
reporting live on the ITV News website, streaming the programme live on YouTube, having a 
physical presence from social media networks in the opinion room, promoting the programme 
across social media networks, sourcing information from online spaces, and using new 
technologies to improve communications. Despite the success described above, the extent of this 
integration in terms of pushing boundaries was limited. It can be argued that the interactivity 
afforded to the audience was insufficient. However the way in which social media was used did 
augment a traditional journalistic practice; it enabled them to strengthen their narrative and agenda 
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by sourcing supportive information from digital spaces which provided constituted new 
information in the news cycle. 
 
7.4. The Two Functions of Social Media 
 
Despite early indications that interactivity would play a large role Election 2015, on 
results night the programme had a very limited reciprocal engagement with its audience on 
Facebook and Twitter. With the exception of the Facebook Q&A sessions, hosted by people who 
were guests on the programme, there were only a few calls for the audience to “get involved” 
online. No audience tweets were used in the programme, and all references to data from Facebook 
and Twitter involved curation and interpretation. This meant that data from social media could be 
used as evidence to support Election 2015’s framing of the results, information created by the 
audience was not used to give a platform to different viewpoints. This raises the question of what 
the team deem to be “artificial” engagement. When I started this research I expected to find 
evidence of relational power structures, and horizontal networks, but observing and interviewing 
journalists working on Election 2015 demonstrates that while they believe power to be more fluid 
and networks to be more horizontal than in the past, their continued ties to legacy news-making 
practices negates the attempts at engaging with their audience and the content they can create. In 
fact, the programme simply used its boundary-drawing power to create logics allowing it to sit 
across platforms and disseminate its news lines.  
 
7.4.1. Tensions between beliefs and action about the uses of social media  
 
[Social media] has changed the way that journalists discover stories, it’s changed the 
speed at which stories develop, and it’s changed the number of different people who can 
input into the story. (Jason Mills, interview 1, October 2014)  
 
During my first observation with the team on 8 January 2015, in which I attended a 
meeting held between Chandler and Mills to discuss the role of digital media, I noted that 
Facebook and, later on, Twitter were to be included for two main reasons. The first of these was 
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to use information from social media to spark the discussion offline, the second was its merits as 
a source of demographic data70 to be drilled down into to provide information or context to a 
story. These are two very different reasons for including information from social media. The first 
suggests that information produced by the programme’s audience and wider social networks 
would – to some extent – direct and support discussion on the programme. This is an important 
use of network power which would enable the programme to exact alternate or new information 
to be included in the political information cycle, and potentially alter or set news agendas.  
The second reason suggests that the amalgamated information available from social 
media would be used to provide evidence for the stories already being told, strengthening the 
message coming from the broadcast but not the messages being promoted on other platforms. 
There is a key difference relating to this between what I noted in the interviews and observed 
during my fieldwork. In the interviews the Editor and Digital Director quite often spoke about 
engaging with the audience through social media, and incorporating social media output into the 
fabric of the programme. However, during observations I noted the way in which this data would 
be used was discussed more “realistically”, as a way in which a story could be told, supported, or 
strengthened. 
Chandler expressed a concern about the way that broadcast journalists sometimes use 
social media in their news productions and stressed how he not only wished to avoid this, but 
actively carve out a role for social media content within the broadcast programme:  
 
I think the danger is sometimes with broadcasters you think “oh god I’ve got to do 
something with social media, I’ve got to do something about online” and it becomes 
something that’s stuck on rather than part of the fabric of the programme.” (Alex 
Chandler, interview 1, November 2014) 
 
Therefore, one of the programme’s aims was the incorporation of social media into Election 2015 
to encourage interaction and provide a different viewpoint. Yet, the extent to which this happened 
                                                          
70 Described during the meeting as the ability to pinpoint what different groups of people (age, gender 
etc.) were discussing in different geographical locations at any given moment. 
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was somewhat limited. This is similar to beliefs and aims expressed by Today and is reflective of 
changes in the wider journalism industry, where the relationship between social and other media 
is symbiotic. Jim Waterson, Deputy Editor of BuzzFeed UK, provided support for this in his first 
interview: “We spend our entire time trying to create things that you will share on Facebook or 
Twitter. If you aren’t sharing it on Facebook or Twitter then we aren’t getting any traffic” (Jim 
Waterson, interview 1, October 2014).  
This factor was considered early on in the design phase of the programme. The team 
expressed the desire to have a mechanism in place for audience members to get in touch with their 
own questions, specifically through hosting a series of Facebook Q&As. This idea was further 
developed through discussions with representatives of the Facebook and Twitter companies 
regarding their incorporation into the Opinion Room. These discussions focussed upon what data 
the social media companies would be able to provide during the programme and what it would 
look like on screen, but also covered topics such as how the zone for each company would be 
branded within the Opinion Room.  
The approach to social media was therefore built around two separate methods but the 
implementation of these was demonstrated a large degree of variation between the two. 
Throughout interviews prior to the election it appeared that from the editor’s viewpoint social 
media were a reciprocal medium: “there’s a whole online group of people who will be monitoring, 
filtering, and making some editorial decisions about what social media bleeds into the programme 
on air, and how that happens. And what of our programme gets onto social media” (Alex 
Chandler, interview 1, November 2014). However this was something of a balancing act for the 
programme team: “we want to try and, without giving overweight to what people are sharing and 
posting online, what they’re talking about on social media, we want to make sure that we tap into 
what the atmosphere and what the mood is out there” (Alex Chandler, interview 1, November 
2014). The interviews with Chandler therefore demonstrate a desire for the integration of social 
media into the broadcast. However, I observed that very little content from social media was 
included in the broadcast, with focus instead falling on statistical information and demographic 
data which illustrated the story being told.  
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In terms of the new media agenda setting process, this approach did not meet the criteria 
established. In answer to research question 271, the reality of the programme’s engagement with 
social media did not enable them to exert power over the news media agenda via networks. They 
did not release a substantial amount of content with the intent to interact with their audience. 
Although their content did meet the standard of predictability, had the reciprocal relationships 
been a key part of content creation then message control and direction online may have been 
stronger. This may have allowed the programme to release a greater amount of information which 
impacted the political information cycle. Such action would have constituted the standards of 
spontaneity and immediacy, and their interactions may have been authentic instead of the 
inauthenticity which occurred in the Opinion Room, discussed below. 
Chandler spoke about the positive aspects of working across boundaries. The discussion 
of an event or the use of a specific frame on the programme, either in the studio or in the Opinion 
Room, followed by Opinion Room guests tweeting or posting on Facebook, made it possible to 
extend that aspect of a story beyond the spatial and temporal boundaries of the broadcast: “So 
there’s an interaction going on that we’ve picked up on and broadcast but then it carries on and 
continues to deliver online” (Alex Chandler, interview 2, March 2015). The positive impact of 
this for the programme’s role in the news media agenda-setting process is that, if this were 
successful, it would give Election 2015’s stories more salience and increase their longevity within 
discussion amongst influencers and non-influencers. This is also pertinent because it demonstrates 
the belief in the need to exercise of boundary-drawing power and create content that can travel 
well across platforms, potentially allowing the programme to lead conversations about the 
election in a wider variety or spaces. 
 Another advantage of encouraging interactivity within the broadcast and online output is 
the way in which the output can be used to strengthen the programme’s narrative. The programme 
could choose whether or not to incorporate audience discussions online directed at or about the 
                                                          
71 How do news media producers and political parties attempt to successfully harness network power? 
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programme. The niche audience watching were seen, at least initially, as almost akin to analysts. 
Chandler spoke about members of the audience who might be dual-screening:  
 
They’re watching the results but they’re also commenting on them. Now I think capturing 
some of that will be really interesting, simply because we know that our audience is not 
representative of a mainstream regular, primetime audience. It is there to serve a purpose, 
and actually the depth of opinion and critique that you’ll get from people who are engaged 
by the nature of it being an election programme will be a benefit rather than a 
disadvantage. (Alex Chandler, interview 1, November 2014) 
 
 Furthermore, when discussing the content that publics can generate, the editor spoke quite 
clearly about how such actions fit into the media ecology:  
 
Just being in the right place at the right time with a camera phone doesn’t make you a 
journalist – it makes you a very useful feature of what our modern media world is, because 
the more opportunities to capture images makes it much easier to tell different stories. 
(Alex Chandler, interview 1, November 2014) 
 
That is to say that, whilst contributions are recognised, they are more of a tool – a “useful feature” 
– for journalists to tell the stories in greater detail, rather than allowing a non-professional to tell 
their own story. Picking out the content produced by audiences, whether tweets, Facebook 
comments, or media content that the audience have produced, aids the story-telling function of 
the programme. Therefore I can ascertain that interactive features were used as a way to direct 
the audience’s attention to ITV News’ coverage, and also were an attempt to encourage them to 
share this amongst their online and offline networks. 
In addition to using social media in the broadcast, the programme team wanted to deliver 
their content seamlessly across multiple platforms, and it was able to do this by harnessing online 
tools, although digital content remained driven by the primary broadcast. During my observation 
of a rehearsal on 17 March 2015 I witnessed discussions around how tweets would be shown on 
screen, and how the presenter – Tom Bradby – would view them and highlight them to viewers. 
At a follow-up observation on 19 March 2015 I was privy to discussions around the types of 
tweets which would be shown and the importance of an editorial bar being in place to ensure 
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consistency and relevancy; tweets from influential actors, political elites, journalists and 
commentators were preferred. Additionally, the decision to include a ‘Twitter mirror’72 in the 
Opinion Room enabled the commentators and guests to record statements and immediately tweet 
these directly from the studio. 
During rehearsals it was decided that Bradby would have a screen in front of him showing 
tweets, and that it would be up to him to highlight these for the audience. An editorial process 
was put in place whereby tweets would be read out and put into context by Bradby so that they 
made sense to the audience. Concerns were expressed during the workstream meetings that it may 
not be easy for the broadcast’s audience to understand tweets out of context. Therefore, it was 
stated during rehearsals that whilst the Opinion Room would be able to look at whole 
conversations, Bradby would only see one tweet at a time relevant to the on-air conversation and 
deemed to be adding something to the discussion. The programme team were planning to curate 
information from social media users and act as a gatekeeper highlighting social media content 
related only to the show’s stories, and contextualised by the presenter. The impact of this for the 
story told would be that different news lines may be unlikely to be presented, or they could be 
used to challenge guests on-air.  
In our interviews the editor emphasised the reciprocal relationship that Election 2015 
could have with its audience on social media platforms. Specifically social media was both a way 
of sharing information and a source of information, and both those things would benefit the 
programme by increasing the salience of their narratives. Despite Chandler’s positive view 
regarding engagement with the audience on Twitter and Facebook, he spoke about how he wanted 
to avoid giving a platform to “meaningless and uninformed or ill-informed opinion” (Alex 
Chandler, interview 1, November 2014). He went on to state that “We know that there are lots of 
people out there who have a really in-depth connection to politics … we will be looking for those 
people particularly and to see what trends there are.” Therefore, the editor expected that the 
programme would be sourcing from social media very much as it sourced from other areas: with 
                                                          
72 Twitter Mirror is a tablet computer that allows users to record a video or take a photo and approve it 
before tweeting it. 
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a focus on elites, and through the curation of political information. This clearly demonstrates a 
continuation of legacy practices, simply transposed to a digital space. Indeed, on election results 
night, the information used fitted the agenda that the programme wanted to put forwards. 
This can be illustrated with an example of story-telling on the programme regarding the 
Scottish National Party’s polling success. This topic dominated conversation on the broadcast 
between 0200 and 0400. Looking at a 20-minute segment of the programme focussing on the 
Scotland story, from 0235 to 0255, demonstrates how social media information was used in 
comparison to elite and expert sources, and deductions regarding the meaning for the news media 
agenda setting process can be made. Beginning this section, Bradby engaged the two academic 
experts present in the studio, Jane Green and Colin Rallings, in a discussion about the SNP, the 
reasons behind their success, and the probability of them winning all Scottish constituencies. The 
action then moved to the Opinion Room, where Adam Sharp, then Head of News and Politics at 
Twitter, highlighted two pieces of data from the website. The first of these being that at that 
moment one-third of all tweets related to the election were about the SNP, making them the most 
talked about party for the first time that night, and secondly that Nicola Sturgeon, who he 
introduced as an “active Twitter user”, was the biggest share of the conversation she had been 
since the Scottish leaders’ debate a week prior. Following the Opinion Room segment, Bradby 
then interviewed Nicola Sturgeon live from her location in Glasgow, focussing on her 
interpretation of the results and what role the SNP might play in Westminster.  
Only two tweets were actually shared on screen and discussed by the presenter and 
analysts in the main news room. This was lamented by Chandler when we spoke after the election: 
 
The first [tweet] … where Nicola Sturgeon said “looks like it’s going to be a good night 
but it’s far too early to tell,” it was that sort of level of discourse we were anticipating 
much more of, and actually, from the major political players, it didn’t really deliver. So 
that was a surprise. And in part a disappointment because we had wanted to make that 
aspect of the election on social media very much part of the fabric of the programme. 
(Alex Chandler, interview 4, July 2015) 
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The disappointment expressed by the editor in our final interview suggests that he wanted to 
incorporate more content from social media, but specifically from political elites. He places the 
blame for the lack of political tweets with the candidates and parties. My observations prior to 
election night had pointed towards the inclusion of citizen tweets in the programme, of which 
there were thousands available. Chandler’s consternation at the low level of discourse amongst 
political elites demonstrates the continued hierarchy through the practice of reliance on political 
parties as the only news sources in this context.  
In the same interview he went on to state that: 
 
As it happened, because we had Twitter in the Opinion Room, we were able to do 
different things with the interactivity of social media and capture what was being shared, 
but at a lower level, more in volume terms rather than individual bits of content. (Alex 
Chandler, interview 4, July 2015) 
 
Whilst this statement paints a picture of the team taking a pragmatic approach, the use of data 
from Twitter and Facebook at a “higher level”, such as using demographic data to discuss how 
many people in Sunderland were talking about UKIP, was a core part of the strategy throughout 
the planning stages. Although the programme team did expect a larger volume of individual 
tweets to be used, discussion around the incorporation of macro-level data was planned for. 
Therefore, despite the disappointment levelled at the number of tweets shown on screen in the 
programme, the actual methods of using social media data demonstrated the execution of the plans 
the programme had made during their preparation.   
As discussed above, to add to disappointment over the Twitter output of political elites 
Chandler further lamented that “There wasn’t any of that sort of posting on social media networks 
[by MPs and candidates] of the sorts of content that you might have anticipated there being. So 
that was a surprise I suppose in a way.” (Alex Chandler, interview 4, July 2015). Nevertheless, 
Chandler was pleased with the contributions made by the analysts from Twitter and Facebook to 
the Opinion Room “The social media connection, watching what was going on with volumes, and 
traffics, and peaks, and interesting areas was an opportunity to really connect with those people” 
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(Alex Chandler, interview 4, July 2015). Therefore, even though the level of interactivity was not 
what the Editor had outlined in our earlier interviews, the inclusion of data at an aggregate level 
helped the programme to tell the story and deliver a more superficial level of interactivity.  For 
example, during my observation periods I noted that it was felt that the Twitter analyst would be 
able to offer the tracking of moments and how they developed, instant reaction, changes in the 
conversation (and also pinpoint the moment at which the conversation changed), and how the 
conversation continued. This was not provided.  
This is an example of commodification on the part of a news producer. Whilst some 
interaction was managed through Twitter and Facebook, both social networks were used as push 
mediums statistical information taken from them was used to tell the story that the media 
organisation wished to tell. As Chandler stated, citizens are a “useful feature” of social media. 
Using data in this way, without meeting the communication standards of the platforms and using 
network power means that the relationship is not reciprocal, it is hierarchical. Message control 
strategies are being used which do not meet communication standards and therefore do not meet 
criteria outlined in the theory of controlled interactivity. 
 
7.4.2. Insufficient Interactivity: ‘Othering’ social media in the Opinion Room 
 
The desire to include some element of interactivity in the programme had a number of 
different incentives, including – as outlined above – utilising digital media as a tool to aid 
reporting. However, there were two sides of the coin in relation to how social media could help 
the programme reach their potential audience. Chandler told me that creating a programme that 
offered something different, and some level of interactivity, was important in attracting an 
audience. Nevertheless, it is important to note that in the course of my observations at ITV there 
was a tension between how the programme team spoke about using Facebook data, and how it in 
fact came to be used. From a focus on interactivity, there was a shift to the ability to tap into 
aggregate data as a way of telling the story on the night. This gap between belief, statement, and 
action was also observed at Today suggesting that in 2015 there may have been a common 
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disconnection between what journalists believed social media could offer and how it was actually 
used.  
Having spoken about the insufficient interactivity offered by Today in the previous 
chapter, I draw similar conclusions through analysing the reasons underpinning engagement on 
social media by Election 2015. In our first interview, Chandler stated that: 
 
I think being honest and open about what the offering [on social media] is and what the 
likely outcome is going to be is important so that you’re not artificially getting people to 
engage with you, or the engagement only really being one way. (Alex Chandler, interview 
1, November 2014) 
 
Therefore, as at the Today programme, there was concern around what constitutes authentic 
engagement on social media. Chandler’s use of the word “artificially” suggests that some ways 
of encouraging interaction between the audience and the programme create a false interaction, 
perhaps less meaningful or realistic than either actor would want it to be. There is also concern 
with ensuring that the interaction is not artificial, that it is perhaps an organic process. This could 
also be an implicit recognition of, and desire to avoid, the process of commodification of citizens’ 
action or content. But by the nature of the power relationship between media organization and 
audience, engagement will almost always be orchestrated – controlled or commodifed. The action 
to take for news media agenda setting is to ensure that the content output meets communication 
standards, enabling journalists to produce communications which are perceived as authentic and 
thereby utilise their network power.  
Chandler stated specific expectations regarding how Election 2015’s audience would 
behave on social media platforms and recognised that the programme would benefit if an 
interactive relationship was created with the audience, however I found that the level of 
interactivity offered was insufficient in enabling the programme to set the news agenda across 
digital platforms. When speaking about what he expected to see online on election results night, 
Chandler stated that “People will be sharing, talking, contributing, a lot of stuff and we need to 
be aware of that and find ways of incorporating that both in our online offering but on the 
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programme too” (Alex Chandler, interview 1, November 2014). By incorporating information 
from their social networks and audience, and through promotion of Election 2015’s content by 
those online networks their agenda-setting function may have been stronger. Their networks 
would have been encouraged to share the information as well as providing new information to be 
used in the creation and promotion of content. 
My reading of existing literature has demonstrated that the contemporary agenda-setting 
process is reliant upon networks of producers and consumers in a hybrid media system.  For 
example, Lilleker and Jackson (2011: 25) demonstrate that “while the social units may be 
fragmented over space and time, they operate within an ecosystem that relies upon participation 
and connectedness.” Statements made in my interviews with Chandler support this notion. He 
claimed that people’s opinions as shared on social media, and the content they might create, would 
play an important part in the campaign and, thus, in the coverage. This supports the level of 
importance ascribed to the use of network proliferation in the relationship structures that exist 
between media producers and their audiences in the news media agenda-setting process. 
However, evidence for this was not found in relation to Election 2015. 
The journalists also expected that political party information creation and dissemination 
would be impacted by social media. Chandler reflected on the myriad ways information can be 
released by parties during a campaign by describing the difference between past campaigns and 
his expectations regarding the speed of information dissemination in 2015. Critically he 
considered how this would impact the power relationship between journalists at ITV and political 
parties. He specifically emphasised that the abundance and intensity of information could in fact 
encourage journalists to critique communications more strongly and efficiently, something also 
raised by Jamie Angus at Today and discussed in the previous chapter: 
 
I actually think the speed has the potential to deliver much more critical journalism than 
just putting stuff out as and when it arrives [in press releases]. It encourages you to ask 
questions immediately, rather than waiting for other people to ask questions first. (Alex 
Chandler, interview 1, November 2014) 
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Again, this is the belief that social and digital media affordances, in this specific case the 
speed with which information can be shared, would allow journalists to challenge party news 
agendas at an increased pace. When discussing his opinion of parties’ power in the agenda-setting 
process during the impending election campaign, Chandler was initially quite clear that he 
believed it to be limited, telling me that he “think[s] our experience is that politicians always want 
to set the agenda and they rarely manage to do it” (Alex Chandler, interview 1, November 2014). 
He linked this to the fast-paced contemporary media environment containing more platforms and 
sources, meaning that it is easier for the messages of political parties to be challenged or deflected. 
Mills echoed this optimism prior to the campaign, stressing the importance of media 
fragmentation and greater opportunities for consumers in allowing other narratives to be heard:  
 
The old days of dominance of a few media players in a wider landscape has gone. I think 
the quicker legacy organisations realise that, that the narrative we think is not the only 
narrative, there are all sorts of conversations going on the whole time … We should 
embrace that and say that’s fantastic, that the narrative is what people decide what they 
want it to be really. (Jason Mills, interview 1, October 2014) 
 
However, in practice in the UK general election campaign of 2015, this was not the case. Political 
parties ran very tightly-controlled campaigns, the most salient stories reflected the output of 
parties, as well as stories from the polling organizations. There were no instances of party 
narratives being successfully derailed through the use of newer media or citizen journalism, 
although some stories did start on social media, such as the Milifandom73 . Citizen-users’ reactions 
on Twitter to campaign events and news reports often constituted stories in their own right: “If an 
event happens on Twitter it’s as real as if it happened in real life” (Jim Waterson, interview 1, 
October 2014). 
That there was a dearth of tweets from high-profile figures available for Election 2015 to 
use demonstrates the continuation of hierarchical power relationships, as established in previous 
                                                          
73 Hills (2015) describes #milifandom’s journey from Twitter to national media: “The hashtag 
#Milifandom was reinvigorated by 17-year-old Abby Tomlinson during the campaign, taken up by 
Buzzfeed and conveyed into the wider media ecology.” 
253 
 
chapters. This was one way in which political parties maintained tight control of messages 
throughout the campaign and into results nights. Chandler does not fully explain why so few 
tweets were shown on-air and links it to the output of politicians themselves, which suggests that 
the programme’s focus on interactivity was very much concentrated upon their traditional sources, 
especially political elites. The use of citizens’ tweets or posts in the programme was never really 
considered, beyond the commodification described above. Therefore limiting newsgathering to 
their legacy sources reduced the ability of the programme to include a wider variety of voices in 
their story-telling and to strengthen their narrative by engaging with a broader range of actors.  
Additionally, there was tension between Chandler’s characterisation of and use of 
interactivity. For example, in our final interview he discussed the way in which social media was 
incorporated into the programme and stated that “It would feel more odd if you had done that 
whole thing ‘right now we’re going to turn a corner and go over to our social media area and dip 
our toes into what might be going on in this weird and wonderful world’” (Alex Chandler, 
Interview 4, November 2014). Yet Chandler’s statement describes exactly how information from 
social media was incorporated into the programme. Facebook and Twitter were given their own 
branded corners of the Opinion Room and their representatives were asked to share their data 
specifically, albeit in relation to the framing of the news story being told. They were effectively 
‘othered’, talking about what the conversation was like on their respective networks. Occasionally 
a link was made between presenter Nina Hussein’s discussion with the Facebook or Twitter 
representative and subsequent discussion with Opinion Room commentators (comprised of 
journalists, pollsters, and party representatives) but only once did a social media representative, 
Facebook’s Elizabeth Linder, then Government and Politics specialist, appear in conversation 
with other guests. That the information given by the social media companies was standalone in 
these ways did create the feeling of “let’s go see what happening on social media”, rather than 
fully incorporating it into the framing of the stories. 
For example, following the announcement of results from the Sunderland South 
constituency, Bradby discussed how the share in the UKIP vote had increased massively in that 
area, despite the party not winning the seat. Immediately after this, Hussein in the Opinion Room 
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discussed data given from the Facebook representative regarding the specific constituency (see 
Figure 7.1 below). The representative highlighted how: 
 
Within the constituency just called, 45% of that conversation dominated around UKIP. 
Now what’s really important to note is that these are the conversations that real people 
within the UK are having, in this constituency are having, at home, with their friends, out 
at restaurants with colleagues. This is not reflective of what the press is talking about, this 
is reflective of what the people are talking about. 
 
Hussein clarified, “We don’t know whether they’re talking positively or negatively, but we know 
they’re talking about UKIP.” This episode demonstrates how digital information is used as a 
source to strengthen the story told by the programme, in this case the story regarding the surge in 
votes for UKIP. Data from Facebook was aggregated and used to support this narrative. The 
language used pertaining to the audience should also be noted; they are ‘real people’, as opposed 
perhaps to the commentators and experts dissecting the election during the broadcast. There is 
also a dichotomy created by Hussein between “we” and “they”, which fits the way in which 
information from social media is othered and not used to advance the story, simply to support the 
narrative that the journalists are telling. 
 
Table 7.1. Screenshot of Facebook data regarding discussion in Sunderland South 
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Source: ITV News (2015r) 
 
The creation and inclusion of the Opinion Room is indicative of the goal to increase the 
programme’s presence on social media. The Opinion Room did play a role in facilitating 
discussion related to the programme and its output online. This was particularly notable in the 
response to the five Facebook Q&As held by commentators in the Opinion Room, which 
demonstrates some level of interaction offered to the audience, and in the use of ‘#opinionroom’ 
to enable the audience to participate in discussion, although no tweets using this hashtag were 
highlighted in the programme. The Opinion Room was a second space for the programme to 
deliver analysis from, and also was an attempt to mark the programme’s output as different to that 
of its competitors. However, although it had to potential to bring it to the attention of a wider 
demographic its role in increasing the programme’s reach through activating its audience’s social 
networks in this way was limited. This would have been an action that could have provided the 
programme with a wider reach and hence a stronger position in the news media agenda setting 
process had the programme integrated social media more fully. 
As with the journalists at Today, interviews with journalists at ITV News demonstrated a 
sustained belief in the importance of incorporating digital media into the programme’s content 
production. As at Today, the reality of this fell below expectations. Interviews with, and 
observations of, the programme team suggest that the journalists were interested in how they 
could use information from social media to contribute to the conversation. This is a central 
finding; interactivity with the audience to source a wider set of opinions or information to 
challenge party agendas, or to improve audience experience, are not the most desired outcomes. 
The application of information sourced online to tell the story is the most beneficial outcome for 
the programme as it strengthens the narrative and helps to increase the salience of their agenda.  
 
7.5. Conclusion 
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The Election 2015 programme team recognised the utility of integrating digital and legacy media 
logics and practices to tell a story effectively, and to make the most of a hybrid media system. 
However the creation and dissemination of content was characterised by a continuation of 
traditional news-making practices, hierarchical power relationships, and selectively using social 
media to enhance their news agendas. This limited form of interaction with citizens constituted 
commodification of citizen content to further the programme’s goals. Nevertheless, this 
combination did not help them to dominate the news agenda. I argue that by creating authentic 
engagement with their audiences via social media, constituting content that is spontaneous, 
immediate, and predictable and is also responsive to citizen-users, and incorporating more 
individualised social media content into the broadcast, it may have been possible for Election 
2015 to present a greater challenge to news agendas and political party lines on results night. 
 The programme team had two main approaches to social media, but only one of these 
played a substantial role in the broadcast. The first approach, spoken about at length in interviews, 
was the sourcing of political information from content produced by social media users, and 
including it in the broadcast – although in a mediated manner. The potential advantages of this 
would have been to strengthen the story being told, and to create a strong networked relationship 
with their audience who may then have shared the programme’s content more widely, resulting 
in increased salience for their news content. This did not happen, only two tweets were used in 
the programme. This may have been a result of the programme team’s focus on legacy sources 
combined with the political parties carefully managed media strategies. Throughout our 
interviews, the editor spoke about incorporating the “right sort” of social media content, and this 
narrow focus limited the team in what they could achieve regarding interactivity. Whilst there 
were calls for citizens to take part in the debate on social media using #opinionroom and by 
joining in the Facebook Q&As, this interactivity was insufficient to activate an agenda setting 
process by harnessing the network power inherent within social media networks.  
 The second approach to social media was more widely exercised. This focussed upon 
incorporating brief analyses of macro-level data into conversation in the Opinion Room. The 
analysis was presented by representatives of Facebook and Twitter. This data was used to 
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illustrate the news stories and helped the programme to strengthen their own agenda items. 
Throughout the pre-polling day interviews that I conducted with Chandler and Mills this function 
of social media was downplayed, although its role was evident during the observations and from 
analysis of the broadcast of Election 2015. This finding is important. It suggests that journalists 
recognise that platform boundaries should be crossed when creating programmes, and that to 
some extent audiences must be included. Yet, in practice the Election 2015 team limited their use 
of social media to be another source from which to add colour to the story or reinforce their news 
lines. Arguably this could result in a more virulent role for the programme in the news media 
agenda setting process. Nevertheless it is a limited interaction with citizen-users, represents 
commodification of their data, and highlights a continuation in hierarchical power structures, 
specifically those between journalists and their audience. It lacks the interaction with citizens that 
is needed to use network power and make headway in setting the news media agenda in the 
contemporary media system.  
 Election 2015 did undertake some re-drawing of media boundaries, integrating digital 
and legacy media practices such as the use of new technologies, and the automatic simultaneous 
dissemination of results across platforms. I argue that their focus would have been better spent on 
not just reporting the results quickly, but on harnessing a wider range of views from sources other 
than elites in order to unpick what was happening on a very surprising results night; challenging 
party agendas using social media to carve out their own space in the media ecology. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
This dissertation has examined the news media agenda setting process within the context of the 
2015 UK general election. I combined a thick descriptive account of information flows relating 
to two news events that occurred during the campaign with observations and data from interviews 
at two of the UK’s leading media organizations. This approach enabled me to describe the process 
of setting the news media agenda. I identified that it comprises a combination of networked and 
hierarchical power relationships, alongside newer and older media logics and practices. I also 
described and applied the characteristics of authentic communications on social media which, if 
met, enable actors to direct network power and set the news media agenda. The findings of this 
research therefore constitute a development in our understanding of news media agenda-setting 
as they introduce a dialectical view of power into a process in which researchers have typically 
only considered one function of power at a time.  
Additionally, the importance of the standards of spontaneity74, immediacy75, and 
predictability76 in creating authenticity of communication have been considered and shown to 
impact the role social media content can play in setting the news media agenda. Authenticity of 
communications are necessary for elite actors to the avoid commodification of citizen-users’ 
content and actions, and by extension to avoid challenges to – or subversion of – their agenda. To 
become a part of networked relationships an actor must appear authentic to other users by meeting 
the required communication standards of the network. I found that being perceived as inauthentic 
on social media makes explicit the attempts to use citizen-users’ content actions for campaigning 
or reporting. I conceptualised this finding as the commodification of citizen-users content and 
                                                          
74 Authentic communications appear to be unrehearsed, spontaneous responses to events or actors. 
75 Authentic communications are timely and contribute information to an event in a seemingly live 
manner. 
76 Authentic communications are predictable in that they contain the discursive features and technological 
protocols that users expect to see. 
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actions. I further identified evidence of the occurrence of commodification by distinguishing 
moments when citizen-users took action to subvert or challenge an elite agendas on social media. 
These findings advance our study of this subject by opening up new lines of enquiry regarding 
the role that authenticity plays in effective political communications.   
From a discussion of the existing literature, I grounded the conceptual framework in a 
number of key theories: Chadwick’s (2013) theory of the hybrid media system, Stromer-Galley’s 
(2014) controlled interactivity, and Enli’s (2015) conceptualisation of authenticity. A fourth 
central theory was Grewal’s (2008) network power. Chadwick (2013) introduces network power 
in relation to political communication; I extended this application by using this conceptualisation 
of power as a prism through which to view relationships between political elites, media elites, and 
citizens. I also assessed network power in conjunction with traditional, hierarchical power 
relationships in order to establish the role of each in agenda-setting. From these theories, six 
research questions were formulated: (1) How do power relationships between traditional news 
media producers and political elites function in the 2015 UK general election campaign, and how 
do they impact the agenda-setting process?; (2) How do traditional news media producers and 
political parties attempt to successfully harness network power?; (3) How are social and digital 
media integrated into traditional news media producers’ outputs, and how does this impact their 
power relationships with political elites?; (4) How are (i) information sourced from social media, 
and (ii) the technological affordances of social media incorporated into the process of setting the 
news media agenda?; (5) Do citizen-users of social media play any role, such as intervention in 
the information cycle, in the process of setting the agenda?; and (6) Do citizen-users of social 
media replicate or challenge agendas? 
A mix of qualitative methods were incorporated into the research design to answer these 
questions. The output of this methodology was of a thick descriptive analysis of two media events 
and two news programmes. I used an integrated analysis of the data77, for which I generated a 
number of different datasets. I began the analysis by the identifying the key themes and analytic 
                                                          
77 Integrated analysis involves the generation of a number of different datasets, followed by the 
identification of themes and analytic questions across the data. 
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questions which emerged across the data. These themes were the dialectical nature of power 
relationships, the use of strategies of message control on social media, tensions between citizens’ 
and elites’ use of social media, and tensions between journalists’ beliefs and actions taken to 
exercise control over the news media agenda setting process.  
 Firstly, analysis was undertaken on media texts pertaining to the first leaders’ debate of 
the election campaign. This generated a thick description of different agendas as they emerged 
over a 48-hour period. I described the ways in which different actors attempted to exercise control 
over their messages in order to impact the news agenda. Secondly, I applied this method to a 
specific news story, the allegations against Nicola Sturgeon made in a memorandum leaked from 
the Foreign Office. Focussing analysis on one news story allowed me to track the information 
flows in great detail and take a deep data approach78 (Salmons, 2016) to understanding both how 
this item impacted the news agenda and the efficacy of actions taken by different elite groups. 
The final two empirical chapters reported on interview and observational data from my 
time spent with BBC Radio 4’s Today programme and ITV News’ election night programme 
Election 2015, which was augmented by data from in-depth interviews with key actors. I provided 
a detailed account of practices and behaviours within the teams that enabled me to draw out 
important findings about the nature of intra-elite power and power relations that exist between 
elites and citizens. I also observed and assessed the actions taken to harness network power 
through their interactions on social media. 
This chapter outlines the main findings and contributions made by this dissertation. The 
findings show that the news media agenda setting process is highly complex and fluid. It consists 
of hybrid structures and hybrid media logics, including overlapping hierarchical and network 
power relations. In order to exercise control over messages to increase impact on the news agenda, 
elites must learn to balance these along with a number of other tensions which are outlined below. 
 
                                                          
78 A deep data approach requires a close analysis of qualitative data as opposed to systematic quantitative 
analysis of big data. 
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8.2. Main findings 
 
This dissertation examines the impact of online media and social networking sites on the process 
of setting the news media agenda during the 2015 United Kingdom general election. It specifically 
describes the structures of power relationships that exist between political elites, established 
media producers, and citizens in this process. The most important conceptual development to 
agenda-setting research is the description I provide of the integration of networked and 
hierarchical power used to exercise control over political information. This is an advancement of 
our understanding by considering the different forms that power can take in this process. My work 
is a departure from established work on agenda-setting, such as McCombs and Shaw (1972) and 
McCombs (2005), as although my findings show that hierarchical power remains central in the 
process, there are also strong indications that power in agenda-setting is increasingly fluid and 
hybrid, specifically comprising a networked element. Further, I found that if enacted correctly, 
network and hierarchical power can be used simultaneously by elite actors to augment their 
position in the news media agenda setting process.  
This work also contributes to literature on audience participation, extending and updating 
our knowledge of how and why audiences are incorporated into journalistic outputs. I extended 
the findings of studies which demonstrate how journalists view citizen-users of social media as a 
news source and retain their editorial control despite greater interaction with audiences, for 
example Williams, Wardle, and Wahl-Jorgenson (2011). However, I also extended this 
understanding by integrating it with evidence of elites’ attitudes towards citizen-users within the 
process of agenda-setting.  
My targeted application, focussing on a specific process, found a more nuanced and 
complicated relationship than previously expressed. Despite a widely-held belief amongst my 
informants that citizen-users of social media could be an active part of the agenda-setting through 
networked relationships, over and above simply being a news source, hierarchical power 
relationships remained central and interaction with citizen-users was peripheral. Therefore 
network power was a secondary structure to the primary hierarchical relationships. As a result, 
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my findings contradict some studies on the relationship between audience participation and 
agenda-setting. For example, Lee and Tandoc Jr. (2017) noted that “Meetings to plan a day’s 
news coverage usually begin with a discussion of trending topics on social media”. I saw no 
evidence of this in my observations of editorial or team meetings at Radio 4 or Election 2015.  
I initially asked (RQ1) how do power relationships between traditional news media 
producers and political elites function in the 2015 UK general election campaign, and how do 
they impact the agenda-setting process?  I found that the ultimate driving force was the interaction 
between media and political elites. However, in some instances the process of setting the news 
agenda required political and media elites to interact online through networks. This finding both 
supports existing literature and extends our knowledge of power in the news media agenda setting 
process.   
The most important contribution to the study of agenda setting were the instances I 
assessed in which political and media elites were required to harness network power in online 
social networks. Successfully using network power constituted sharing an authentic 
communication79 on a social networking site which could then be further disseminated amongst 
citizen-users’ networks or was reflected through the use of the same or similar discursive terms 
within the comments. Achieving this, in conjunction with established inter-elite power 
relationships, led to greater success for elite actors in message control and in the process of setting 
the news media agenda. For example in the case of the leaked memorandum, the SNP’s response 
successfully challenged and then set the news media agenda through the use of networked and 
traditional hierarchical interactions with citizens and the news media. Therefore, my findings 
extend our understanding of power in agenda-setting: it is not a one-way process incorporating a 
limited number of actor groups, but rather it can be multi-directional encompassing many 
different actors at different points in time. I argue it is most effective when it achieves this 
combination. 
                                                          
79 A communication on social media defined as meeting the standards of spontaneity, immediacy, and 
predictability. 
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This is an area which merits further investigation as my findings contradict studies that 
have found evidence of media agendas being led by user-generated content (UGC) (Jang et al., 
2017). Although this dissertation shows a role for citizen-users, my findings from interviews and 
observations are clear that power to set the news media agenda remained in the hands of elite 
actors. A reason for this contradiction is the context of these studies. Previous research has found 
the media agenda to be led by UGC during non-election periods. During a general election 
campaign the stakes are higher for political actors, as a resulted political parties’ tightened control 
over their information production and dissemination and journalists relied to a greater extent on 
expert and political sources. The difference in context therefore explains the difference in these 
findings, and new lines of enquiry concerning comparative research would be worthwhile to 
reconcile these. 
As stated above, evidence noted from observation and interview data demonstrated 
clearly that journalists and politicians expressed a desire to interact with citizens on social media. 
Interviewees wanted to engage with citizens online and become a part of their networks. This is 
in line with existing attitudinal studies which assess journalists’ beliefs about their audiences. For 
example, the findings that my elite informants wanted to engage with citizens through social 
media channels supports Heise et al. (2014).  
Taking this research to its logical next step, my research combines attitudinal findings 
with an analysis of the actions taken by journalists at BBC Radio 4 and ITV News. A critical 
finding emerges from the combination of these two analyses, which develops our understanding 
of this phenomenon; although media elites spoke of including audiences in content creation, in 
the 2015 election campaign citizen-users were side-lined in favour of traditional news-making 
practices. This is a departure from agenda-setting and audience participation research which has 
tended to find that information from citizen-users becomes a part of those news-making practices. 
In the analysis presented here, I found little evidence of user-generated content playing a role in 
newsgathering.  
Nevertheless, media and political elites did work to become a part of citizen-users’ 
networks on social media. This was for a number of reasons. Firstly, the journalists expressed the 
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belief that social media could be a source of alternate information for them, as was often opined 
at both the BBC and ITV. Novelty in this finding comes from uncovering beliefs about the use to 
which information from citizen-users could be put within the news media agenda setting process. 
Drawing on a wider array of information from social networks was viewed by journalists as a 
way to challenge the news agendas of other elite actors. Secondly, elites wanted to engage with 
citizens on social media to direct their actions in support of the elite actor’s agenda. This study 
therefore highlights that elite actors recognise the existence of network power and its value to 
them in controlling their messages online.  
The role of network power on social media is a new but growing area of research. The 
findings outlined here develop knowledge from work produced so far which has been 
predominantly based on quantitative methods. My use of qualitative methods contributes a 
behavioural dimension to the current picture of network power. D’heer and Verdegem’s (2014) 
study of relations between Twitter and mainstream media found similar structures to those 
outlined in this dissertation using quantitative and network analysis. My work extends their 
conclusions further following their recommendation that “in-depth interviews could reveal how 
the different agent types perceive these structures” (ibid., 731). I found that elites perceived 
network structures as inherently useful to them, particularly pertaining to sharing information and 
maintaining their position of influence within the process of setting the news media agenda. 
In the 2015 election campaign, elite actors to needed to grow their own networks or enact 
the ability to join groups to which they did not usually belong in order to successfully gain 
network power. News media agenda setting as a motive is an erroneous rationale for joining such 
online networks and communicating in those spaces; that is to say elites do not join those online 
networks for the same reasons that citizens do. Harnessing network power through the sharing of 
content was successful if the content was perceived as authentic, meeting the standards of 
communication outlined above, or unsuccessful if the content was perceived as inauthentic. 
Therefore I argue that this demonstrates the maintenance of hierarchy in power relations, and 
using social media network as a way to promote agendas was a means to this end; it is not true 
“network power”. The contribution of this finding to the field of study is that it provides a caveat 
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to our knowledge of the use of networks to exert power. On one hand, it categorically supports 
existing research which finds evidence of both intermedia relationships between social media and 
mainstream media and of elite actors producing content for social media. On the other hand, it 
provides a tempered approach which encourages us to consider the ways in which elite actors 
incorporate social media and UGC into existing campaign repertoires and reproduce established 
hierarchies. 
Although power relations functioned through a combination of hierarchy and network 
structures, elite actors held the expectation that through sharing online content they could direct 
citizen-users in their networks to promote their messages in a two-step flow protocol and gain 
greater control over the news agenda. However, social media are predominantly based upon one-
to-many and many-to-many communications and failing to authentically interact with users, or to 
appropriate or re-package information from users in order to strengthen frames, results in a weaker 
hold on power. I found evidence for this in the evaluation of the leaked memo news report. The 
Telegraph and the Labour Party failed to produce enough diverse content that met the required 
standards for authenticity of communication on social media sites. Combined with the volume of 
political information challenging The Telegraph’s agenda and with Sturgeon’s decisive early 
intervention on Twitter – itself an indicator of hierarchy in news sources –this particular news 
agenda item was challenged and replaced. 
The Telegraph was undoubtedly successful in placing this item on the news agenda, but 
it ultimately lost control of the story because it did not have any new information to release into 
the political information cycle. This finding has implications for research into agenda-building 
(see Kiousis et al., 2015; Parmalee, 2014) which considers the types of information subsidies 
which can create or challenges agendas. The Telegraph and the Labour Party’s response, simple 
repetition of the same information on social media, was an inauthentic way to act on a media 
platform which requires perceived spontaneity and immediacy in content. The Telegraph failed 
to do this, but the SNP and their supporters on social media were successful in doing so and so 
were able to shift the frame of the story. Agenda-building research discusses the role of different 
types of information subsidies in creating agendas. Parmalee (2015) shows that political tweets 
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play an important part of this process. The findings of this dissertation contributes to and extends 
this knowledge. I suggest that not only are a variety of information subsidies required to build a 
strong agenda, but the information contained within them should also vary and keep pace with 
the political information cycle. Immediacy and novelty, in this case, become important.  
Furthermore, my analysis of the leaked memorandum story extends the methods of some 
audience participation research, which has assessed intermedia agenda-setting through 
quantitative time-lag analyses, into qualitative realms. Jang et al.’s (2017) study on the correlation 
between the social media agenda of the ice bucket challenge agenda and the agenda in mainstream 
media found that “By reversing the direction of intermedia agenda-setting, the mainstream media 
may be able to rekindle a dying fire and offer a fresh perspective on the agenda.” (ibid.: 1304). I 
offer an extension of this approach in my qualitative analyses of the leaders’ debate and the leaked 
memo. Where Jang et al. (2017) found correlation between the social media agenda and the 
mainstream media agenda, my chapters analysing information flow through tracking information 
across platforms and incorporating discourse analysis demonstrate in more descriptive detail 
exactly how this relationship functioned to set the news media agenda. 
Secondly I asked (RQ2) how do traditional news media media producers and political 
parties attempt to successfully harness network power? This question links closely to the third 
research question, as the integration of newer and older media can often be seen as attempts to 
harness network power: (RQ3) how are social and digital media integrated into traditional news 
media’s output, and how does this impact their power relationships with political elites? The 
analysis of news stories and political information flows from the first leaders’ debate and the 
leaked memo news report provided evidence that a multitude of actions are taken by elites in the 
news media agenda setting process with the goal of controlling their message. Whilst I noted that 
the process remained dominated by hierarchical power relationships and established practices, I 
did find evidence that political and media elites utilise mixed media logics to produce content for 
online and offline platforms. The process itself is changeable; logics reconfigure as new 
information emerges and travels across different platforms. As a result, combining legacy and 
digital practices of content production and sharing was a key part of message control strategies, 
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and central to controlled interactivity. My elite informants believed that achieving this would 
allow them access to network power. 
Despite this belief the continuation of hierarchical power structures and legacy news 
practices was evident from my observations of the news teams at BBC Radio 4’s Today 
programme and ITV News’ Election 2015.  Despite some meshing of older and newer media 
logics in their creation, curation, and dissemination of content, traditional patterns continued to 
dominate. This may have been a result of the intensely stage-managed campaign run by the 
political parties, but neither of the programmes that were analysed diversified their content and 
used the affordances of newer media platforms in ways which would have increased their network 
power. 
These findings extend current knowledge of how media organisations use social media 
to control interaction with their audience and augment their own outputs. Jacobson’s (2013) 
research into the use of Facebook by the Rachel Maddow Show found that staff used the social 
networking site for two reasons. Firstly to “reinforce the importance of the story as an issue for 
its audience” and secondly “to frame the story” (Ibid.: 351). Maddow concludes by stating that 
“Further research is needed into how news organizations use social media to frame news stories” 
(Ibid.) This dissertation responds to Jacobson’s call for further research. It describes the way in 
which organizations promote the same information across platforms to harness multiple networks 
and to set the agenda. This dissertation contributes to this field of research by providing evidence 
that, among the organizations analysed, Facebook was used as a push medium to reinforcing the 
visibility of selected stories. This was the case at Today where Facebook was used to share 
specific content with the goal of attracting an audience to the ‘harder’ current affairs output. It 
also occurred on the pages of political parties, for example in the Conservative Party’s choice to 
reiterate ‘Cameron in charge’ across multiple media platforms, despite being unsuccessful.  
Successful attempts at harnessing networks included the SNP’s response to The 
Telegraph’s report of the leaked memo and the Conservative Party’s “coalition of chaos” 
narrative. Both of these involved the production of content using different media logics and 
practices, allowing for the exercise of power between political and media elites in a hierarchical 
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structure alongside harnessing network power on Twitter and Facebook. Network power is not 
negligible in this process. Its role can perhaps best be seen in failed attempts to activate networks. 
When elites produce online content which breaks the authenticity contract with citizens, their 
attempts at controlling interactivity instead appear as attempts to commodify citizens. This 
reduces citizens’ motivations to share messages amongst networks and hence the ability of elite 
actors to use network power. It can also lead to an increase in subversion of the message and 
greater challenges to attempts to set the news media agenda. 
Unsuccessful attempts at setting the news media agenda also make clear the necessity of 
creating content which uses both forms of power. The Conservative Party’s hashtag 
‘#cameronincharge’, following the leaders’ debate, showed how a failure of authentic 
communication on social media closes the doors to network power. UKIP’s failure to make an 
impact in the print and broadcast media despite strong support from citizen-users on Facebook, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, is evidence of the continuation of hierarchy in the production and 
sourcing of news. The case of UKIP in particular demonstrates the need for political actors to 
have an established relationship with journalists.  
This relationship can work inversely. My findings that UKIP’s supporters on Facebook 
did not limit their discussion to those issues on the traditional news media agenda extends a body 
of literature which finds that media coverage does not constrain how an online audience frames 
their discussion (Zhou and Moy, 2007). Farage was regularly featured in news media80, but the 
agenda that journalists chose to highlight regarding his comments about health tourism went 
against UKIP’s interests. This was in comparison to the many favourable comments made by 
citizen-users on Facebook. Therefore, in the 2015 election campaign successfully setting the 
social media agenda did not equate to setting the new media agenda. This finding contradicts 
work which suggests a positive correlation between social media agendas and mainstream media 
agendas. Again, this discrepancy can be explained by the different contexts within which many 
                                                          
80 This was especially the case after UKIP was designated a major party by OFCOM. 
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of the studies take place, namely everyday politics compared to a general election campaign. I 
reiterate a call for comparative research to further substantiate and test these outcomes. 
The importance of social media networks in the agenda-setting process was 
acknowledged by the journalists and political elites who participated in this research, but – as 
discussed above – a tension was found between understanding this fact and incorporating it into 
reporting or campaign strategies. At Today the editor and programme team recognised the 
potential for digital and social media to help them in the content creation and promotion but this 
recognition did not turn into action during the campaign. Instead, Today continued to exist within 
a hierarchical power structure where their main sources were traditional organizations such as 
parties, who – in keeping a great deal of control over their messages – were able to lead the news 
agenda most days. These findings provide support for existing work which explicates the 
integration and overlapping of mass media logic and social media logics, or network media logic 
(Klinger and Svensson, 2015). I offer a revision to this understanding: in the 2015 campaign, 
although elites attempted to harness network power by creating content that met social media 
communication standards or by using social media as a tool for newsgathering, this was only 
partially realised. Leading from this I suggest that by re-drawing boundaries across media 
platforms and creating more original content for digital which meets communication standards, 
news producers can better mobilise their networked audience to share their stories.  
 I also asked (RQ4) how were social media, including information sourced and 
as a sharing platform, incorporated into the news media agenda-setting process? The clearest 
answer to this is that social media provided elites with the ability to access network power. Social 
media was a key route to controlling interactivity. I applied and extended the work of Stromer-
Galley (2014) and Freelon (2017) to reach this finding. I contribute further empirical evidence 
which demonstrates forms of controlled interactivity, and also the successful application of this 
theory to agenda-setting. Both political and media elites attempted to harness network power in 
order to control their message on social media. This became more important when there were 
competing or contested agendas, as in the case of the leaders’ debate. As message control through 
the professional media becomes more difficult, message control on social media to activate a two-
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step flow process can increase the ability of an actor to retain control over the agenda setting 
space.  
Evidence for this is best seen in the combination of older and newer media logics which 
was used successfully by the SNP to share information across platforms and deny the allegations 
against Sturgeon in the leaked memo case. I discuss above the integration of mass media and 
social media logics as unsuccessful when only partially realised. However, evidence from the 
SNP’s interventions in this case show how they can be successfully integrated and provide a way 
to direct the news media agenda. Sturgeon was quick to issue a “categorical” denial of the 
allegations on Twitter, and this was followed by an official statement from an SNP spokesperson 
that repeated the wording of the original tweet. The SNP then engaged with professional media 
organisations, a strategy which included Sturgeon herself writing a comment piece in The 
Observer newspaper that was also published on The Guardian’s website and promoted on its 
social media accounts. This combination, wherein the party met communication standards on all 
platforms, activated their network of supporters to share their denials, and engaged with 
hierarchical structures to promote their framing of news reports, was successful in shifting the 
agenda in their favour. 
I argue that news production practices should be diversified and should incorporate a re-
drawing of boundaries. I found in my observations that journalists both at Today and at Election 
2015 were conscious of the need to do this and to increase their interaction with audiences on 
social media.  However, the extent to which this was achieved was insufficient for the 
programmes to access network power and hence to gain more control over the news media 
agenda-setting process. Election 2015 pre-defined its approach to social media as the sourcing of 
political information from content produced by social media users. This had a number of potential 
benefits for the programme, such as strengthening story-telling by incorporating information from 
a variety of sources, and strengthening the networked relationship with the audience. As described 
in Chapter 7, they were not successful in achieving this because the programmes incorporation of 
social media content was minimal. 
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Similarly, the editor of Today expressed a desire to produce specific content for digital 
which would both direct their audience to share their outputs and attract a larger number of 
listeners to the programme. Today did produce digital-specific content which met communication 
standards for Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. However, their approach was ad hoc. The social 
media strategy employed did not involve a consistent stream of content across these platforms, 
and input from listeners on social media was not encouraged not included in the programme. 
Furthermore, they did not use social media as a source of information – despite a recognition of 
this affordance made by the editor. Therefore boundary-drawing power was only partially 
achieved. For both programmes, the integration of newer and older media and practices was 
limited. 
The fifth and sixth questions I posed were: (RQ5) do citizen-users of social media play 
any role such as intervention in the information cycle, in the process of setting the agenda?; and 
(RQ6) Do citizen-users of social media replicate or challenge agendas? I found that non-elite 
users on social media did not make decisive interventions in the case studies analysed here. 
Instead, the role of social media users was to promote or challenge the agendas put forwards by 
elites. I found that the content created and shared by citizens on Twitter reflected elite outputs or 
stories already on the news media’s agenda. I did find evidence of non-elites subverting and 
challenging content produced by parties and journalists, but I did not find evidence of user-
generated content setting or changing the course of the agenda. This finding contradicts the 
conclusions of Chadwick (2011a). To reiterate, Chadwick’s analysis of ‘bullygate’ finds that  
 
The hybridized ways in which important political news events are now mediated 
presents new opportunities for nonelite actors to enter news production 
assemblages through timely interventions and sometimes direct, one-to-one, 
micro-level interactions with professional journalists. (Chadwick, 2011a: 19) 
 
I agree that individual actors can make interventions in the political information cycle, and so 
impact the news media agenda setting process. However, I found no evidence on non-elite actors 
actively intervening in news production in this way. My findings also mark a departure from the 
intermedia field of research which finds evidence of social media agendas leading mainstream 
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media agendas. I caveat this by acknowledging the different contexts of the studies and suggest 
that comparative research would be a useful avenue to pursue to clarify these discrepancies. My 
response to the question of intervention from social media users is markedly different to research 
on intermedia agenda setting during every day politics for this reason. I argue that some 
interventions on Twitter can change the course of the news agenda, but in the case studies 
analysed these were solely interventions from elite-users. 
A second role for social media users was that of news source for elites, albeit it either as 
supporting evidence for a story (in the form of vox populi) or in instances where social media 
discussion in general became a news story. On Election 2015, for example, I found that social 
media was used regularly in this way. Macro-level data was used to illustrate the news stories. 
This had the effect of allowing the programme to strengthen its own narratives and story-telling. 
Despite the beliefs stated by the team during planning discussions for the programme in which 
journalists expressed a desire to integrate social media content with the programme, during the 
broadcast social media was used as simply an additional source from which to add colour to the 
story or reinforce their news lines. I argue that the programme would have benefitted from 
harnessing a wider range of views from sources on social media in order to better understand what 
was happening as results were called, and for the potential to provide alternate viewpoints to help 
Election 2015 lead the news media agenda.  
  
8.3. Thesis contributions 
 
8.3.1 Authenticity and its relationship to commodification of citizen-users 
 
One of the most important original contributions to knowledge offered by my research is 
the conceptualisation of authenticity of communication on social media within this process, and 
how this relates to commodification of citizen-users’ content and actions. These were two factors 
which determined the success of news media agenda setting across a hybrid media system, due to 
their importance in harnessing network power. It is clear that political and media elites engaged 
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in actions to control the interactivity of citizens with their campaigns in the manner described by 
Stromer-Galley. I argue that media elites also attempt to control interactivity of audiences with 
their news gathering and reporting. I have focussed on the aspect of message control within 
controlled interactivity. Message control is central to news media agenda setting, and in a hybrid 
media system elites must find ways of enacting this across social media.  
The answer to this lies in elite actors becoming authentic actors within a network, thereby 
gaining access to network power in order to direct relevant information flows. To achieve this, 
the actor must be perceived as authentic by meeting the communication standards for the given 
social networking site. The defined standards are spontaneity, immediacy, and predictability. For 
example on Twitter communications should appear informal, timely, short, spontaneous, and 
relevant. Facebook posts can be longer, but the need for immediacy and spontaneity remains. 
There is an expectation of computer-mediated human interaction on both sites. Heise et al. (2014: 
417-418) found that “Users … expect journalists to get into conversation with their audience 
about current events to a greater extent than the journalists themselves feel professionally obliged 
to.” My dissertation therefore extends our knowledge in this area, providing empirical evidence 
of the disconnection between citizen and elite expectations on social media and how authenticity 
contributes to this. If an elite actor produces communications which are perceived as authentic by 
the audience then they are able to exercise network power, and strategies of controlled 
interactivity will be more successful as they are authentically a part of that network. 
The commodification of citizen-users’ content and actions which I demonstrate in this 
thesis is an extension of Stromer-Galley’s (2014) theory of controlled interactivity. It ties 
authenticity to communication and highlights how, if communications produced do not meet the 
required standards, then they will not maintain the authenticity illusion required for strategies of 
controlled interactivity. A breakdown in citizens’ perception of authenticity renders elite action 
commodification of citizen-users. A lack of authenticity within communications appears to 
encourage citizens to challenge or subvert the information shared by elites. This is because it 
reveals electioneering tactics and the attempts to harness citizens as cynical actions, rather than 
as a choice made by a citizen to share information. 
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8.3.2 A process marked by tensions 
 
Describing the process of news media agenda setting in the 2015 UK general election is 
a story of tensions that are so far only partially resolved, and which have not yet been fully 
identified and explained. The process necessarily contains both newer and older media practices, 
logics, and platforms which are often integrated but can be conflicting. There is a tension between 
the beliefs that journalists hold regarding integration of people and social media into news-making 
practices, and what is achieved in reality. Existing literature has noted these phenomena 
separately. This dissertation offers clarification around this discrepancy by drawing on empirical 
evidence from attitudinal data from in-depth interviews, and triangulating these findings with 
analysis of observations and communication outputs. This method enabled me to describe in detail 
the impact of this belief and elites’ related actions on the news media agenda-setting process.  
My work also contributes an extension to existing research, especially in the field of 
audience participation, which has been quantitative. I offer a qualitative dimension which adds a 
behavioural understanding to politicians’ and journalists’ decisions and actions. I found a further 
tension between the roles of the audience; audiences can simply be passive consumers, but they 
are also potential active allies or commodities, and sometimes they act as critics. Whilst these 
tensions have always existed, the growth of social media and its importance in the media ecology 
has thrown these tensions into sharp relief. This merits greater investigation of their impact on 
agenda setting processes, and is an area for future research. 
This dissertation has highlighted these tensions as an inherent part of the news media 
agenda setting process. They are unavoidable given the hybridisation of roles and capabilities in 
the media system. It is important to acknowledge that these tensions exist because of the need for 
combination of structures used in power relationships. Setting the news media agenda is no longer 
a straightforward process involving a limited group of powerful actors within a mass media 
system. This dissertation’s description and understanding of these tensions, particularly 
highlighted through observations of news teams and interviews with journalists, is crucial in 
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moving forwards our explanation of agenda setting. Understanding the different barriers in place 
to elites looking to set the agenda, and therefore how they overcome them, is crucial. 
 
8.3.3 Power in flux: an integration of network and hierarchy  
 
The most important of these tensions which have been identified is that which exists 
between the continued hierarchical power structures and network power drawn from citizen-users 
of, and the structure of, social media. This dissertation describes a news media agenda setting 
process that requires the ability to tap into network power and also to maintain a position within 
hierarchical power structures. This necessitates the production of content that suits older and 
newer media platforms, and also requires interaction with citizens to create salience around a 
news story through promotion in social networks.  
The findings of this dissertation provide support for findings in other research that 
journalists normalise the use of social media as a source in the same manner as legacy sources. 
They value the interaction of their audiences for providing content to use at the discretion of the 
editorial team. This is an easy way to gauge public opinion, and it creates a sense of loyalty 
between media organization and audience, a finding supported by Heise et al. (2014: 422): “From 
the perspective of journalists, audience participation is also an important means to increase viewer 
loyalty.”  However, my findings show that interaction often remains one-sided and insufficient. 
Media organizations retain power over their audience within a hierarchical structure, eliciting 
information from them where needed, using macro-level data to support their stories,81 and acting 
as a gatekeeper through the selection of user-generated content to share. 
This has the impact of rendering elite actions in networked spaces inauthentic. It is 
difficult to reconcile a position of hierarchical power with a position within a flatter networked 
system. Elements of controlled interactivity were required for the control of a message, alongside 
a two-step flow process in which audience members would share content with their own network. 
                                                          
81 For example journalists using Twitter to cite high-level demographic data, as occurred on Election 
2015. 
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However the tension between elite actors’ beliefs that they were authentically interacting with 
citizens, and their actions which demonstrate that they were not, impeded this process. For 
example, the Election 2015 programme team recognised the utility of integrating digital and 
legacy media logics and practices to tell a story effectively. However, the creation and 
dissemination of content was characterised by a continuation of traditional news-making 
practices, hierarchical power relationships, and selectively using social media to enhance their 
news agendas. This constituted commodification of citizen-users’ content and actions. 
The description of commodification is a key contribution to the field of study on 
campaign communications and agenda-setting. It explains why elites might be unsuccessful in 
their attempts to harness network power or direct information flow on social media, offering 
another side to the coin of (successful) controlled interactivity. Commodification is a testable 
phenomenon, and so can be taken forwards into future research. Additionally, it provides a clear 
lens through which we can analyse the attempted integration of network power into hierarchical 
structures as part of the process of setting the news media agenda. Therefore, this dissertation 
provides evidence of the dialectical nature of power in the news media agenda setting process, 
but also provides a conceptual lens for future research. 
 
8.4. Limitations of this dissertation 
 
There are some limitations to this study which should be highlighted. As with any case 
study based on observational insights the findings relate only to this context. However I have 
identified mechanisms that can apply generally to a wider context and can be examined in other 
election campaigns. As an account of elite interactions during an important general election 
campaign and how these impacted the agenda-setting process, statements can be made which can 
be applied more generally to political reporting. Additionally, as stand-alone accounts of Today 
and of Election 2015’s news-making processes and procedures, the dissertation provides a reliable 
insight into a legacy organisations’ attempts to adapt to a hybrid media system. 
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The sampling for the interview participants was mostly opportunistic. Although I 
identified and contacted suitable participants in the early stages of research, I received a low 
response rate. This led me to use a snowball sampling technique which inevitably resulted in a 
bias in the overall participant population. This population was not statistically representative of 
journalists, politicians, and staffers – most starkly it featured only one female journalist.  
However, considering the goal of understanding the rationale and belief behind elite actions I 
believe this method was suitable to achieve this and I am not concerned that this was so limiting 
as to render the findings invalid. 
The most limiting factor was in the collection of data from Facebook and Twitter. As a 
doctoral candidate I could not gain access to Facebook and Twitter data in the same way as 
scholars who may have more privileged access. This resulted in the risk of incomplete datasets 
and the potential to miss the most important or impactful tweets. To overcome this limitation, I 
built my research design not around content analysis of a large dataset but instead focussed on 
thick description of information flows, taking news media texts as my starting point and working 
in a multidirectional manner from them to identify any information mentioned which originated 
in another media text.  
 
8.5. An Agenda for Future Research 
 
When I submitted my PhD proposal I did not expect that there would be a second general election 
during the course of my research, let alone a referendum to decide the UK’s future in the European 
Union. Applying the findings from this dissertation to describe the process which occurred in 
2017 would be an excellent test of the direction in which the news media agenda setting process 
is developing. 
There were some marked differences between 2015 and 2017 that have already been 
noted. 2017 was even more tightly stage-managed than 2015, with the Labour Party banning 
whole groups of journalists from their campaign events and Theresa May making minimal un-
staged appearances. Did these changes mark a stronger shift back towards hierarchical power, or 
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did social media fill the void left by politicians? The UK 2017 General Election also saw a much 
more tangible and long-lasting version of #cameronincharge. The Conservative Party’s slogan 
“strong and stable” was used in all of their communications consistently, and was roundly mocked 
across different forms of media. What role did the challenge to this agenda item play in the 
Conservative Party’s bad election results? 
Questions around audience perceptions of authenticity also remain to be answered. 
Further research to understand why citizens decide to subvert an agenda on an individual-level is 
paramount to fully capturing their role in the agenda-setting process. Assessing how authenticity 
in election communications is perceived by citizens would strengthen the findings here and the 
authenticity characteristics and standards of communication could be characterised as testable 
variables in future projects.The findings of this research raise further questions such as: why did 
social media users decide not to share communications that were perceived as inauthentic? What 
aspects of a communication act make social media users more likely to engage with it? 
Additionally, commodification of citizen-users’ content and actions merits further investigation. 
As an extension to controlled interactivity, this concept – linked to authenticity – provides an 
understanding of why strategies to direct citizen-user engagement might be unsuccessful. The 
testing of this concept empirically alongside citizens’ recognition of authenticity would 
strengthen it further.  
Questions should also be asked around first- and second-level agenda-setting more 
broadly. If the process of setting the agenda has become so complex and volatile, what are the 
repercussions for issue transference from the media agenda to the public agenda? Research has 
established that intermedia agenda-setting and network agenda-setting takes place, but there is 
room to take this further. In spaces where audiences are fragmented and receive different 
information and perhaps multiple news agendas, what issues retain their salience? What does this 
mean for how different groups in society understand key issues? 
The overall recommendations that can be drawn from the findings and contributions of 
this dissertation are that any elite organization attempting to set the news media agenda in a hybrid 
media system must engage in a redrawing of platform boundaries. Across that they must engage 
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with their audience authentically to harness network power. That said, the process of setting the 
news media agenda is constantly in flux. The most common criteria for setting the news media 
agenda remains influence with the hierarchical relationship between politicians and journalists, 
but the influence of social media is growing. Elites must balance their hierarchical power 
structures and inter-elite competition with network power by interacting meaningfully with 
citizens not only to promote content but also as a source from which to challenges other agendas 
and frames.   
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Appendix A: Supporting information for 
Chapter 3 
A1. Example of letter sent to potential interview participants 
 
Department of Politics and International 
Relations 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
Egham 
Surrey 
TW20 0EX 
 
 
21 October 2014 
 
 
 
Dear Mr Chandler, 
 
I am a PhD candidate in the New Political Communication Unit at Royal Holloway, University of 
London. My thesis is supervised by Professor Andrew Chadwick and Professor Ben O’Loughlin 
and will analyse the news coverage of the 2015 UK general election. I am writing to ask if you 
would be willing to be interviewed as part of my research.  
 
I understand that you will play a pivotal role in ITV’s coverage of the UK election, and as such 
your opinions will help to inform my research by providing an “insider” look at the election 
campaign and the way in which it is reported. During the interview I would also like to explore 
your opinions and thoughts on the impact of new media tools on the news agenda, and upon 
the status of journalism as a profession. Your insights would offer an extremely important and 
useful perspective for my work. 
 
Before you agree to an interview, I can confirm that: 
 
 This research has been approved by the Royal Holloway College Ethics Committee; 
 The interview can be conducted on or off the record, dependent upon your choice. 
Should you choose to remain off the record your anonymity will be maintained at all 
times and no comments will be attributed to you by name in any written work or verbal 
presentation. Nor will any data be used from the interview that might identify you to a 
third party.  
 Should you request one, a list of questions will be available to you five working days 
before the interview; 
 You will be free to withdraw from the research at any point and for any reason, and to 
request that your transcript not be used; 
 I will write to you on completion of the research and a copy of my final research report 
will be made available to you upon request. 
 
I expect that the interview would take around 30-40 minutes and it will be recorded for 
transcription. I sincerely hope that you are able to help but if, for any reason, you are 
unavailable, I would be extremely grateful if you could suggest the names of one or two 
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colleagues who might be willing and able to speak to me. If you have any queries please don’t 
hesitate to contact me via email at amy.smith.2011@rhul.ac.uk or telephone on 07825769351.  
 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Amy P. Smith 
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A2: Example of an interview guide for a round 1 interview 
    
 Ms Amy P. Smith 
PhD Candidate 
Department of Politics and International 
Relations 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
Egham 
Surrey 
TW20 0EX 
 
 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. Please can you begin by outlining what your specific role is, and any involvement you 
think you will have in the 2015 UK general election. 
 
2. In your opinion, how has the rise of online media impacted upon your profession and 
upon news production? 
 
3. Thinking generally, how important are online tools and social media to (1) your 
organisation; and (2) to you within your current role? 
 
4. How do online and offline media mix, or otherwise, within your organisation? 
 
5. In your organisation, roughly how much of the content produced relies on both online 
and offline sources? 
 
6. In your organisation, roughly how much of the content produced is shared across online 
and offline sources? 
 
7. During the 2015 campaign, how important do you think online and social media will be 
to campaign coverage? 
 
8. Does your organisation encourage interaction with its audience? If so, how does it do 
this? 
 
9. How much attention do you/your organization pay to bloggers or amateur news sources 
available online? 
 
10. Does your organisation, in any way, rely upon citizens to create, or share, a story or news 
frame? How does it do this? E.g. are there any special online ‘members areas’ etc. 
 
11. How much attention do you/your organization pay to the online content produced by 
political parties, as opposed to their traditional outputs (press releases etc.)? 
 
12. How much influence do you think your organisation has in creating or challenging the 
news agenda or in promoting their own interpretation of a news story? 
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13. Thinking about the 2015 election campaign, can you imagine how your organisation will 
react to breaking news or statements by politicians? I.e. how will content be created 
and distributed to your readers? How might fact checking work in a faster news cycle? 
 
14. Thinking again about the election, how do you think your organization will engage with 
readers and share information? Will it change as we go through the different stages of 
the election? 
 
15. Do you think that groups (political parties and their staff, citizens, amateur journalists, 
bloggers etc.) will be more or less likely to have power over or impact a news story 
during the election campaign in 2015 than in previous elections? 
 
16. In your opinion, who would you say exercises the most power over the framing and 
promotion of political news stories (a) currently; (b) during an election campaign; and 
(c) immediately after an election? 
 
17. Can you think of any ways in which non-journalists can share news or challenge the 
power of professional journalists or politicians in promoting a news agenda? 
 
18. Will you pay attention to the international reporting of UK elections? 
 
19. How does your social media system work? What platforms are used (e.g. Twitter, 
Facebook, Instagram)? Is there a style guide or guidelines for using online or social 
media? 
 
20. In your opinion, when did/will the election campaign really begin? 
 
21. In your opinion, has power become more centralised (i.e. located in Westminster and 
the Government) in the UK, despite technological advances? 
 
22. How does having a fixed term limit for a government affect election coverage? 
 
23. What impact do you think TV debates will have, if they are held? 
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A3: Proposal document for participant-observation 
 
 
Department of Politics and International 
Relations 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
Egham 
Surrey 
TW20 0EX 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT-OBSERVATION PROPOSAL:  
AMY P. SMITH, PhD CANDIDATE 
 
1. What is participant-observation? 
 
Participant-observation is a form of qualitative social science research wherein the researcher 
spends time with the subject, and can take part in tasks within that group, in order to arrive at 
a deeper understanding of how the subject works and of the behaviour that occurs and the 
decisions that are taken. 
 
In this specific case, the researcher would act as a participant-observer in editorial meetings, or 
with the news team, and would witness the gathering of news and creation and broadcast of a 
news programme. 
 
2. Main aims of participant-observation 
 
 To provide the research with observed evidence to support or disprove its hypotheses. 
 To allow to researcher to view behaviour and decision-making as they happen within 
the news-making process, providing support for findings ascertained from interviews. 
 To give credibility to the research through observation of actions taken in the ‘real-
world,’ and hence to increase the validity and reliability of the research. 
 To enable the researcher to give as detailed an account as possible of news-gathering 
and production during the 2015 election campaign in a prominent media outlet. 
 
3. Logistics of participant-observation 
 
 The researcher envisages an ‘observer-as-participant’ role, whereby they principally 
observe what is happening, but are able and free to take on certain duties to help the 
teams where and when needed and/or appropriate.  
 It is proposed that the researcher takes on a low level of participation, if any, and this is 
to be discussed and mutually agreed with the Editor prior to the first observation taking 
place. 
 The researcher will use a tablet computer to take written, or record spoken, notes. The 
notes will be typed up as a full report and included as an appendix in the finished thesis. 
 Dates and times are to be pre-agreed with the programme Editor, but can be subject to 
change if necessary. 
 The researcher will visit the team on the following occasions:  
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4. How will the data be used? 
 
 All observations will be written up as a full record of the day; 
 Observations will form the basis of written work in the afore-mentioned thesis and may 
be published following successful completion of the doctorate or prior to this in the form 
of journal articles; 
 This research has been approved by the Royal Holloway College Ethics Committee; 
 The Editor may choose whether they and their team and programme remain 
anonymous in any or all published works; 
 Should the Editor choose to remain anonymous, this will be maintained at all times and 
no comments or observations will be attributed to you, your staff, or your programme 
Date To Visit Aim of visit 
January 2015 (Date 
TBC) 
Editorial team or whole 
team meeting. 
See decision-making and preparation in 
action and understand the aims and 
strategies of the editorial team. 
February  2015 
(Date TBC) 
See decision-making in action regarding 
content and strategy and understand 
the aims of the editorial team and 
journalists. Take note of progression 
since last observation. 
March 2015 (Date 
TBC) 
April 2015: Week 
Commencing 
06/04/15 (Date 
TBC) 
Editorial team or whole 
team meeting. 
See decision-making in action regarding 
content and strategy and understand 
the aims of the editorial team and 
journalists. Take note of progression 
since last observation. 
April 2015: Week 
Commencing 
13/04/15 (Date 
TBC) 
April 2015: Week 
Commencing 
20/04/15 (Date 
TBC) 
April 2015: Week 
Commencing 
27/04/15 (Date 
TBC) 
May 2015: Election 
Night (07/05/2015) 
Election night coverage 
Observe the broadcast of the election 
night programme and production of the 
live show on the night, including 
reports and strategies discussed in 
previous observations and their 
execution. 
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by name in any written work or verbal presentation. Nor will any data be used from the 
observation that might identify you to a third party; 
 The Editor will be free to withdraw from the research at any point and for any reason, 
and to request that any observations collected not be used; 
 The researcher will write to Editor on completion of the research and a copy of the final 
research report will be made available to you upon request. 
 
5. What are the benefits for the organization? 
 
As an academic studying news and journalism within new and online media, the researcher 
would be able to impartially observe and produce a report for the Editor on the effective practice 
of his or her team. Should this be requested, it would include an analysis of working practice, 
use of online media tools to best effect, and engagement with the programme’s audience 
through the prism of contemporary communications theory. It could also include an analysis of 
the programme’s output through online and social media and recommendations, if requested. 
 
6. Researcher’s contact details 
 
Name: Amy P. Smith 
Address: Department of Politics and International Relations 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
Egham 
TW20 0EX 
Email: amy.smith.2011@rhul.ac.uk 
Telephone: 07825 769 351 
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Appendix B: Supporting information for 
Chapter 4 
B1 List of sources from organizations’ websites organised by publication date 
and time 
 
Date Time Organization 
01-Apr-15 22:41 Sky News 
02-Apr-15 01:02 The Times 
02-Apr-15 01:03 The Times 
02-Apr-15 01:22 Sky News 
02-Apr-15 06:28 The Times 
02-Apr-15 06:30 The Telegraph 
02-Apr-15 08:00 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 08:46 The Guardian 
02-Apr-15 08:55 Huffington Post 
02-Apr-15 09:00 The Guardian 
02-Apr-15 09:39 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 09:58 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 10:15 Guido Fawkes 
02-Apr-15 10:31 The Guardian 
02-Apr-15 10:33 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 11:34 The Telegraph 
02-Apr-15 12:00 The Guardian 
02-Apr-15 12:00 The Telegraph 
02-Apr-15 12:18 BuzzFeed 
02-Apr-15 12:25 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 12:29 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 12:29 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 13:33 Huffington Post 
02-Apr-15 13:36 MailOnline 
02-Apr-15 13:52 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 14:11 Guido Fawkes 
02-Apr-15 15:48 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 17:25 BuzzFeed 
02-Apr-15 17:36 The Guardian 
02-Apr-15 18:17 The Telegraph 
02-Apr-15 19:50 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 20:05 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 21:12 Guido Fawkes 
02-Apr-15 21:30 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 22:15 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 22:19 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 22:22 ITV News 
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02-Apr-15 10:23 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 22:25 Guido Fawkes 
02-Apr-15 22:28 The Telegraph 
02-Apr-15 22:29 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 22:33 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 22:33 Channel 4 News 
02-Apr-15 22:41 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 22:48 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 22:56 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 22:58 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 23:04 The Telegraph 
02-Apr-15 23:22 BuzzFeed 
02-Apr-15 23:40 Sky News 
02-Apr-15 23:53 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 082 BBC News 
02-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
02-Apr-15 0 Channel 4 News 
02-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
02-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
02-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
02-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
02-Apr-15 0 The Green Party 
02-Apr-15 0 The Green Party 
02-Apr-15 0 The Sun 
02-Apr-15 0 The Sun 
03-Apr-15 00:20 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 00:25 Huffington Post 
03-Apr-15 01:05 The Times 
03-Apr-15 01:26 The Mirror 
03-Apr-15 01:34 ITV News 
03-Apr-15 01:52 MailOnline 
03-Apr-15 01:55 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 03:02 Sky News 
03-Apr-15 03:22 BuzzFeed 
03-Apr-15 03:36 BuzzFeed 
03-Apr-15 04:00 ITV News 
03-Apr-15 05:53 ITV News 
03-Apr-15 06:00 ITV News 
03-Apr-15 06:00 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 06:00 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 06:15 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 07:00 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 07:04 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 09:57 The Mirror 
                                                          
82 0 denotes that no publication time could be established 
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03-Apr-15 10:13 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 01:05 The Times 
03-Apr-15 10:34 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 10:48 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 11:21 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 11:50 Guido Fawkes 
03-Apr-15 12:24 The Mirror 
03-Apr-15 12:31 ITV News 
03-Apr-15 12:43 MailOnline 
03-Apr-15 13:31 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 13:37 ITV News 
03-Apr-15 13:50 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 14:23 BuzzFeed 
03-Apr-15 14:30 The Mirror 
03-Apr-15 14:35 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 14:54 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 15:17 Huffington Post 
03-Apr-15 15:42 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 16:23 MailOnline 
03-Apr-15 16:30 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 17:11 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 17:11 MailOnline 
03-Apr-15 17:32 Guido Fawkes 
03-Apr-15 18:16 ITV News 
03-Apr-15 18:23 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 18:29 MailOnline 
03-Apr-15 18:34 The Mirror 
03-Apr-15 18:40 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 18:42 MailOnline 
03-Apr-15 19:45 ITV News 
03-Apr-15 19:55 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 20:07 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 10:08 ITV News 
03-Apr-15 22:24 ITV News 
03-Apr-15 10:55 ITV News 
03-Apr-15 12:15 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
03-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
03-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
03-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
03-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
03-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
03-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
03-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
03-Apr-15 0 BBC News 
03-Apr-15 0 The Sun 
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03-Apr-15 0 The Sun 
03-Apr-15 0 UKIP 
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B2. Frequency of organizations’ websites in dataset 
 
Organization Frequency 
% 
(n=129) 
BBC 15 11.63 
BuzzFeed 6 4.65 
Channel 4 News 2 1.55 
The Green Party 2 1.55 
The Guardian 18 13.95 
Guido Fawkes 6 4.65 
Huffington Post 4 3.10 
ITV News 34 26.36 
MailOnline 7 5.43 
The Mirror 5 3.88 
Sky News 4 3.10 
The Sun 4 3.10 
The Telegraph 16 12.40 
The Times 5 3.88 
UKIP 1 0.78 
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B3. List of sources from organizations’ Facebook posts organised by publication 
date and time 
 
Date Time Organization 
01-Apr-15 22:02 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 07:53 Sky News 
02-Apr-15 07:58 LabourList 
02-Apr-15 08:20 The Telegraph 
02-Apr-15 11:10 BBC News 
02-Apr-15 11:20 The Telegraph 
02-Apr-15 13:07 UKIP 
02-Apr-15 13:52 BuzzFeed 
02-Apr-15 14:01 ITV News 
02-Apr-15 19:46 The Telegraph 
02-Apr-15 22:38 The Telegraph 
02-Apr-15 22:49 Sky News 
02-Apr-15 22:50 The Times 
02-Apr-15 22:58 The Green Party 
02-Apr-15 22:59 The Guardian 
02-Apr-15 23:27 BBC News 
02-Apr-15 23:40 The Daily Mail 
02-Apr-15 23:44 Channel 4 News 
02-Apr-15 23:55 Channel 4 News 
02-Apr-15 23:55 Conservatives 
03-Apr-15 00:13 LabourList 
03-Apr-15 03:22 
Liberal 
Democrats 
03-Apr-15 06:32 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 07:45 Huffington Post 
03-Apr-15 08:00 BuzzFeed 
03-Apr-15 08:02 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 08:32 The Daily Mail 
03-Apr-15 09:13 Labour 
03-Apr-15 11:31 Sky News 
03-Apr-15 13:00 The Guardian 
03-Apr-15 13:07 Guido Fawkes 
03-Apr-15 13:15 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 13:51 Conservatives 
03-Apr-15 14:38 BuzzFeed 
03-Apr-15 14:51 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 15:00 The Daily Mail 
03-Apr-15 15:04 Channel 4 News 
03-Apr-15 17:38 Guido Fawkes 
03-Apr-15 18:47 LabourList 
03-Apr-15 19:35 The Telegraph 
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03-Apr-15 20:50 The Telegraph 
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B4. Frequency of organizations’ Facebook posts in dataset 
 
 
Organization Frequency % (n=38) 
BBC 2 5.26 
BuzzFeed 2 5.26 
Channel 4 News 3 7.89 
Conservatives 1 2.63 
The Daily Mail 3 7.89 
The Green Party 1 2.63 
The Guardian 2 5.26 
Guido Fawkes 2 5.26 
Huffington Post 1 2.63 
ITV News 2 5.26 
Labour 1 2.63 
LabourList 3 7.89 
Liberal 
Democrats 1 2.63 
Sky News 3 7.89 
The Telegraph 9 23.68 
The Times 1 2.63 
UKIP 1 2.63 
 
  
326 
 
B5. List of sources from broadcast programmes organised by date and 
programme start time 
 
Date Time Programme 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
02-Apr-15 06:00 Good Morning Britain 
02-Apr-15 06:00 Good Morning Britain 
02-Apr-15 06:00 Good Morning Britain 
02-Apr-15 06:00 Good Morning Britain 
02-Apr-15 06:00 Good Morning Britain 
02-Apr-15 06:00 Good Morning Britain 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
02-Apr-15 13:00 BBC News at One 
02-Apr-15 13:00 BBC News at One 
02-Apr-15 13:00 BBC News at One 
02-Apr-15 13:30 ITV News and Weather 
02-Apr-15 13:30 ITV News and Weather 
02-Apr-15 18:00 BBC News at 6 
02-Apr-15 18:30 ITV Evening News 
02-Apr-15 18:30 ITV Evening News 
02-Apr-15 19:00 5 News Tonight 
02-Apr-15 19:00 Channel 4 News 
02-Apr-15 19:00 Channel 4 News 
02-Apr-15 19:00 Channel 4 News 
02-Apr-15 22:00 BBC News at 10 
02-Apr-15 22:00 BBC News at 10 
02-Apr-15 22:00 BBC News at 10 
02-Apr-15 22:00 ITV News at 10 
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02-Apr-15 23:00 Sky News at 11 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
02-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
03-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
03-Apr-15 13:00 BBC News at One 
03-Apr-15 13:30 ITV News and Weather 
03-Apr-15 17:00 5 News Tonight 
03-Apr-15 18:00 BBC News at 6 
03-Apr-15 18:30 ITV Evening News 
03-Apr-15 19:00 Channel 4 News 
03-Apr-15 19:00 Channel 4 News 
03-Apr-15 19:00 Sky News at 7 
03-Apr-15 22:00 Sky News at 10 
03-Apr-15 22:00 ITV News at 10 
03-Apr-15 22:00 BBC News at 10 
03-Apr-15 22:00 BBC News at 10 
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B6. Frequency of programme broadcast segments in dataset 
 
 
Organization Frequency 
% 
(n=81) 
5 News Tonight 2 2.47 
BBC Radio 4 Today 28 34.57 
BBC Breakfast 18 22.22 
BBC News at One 4 4.94 
BBC News at Six 2 2.47 
BBC News at Ten 5 6.17 
Channel 4 News 5 6.17 
Good Morning Britain 6 7.41 
ITV News and Weather 3 3.70 
ITV Evening News 3 3.70 
ITV News at Ten 2 2.47 
Sky News at 7 1 1.23 
Sky News at 10 1 1.23 
Sky News at 11 1 1.23 
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B7 Code book used for inductive qualitative content analysis of texts relating to 
the leaders’ debate 
The first leader’s debate (2 April 2015) 
Code Book – News Reports, Facebook Posts and Comments, and Broadcasts 
 
1. What media platform is this published on? 
 
1 News website (Any website that produces news, whether linked to a traditional media 
organisation or not) 
2 A post to Facebook 
3 Comments on a Facebook page 
4 Print newspaper 
5 Broadcast – radio 
6 Broadcast – television 
 
2. What organization/programme has published/broadcast the content? 
 
1 The Telegraph 
2 The Daily Mail 
3 ITV News 
4 The Times 
5 The Guardian 
6 LabourList 
7 Labour 
8 Huffington Post 
9 Sky News 
10 The Mirror 
11 BBC Radio 4 - Today 
12 Guido Fawkes 
13 BBC News 
14 BuzzFeed 
15 UKIP 
16 Channel 4 News [online] 
17 Green Party 
18 Conservative Party 
19 The Sun 
20 Liberal Democrats 
21 Good Morning Britain 
22 BBC Breakfast 
23 BBC News at One 
24 ITV News and Weather  
28 BBC News at 6 
31 ITV News at 6.30pm 
32 5 News Tonight 
33 Channel 4 News [broadcast] 
34 BBC News at 10 
35 ITV News at 10 
36 Sky News at 11 
37 Sky News at 7 
38 Sky News at 10 
 
2a. BROADCAST ONLY – What is the segment type? 
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1 News headline 
2 Extended news report 
3 Interview 
4 Feature 
 
2b. BROADCAST ONLY – Who appears in the broadcast? 
 
Which actors speak in the broadcast? Code for all persons speaking in separate columns, 2b1, 
2b2 etc. Populate spare cells with 0. 
 
1 Anchor/Presenter 
2 News reader [different to programme presenter] 
3 Reporter 
4 Political party candidate 
5 Member of the public 
6 An expert commenting on an issue (e.g. Paul Johnson of the IFS) 
7 Political party representative 
 
3. What is the publication/broadcast date of the content? 
 
Publication or broadcast date of the content in the format: DD-MMM-YY 
 
4. What is the publication/broadcast time of the content? 
 
Publication or broadcast time of the content in the format: HHMM 
 
This includes: the time of publication for articles or tweets; the start time of the broadcast or 
start time of the relevant segment; the time that the first comment was published on a Facebook 
post. For print media use 00:00. 
 
5. Which actors are mentioned in the content? 
 
Actors involved in the story or quoted as commenting on it in a news report. Name them in 
separate columns in the order they appear in the text (5.1, 5.2, 5.3 etc.) Populate spare cells with 
0. 
 
1 All party leaders/leaders in general 
2 ITV News 
3 David Cameron 
4 Ed Miliband 
5 Nick Clegg 
6 Nigel Farage 
7 Nicola Sturgeon 
8 Natalie Bennett 
9 Leanne Wood 
10 Sky News 
11 BBC 
12 Julie Etchingham 
13 Labour spokesperson(s) 
14 Viewer(s) 
15 Female leaders in general 
16 Liberal Democrat spokesperson(s) 
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17 Conservative Party spokesperson(s) 
18 UKIP spokesperson(s) 
19 Polling organisation(s) 
20 The Guardian 
21 Heckler (Victoria Prosser) 
22 Party ‘spin’ teams in general 
23 Gary Linekar 
24 Green Party local candidate 
25 Liberal Democrat local candidate 
26 Labour Party local candidate 
27 Conservative Party local candidate 
 
6. What is the prevalent tone towards these actors? 
 
1 Negative 
2 Neutral 
3 Positive 
0 No tone is discerned. 
 
7. What/who are the main subjects of the content? 
 
If there is more than one subject, list them in separate columns in the order they appear in the 
text (7.1, 7.2, 7.3 etc.) Populate spare cells with 0. 
 
1 General logistics of the debate 
2 Speculation on potential outcomes of the debate 
3 Liberal Democrat strategy 
4 Polls on the debate winners/losers 
5 Leader preparations in general 
6 Labour Party strategy 
7 UKIP strategy 
8 The news media coverage/newspaper coverage 
9 Nicola Sturgeon [general] 
10 Female party leaders 
11 Plaid Cymru strategy 
12 Julie Etchingham/the programme 
13 #Ratethedebate 
14 Spin room 
15 The social media response 
16 Winners/losers 
17 Farage’s HIV comments 
18 Cameron as winner 
19 Audience opinion 
20 A win for small parties 
21 General – debate round-up 
22 The heckler 
23 Ed Miliband – personal  
24 Cameron – bad performance 
25 Labour-SNP coalition 
26 Conservative agenda on Twitter 
27 Nick Clegg’s performance 
28 Coalition outcome 
29 Nigel Farage – good performance 
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30 Immigration 
31 NHS 
32 Austerity 
 
8. Is there a clear agenda in the article? 
 
1 Promoting the debate 
2 Neutral reporting – informing citizens 
3 Opinion polls are unhelpful 
4 David Cameron as an underdog 
5 Prediction – Ed Miliband will do well 
6 No – General debate build-up  
7 Nigel Farage as winner 
8 “Dangerous” Nicola Sturgeon 
9 Anti-Labour agenda 
10 Women – positive 
11 Cameron, Miliband, and Farage as winners 
12 Natalie Bennett as loser 
13 Anti-Farage agenda 
14 “Coalition of chaos”/Labour-SNP 
15 Conservatives “in control”/Cameron in charge 
16 Sturgeon – positive 
17 Small parties – positive 
18 Ed Miliband as a loser 
19 David Cameron as the winner 
20 Farage and race 
21 HIV comments – negative 
22 HIV comments – positive 
23 Farage – positive 
24 Coalition outcome 
 
9. Does it refer to any information from social media? 
 
0 No 
1 Yes 
 
10. If yes, who/what is the information sourced from? 
 
0 N/A 
1 Betting Company’s(ies) Twitter account 
2 Organisation’s/Journalist’s own social media account 
3 Citizen-users’ replying to organisation 
4 SNP staffer/candidate 
5 Twitter users in general 
6 Ed Miliband tweet 
7 Polling organisation tweet 
8 Other journalist(s) tweet 
9 Politician’s tweet 
10 Citizen-users’ tweet (non-reply) 
11 Political Party’s tweet 
12 Citizen-user’s vine 
13 Media organisation’s tweet 
14 Social media records organisation 
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15 Celebrity tweet 
16 Influential satire twitter account 
 
 
11. What is the role of the social media information? 
 
0 N/A 
1 Evidence for news story/support 
2 Original sourcing for news story 
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Appendix C: Supporting information for 
Chapter 5 
C1. List of sources from organizations’ websites organised by publication date 
and time 
 
 
Date Time Organization 
03-Apr-15 21:30 The Telegraph 
03-Apr-15 22:00 MailOnline 
03-Apr-15 22:00 MailOnline 
03-Apr-15 22:24 ITV News 
03-Apr-15 23:20 LabourList 
03-Apr-15 23:44 Huffington Post 
04-Apr-15 01:05 The Times 
04-Apr-15 00:17 The Telegraph 
04-Apr-15 00:17 The Telegraph 
04-Apr-15 01:28 Sky News 
04-Apr-15 07:53 ITV News 
04-Apr-15 08:41 The Mirror 
04-Apr-15 09:40 ITV News 
04-Apr-15 10:07 The Guardian 
04-Apr-15 10:10 ITV News 
04-Apr-15 01:21 The Times 
04-Apr-15 10:55 LabourList 
04-Apr-15 11:19 The Guardian 
04-Apr-15 11:41 ITV News 
04-Apr-15 12:18 ITV News 
04-Apr-15 12:35 Guido Fawkes 
04-Apr-15 13:42 ITV News 
04-Apr-15 13:51 ITV News 
04-Apr-15 14:00 The Telegraph 
04-Apr-15 14:13 The Telegraph 
04-Apr-15 14:31 LabourList 
04-Apr-15 16:41 The Telegraph 
04-Apr-15 17:16 MailOnline 
04-Apr-15 18:53 The Telegraph 
04-Apr-15 19:33 The Guardian 
04-Apr-15 20:46 The Guardian 
04-Apr-15 17:34 BuzzFeed 
04-Apr-15 0 UKIP 
04-Apr-15 0 Channel 4 News 
05-Apr-15 07:37 Sky News 
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05-Apr-15 13:29 The Times 
05-Apr-15 01:39 BuzzFeed 
07-Apr-15 01:01 The Times 
07-Apr-15 10:45 The Times 
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C2. Frequency of organizations’ websites in dataset 
 
 
Organization Frequency % (n= 39) 
BuzzFeed 2 5.13 
Channel 4 News 1 2.56 
The Guardian 4 10.26 
Guido Fawkes 1 2.56 
Huffington Post 1 2.56 
ITV News 8 20.51 
LabourList 3 7.69 
MailOnline 3 7.69 
The Mirror 1 2.56 
Sky News 2 5.13 
The Telegraph 7 17.95 
The Times 5 12.82 
UKIP 1 2.56 
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C3. List of sources from organizations’ Facebook posts organised by publication 
date and time 
 
 
Date Time Organization 
03-Apr-15 22:32 The Times 
03-Apr-15 22:32 The Times 
03-Apr-15 22:49 Labour 
03-Apr-15 23:20 LabourList 
04-Apr-15 06:55 The Telegraph 
04-Apr-15 07:00 Huffington Post 
04-Apr-15 06:55 The Telegraph 
04-Apr-15 07:25 Sky News 
04-Apr-15 09:40 The Daily Mail 
04-Apr-15 10:56 LabourList 
04-Apr-15 16:41 Huffington Post 
04-Apr-15 19:55 BBC News 
04-Apr-15 21:13 The Telegraph 
04-Apr-15 21:20 MailOnline 
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C4. Frequency of organizations’ Facebook posts in dataset 
 
 
Organization Frequency 
% 
(n=14) 
BBC News 1 7.14 
The Daily Mail 2 14.29 
Huffington Post 2 14.29 
Labour 1 7.14 
LabourList 2 14.29 
Sky News 1 7.14 
The Telegraph 3 21.43 
The Times 2 14.29 
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C5. List of sources from broadcast programmes organised by date and 
programme start time 
 
Date 
Start 
Time 
Programme 
04-Apr-15 07:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
04-Apr-15 07:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
04-Apr-15 07:00 BBC Radio 4 Today 
04-Apr-15 08:00 BBC Breakfast 
04-Apr-15 12:00 BBC Weekend News 
04-Apr-15 12:30 ITV News and Weather 
04-Apr-15 18:15 ITV News and Weather 
04-Apr-15 18:15 ITV News and Weather 
04-Apr-15 18:40 BBC Weekend News 
04-Apr-15 18:40 Channel 4 News 
04-Apr-15 18:40 Channel 4 News 
04-Apr-15 19:00 Sky News at 7 
04-Apr-15 22:00 Sky News at 10 
04-Apr-15 22:10 BBC Weekend News 
04-Apr-15 22:10 BBC Weekend News 
04-Apr-15 22:30 ITV News and Weather 
04-Apr-15 22:30 ITV News and Weather 
05-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
05-Apr-15 06:00 BBC Breakfast 
05-Apr-15 18:30 Channel 4 News 
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C6. Frequency of programme broadcast segments in dataset 
 
Programme Frequency 
% 
(n=19) 
BBC Breakfast 3 15.79 
BBC Radio 4 Today 3 15.79 
BBC Weekend News (lunchtime) 1 5.26 
BBC Weekend News (evening) 1 5.26 
BBC Weekend News (late evening) 2 10.53 
Channel 4 News 2 10.53 
ITV News and Weather (lunchtime) 1 5.26 
ITV News and Weather (evening) 2 10.53 
ITV News and Weather (late evening) 2 10.53 
Sky News at 7 1 5.26 
Sky News at 10 1 5.26 
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C7: Code book used for inductive qualitative content analysis of texts relating to 
the leaked memo 
 
Nicola Sturgeon and the “leaked memo” 
Code Book – News Reports, Facebook Posts, and broadcasts 
 
12. What media platform is this published on? 
 
1 News website (Any website that produces news, whether linked to a traditional media 
organisation or not) 
2 A post to Facebook 
3 Comments on a Facebook page 
4 Print newspaper 
5 Broadcast – radio 
6 Broadcast – television 
 
13. What organization/programme has published/broadcast the content? 
 
1 The Telegraph 
2 The Daily Mail 
3 ITV News 
4 The Times 
5 The Guardian 
6 LabourList 
7 Labour 
8 Huffington Post 
9 Sky News 
10 The Mirror 
11 BBC Radio 4 - Today 
12 Guido Fawkes 
13 BBC News 
14 BuzzFeed 
15 UKIP 
16 Channel 4 News [online] 
17 Green Party 
18 ConservativeHome 
19 The Sun 
20 Liberal Democrats 
21 Good Morning Britain 
22 BBC Breakfast 
23 BBC Weekend News 
24 ITV News and Weather  
28 Channel 4 News [broadcast] 
31 Sky News at 7 
32 Sky News at 10 
 
2a. BROADCAST ONLY – What is the segment type? 
 
1 News headline 
2 Extended news report 
3 Interview 
4 Feature 
342 
 
5 In depth discussion with the news reporter 
 
2b. BROADCAST ONLY – Who appears in the broadcast? 
 
Which actors speak in the broadcast? Code for all persons speaking in separate columns, 2b1, 
2b2 etc. Populate spare cells with 0. 
 
1 Anchor/Presenter 
2 News reader [different to programme presenter] 
3 Reporter 
4 Ed Miliband 
5 Conservative Party spokesperson 
6 Nicola Sturgeon 
7 Pierre-Alain Coffinier 
8 David Cameron 
9 Jim Murphy 
10 Member of the public 
11 Alastair Carmichael 
12 Labour Party spokesperson 
 
14. What is the publication/broadcast date of the content? 
 
Publication or broadcast date of the content in the format: DD-MMM-YY 
 
15. What is the publication/broadcast time of the content? 
 
Publication or broadcast time of the content in the format: HHMM 
 
This includes: the time of publication for articles or tweets; the start time of the broadcast or 
start time of the relevant segment; the time that the first comment was published on a Facebook 
post. For print media use 00:00. 
 
16. Which actors are mentioned in the content? 
 
Actors involved in the story or quoted as commenting on it in a news report. Name them in 
separate columns in the order they appear in the text (5.1, 5.2, 5.3 etc.) Populate spare cells with 
0. 
 
1 Nicola Sturgeon 
2 David Cameron 
3 Ed Miliband 
4 Jim Murphy 
5 Willie Rennie 
6 SNP Spokesperson 
7 Labour Party 
8 The SNP 
9 Sylvie Bermann (the French Ambassador) 
10 French Consul-General 
11 French Ambassador’s Spokesperson 
12 British Civil Servant 
13 The Scottish Government 
14 The UK Government 
15 The Scotsman 
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16 The Telegraph 
17 BBC 
18 The Daily Mail 
19 Simon Johnson (Telegraph Scottish Political Editor) 
20 Other 
21 The news media [referred to in general] 
22 Alastair Carmichael 
23 Sir Jeremy Heywood 
24 Conservative Party 
25 Foreign Office 
26 Natalie Bennett 
 
17. What is the prevalent tone towards these actors? 
 
1 Negative 
2 Neutral 
3 Positive 
0 No tone is discerned. 
 
18. What/who are the main subjects of the content? 
 
If there is more than one subject, list them in separate columns in the order they appear in the 
text (7.1, 7.2, 7.3 etc.) Populate spare cells with 0. 
 
1 The memorandum 
2 Nicola Sturgeon 
3 News media bias 
4 SNP/Sturgeon’s denial 
5 “Damning revelations” [Quote from the Labour Party] 
6 The inquiry 
7 Ed Miliband as Prime Minister material 
8 “Unholy alliance” [Quote from the Conservative Party] 
9 Coalition in general 
 
19. Is there a clear agenda in the article? 
 
1 Supportive of The Daily Telegraph/Is anti-Sturgeon or anti-SNP 
2 Neutral reporting – no clear agenda, unbiased (either offers no opinion or offers 
opinion on both sides) 
3 Supportive of the SNP/Critical of The Daily Telegraph or the original report 
4 Reflects the Labour Party’s response 
5 Nicola Sturgeon – as a liar/sneaky 
6 Promoting a Labour-SNP coalition  
 
20. Does it refer to, or include a screenshot of, Sturgeon’s original tweet denying the story? 
 
0 No 
1 Yes 
 
21. Does it refer to, or include a screenshot of, Simon Johnson’s (Telegraph journalist) 
original tweet disseminating the news story? 
 
0 No 
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1 Yes 
 
22. Does the article refer to any information from social media other than Sturgeon or 
Johnson’s first tweets? 
 
0 No 
1 Yes 
 
23. If yes, who/what is the information sourced from? 
 
1 Citizen 
2 Labour Party candidate or staff 
3 SNP Party candidate or staff 
4 Journalist 
5 Celebrity 
6 General social media discussion 
 
24. What is the role of the social media information? 
 
1 Evidence in support of The Telegraph’s news report 
2 Evidence against The Telegraph’s news report  
3 General extra information for the report 
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